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Abstract
In civil wars, innocent civilians live in the shadow of violence and destruction.
This can range from low-level violence to aggressive campaigns of shelling of urban
areas and massacres of entire villages in rural settings. In some cases, civilians respond to
this violence by fleeing from the conflict to find refuge in neighboring states; however, in
other civil wars, civilians remain trapped in the conflict zone, creating humanitarian
disasters. This dissertation argues that civilians will flee when they have a reasonable,
safe place to seek refuge, but in the absence of a safe place to seek sanctuary, civilians
have no choice to but to stay put. When civilians can flee from violence, this vents the
pressure from the conflict; however, if there is nowhere to run, civilians will not only
remain in the conflict zone, but will feed back into the conflict processes. Civilians are a
resource in civil wars that armed actors can leverage to extract resources, pull in
humanitarian aid, coopt to join the conflict, and otherwise sustain the continuation of the
fighting. If civilians are trapped and vulnerable in a conflict with high levels of violence
and have no paths to flight, they become easy pickings for armed actors, which in turn
fuels the conflict further; this creates what I call a pressure-cooker conflict state.
To test this theory, this project introduces original data on how states treat
refugees, and subsequently uses this data to create measures of the ability to flee—or
“exit quality.” I conduct empirical analyses using these new measures and find that, if
civilians are exposed to violence, civil wars that lack safe exit options tend to be bloodier
conflicts that flare quickly but also burn out sooner. This project shows, then, not only
that states surrounding civil wars can shape civilians’ choices to flee based on how they
treat refugees, but that this also in turn shapes the development of civil wars. Shutting off
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opportunities for civilians to escape from conflict is problematic not only because it
creates a humanitarian crisis, but also because it can change the course of the conflict.
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Chapter 1: The Theory of the Pressure Cooker Conflict State
Introduction
In the summer of 2014, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip and undertook a campaign
of heavy bombings and shelling in civilian-inhabited areas in an attempt to root out the
terrorist organization Hamas. Gaza resident and journalist Mohammed Omer described
the situation on the ground, where relentless attacks on civilian residences were wiping
out infrastructure and causing massive casualties:
The only power plant in Gaza is bombed. If that means something, it means,
according to officials, that we will have about one year of no electricity and no
light... Rafah crossing is closed. There is nowhere to hide. There is nowhere to
run to, unlike many places or war zones. The humanitarian crises are growing in
the Gaza strip... I believe that Israel, what they wanted to do is to make people
turn against the resistance. In fact, it's the other way around. You find people in
the street who say, “We do support resistance, because that's the only way to end
the occupation."1
The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip literally had no way out. Flight was impossible. While
scholars and policy-makers alike often assume that civilians can flee from conflict and
violence, this is simply not always the case. While the blockade of Gaza is an extreme
example, it is by no means an isolated event. Border closures, policies of arresting and

1

“Palestinian Journalist Mohammed Omer: Lifting the Blockade Isn’t a Hamas DemandIt’s a Human Right.” Democracynow.org. July 29 2014.
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detaining asylum-seekers, and abuses of refugee populations are as common as the wars
and violence that drive civilians to flee in the first place.
As Omer's testimony states, when civilians have nowhere to run or hide, but are
still exposed to high levels of violence and insecurity caused by conflict, they become
quite vulnerable. Vulnerable populations - those without resources or the means to secure
their own safety - become easy pickings for armed actors, either as targets, or as a base of
support. After all, in an insecure environment that offers no escape, armed groups - even
terrorists - can offer some measure of security. In these types of conflicts, in which
civilians are effectively trapped and cannot escape from indiscriminate violence, they will
thus be more likely to feed back into the conflict itself. These vulnerable civilians can be
an important resource for armed actors, and if they are stuck in a violent conflict state,
they can – willingly or not – become part of the base that fuels the fighting. This is what I
call the pressure-cooker conflict state.
Of course, the situation is rarely as black and white as this example suggests;
there is usually some way to flee from conflict. However, not all paths to flight are
created equal, and there is a continuum along which the availability and quality of exit
from conflict states can be measured.
In this chapter, I argue that restrictions on civilian flight from conflict states not
only impact if and where civilians will flee, but also shape the development of the
conflict itself. Specifically, if civilians are exposed to high levels of violence and
infrastructure damage but lack reasonable exit options, they will be trapped without
resources or security, and will thus be easily coopted by armed actors. This will provide a
population from which to extract and recruit, which should in turn fuel the conflict.

2

However, while I initially expected pressure-cookers to see longer and bloodier conflicts,
empirically, pressure-cookers have shorter and more intense conflicts. Where vulnerable
civilians are trapped and threatened by violence, they are more likely to feed back into
the conflict, driving conflicts that are more intense, but that also flare and burn out
sooner.
In this project, I therefore leverage original data on state policies and practices
towards refugees and asylum-seekers, in conjunction with the level of internal violence
and insecurity, to generate separate measures of exit quality - or the factors that “pull"
civilians from a conflict state - and violence, which should exert the pressure to “push"
civilians from a conflict state. This allows me to examine, in later chapters, how the
precise balance of the “push" and “pull" affects internal conflict dynamics. In short, I am
able to leverage these measures to determine whether armed actors in the state in question
are pushing people who are effectively trapped, and what this means not only in a
humanitarian sense, but also for the long-term development of the conflict.
This project should connect the literatures on the macro-level characteristics of
civil wars (Regan and Stam 2000, Regan 2002, Regan and Norton 2005, Collier et al.
2003), violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006, Lyall 2009, Condra and Shapiro 2012,
Wood 2010, Weinstein 2007, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004) and
displacement, in terms of the prediction of refugee flows (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and
Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006,
2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009), the effects of migration (Salehyan and Gleditsch
2006, Salehyan 2007), and the use of forced displacement as a strategy of conflict (Azam
and Hoeffler 2002, Steele 2009, 2011). At its core, the project is about the short and long-
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term internal characteristics of civil conflict: how long a conflict endures, how many
casualties accumulate over the course of a conflict, and how civilians can impact both of
these dynamics. However, building from the understanding of civilians as central to the
development of civil wars, I give new insights on how both external and internal actors
can shape these outcomes - intentionally or not - by restricting the ability of civilians to
exit from the conflict.
Background on Refugee Flight Restrictions
Observationally, it is clear that states do close borders to incoming refugees and
asylum seekers, or otherwise restrict their entry, fairly frequently. The refugee crisis in
Syria has garnered the most substantial amount of attention in recent years; the first wave
of media attention gathered some steam as bordering countries, such as Lebanon and
Jordan, opened and closed their borders to Syrian civilians fleeing the conflict. That
coverage paled in comparison to the avalanche of media attention to European states
closing their borders to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. However, despite what
seems to be a new conversation about the responsibility of sovereign states to take in
civilians fleeing conflict and persecution, these types of restrictions are neither new nor
unique.
In 1991, Turkey closed its border to the Iraqi Kurds fleeing from chemical
weapons attacks by Saddam Hussein (Long 2010, Haberman 1991). In 1999, Macedonia
left thousands of Albanian Kosovar refugees stranded when it closed its border with
Kosovo to refugee flight (Rohde 1999). Kenya has a lengthy history of closing its border
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to Somali refugees. 2 These are but a few extreme examples; many other states have
effectively closed borders to refugees, regularly abused refugees and asylum-seekers
within their territory, or jailed asylum-seekers purely for the crime of entering the state.
These all constitute violations of international law, specifically the United Nations
Convention of the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol. These documents
define a refugee as a person that:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 3
Over time, this definition has expanded to encompass any civilians that flee across
international borders due to fear for their lives or safety arising from violence and
conflict. It is explicitly forbidden to refuse entry to any civilians who meet these
standards, or to arbitrarily detain civilians who meet these standards for the crime of
entering the country. Sending back civilians who qualify for refugee status or asylum to a
country where they have reason to fear for their lives or safety - either at the border or
once they have entered the state - is called “refoulement" and is a clear violation of
international refugee law. 4 Nonetheless, it is quite common.

2

“Kenyans close border with Somalia." BBC News. January 3 2007. Mould, Hussein.;
"Kenya Violates Refugee Laws by Forcing Somali Refugees Back to Somalia." New
American. November 30, 2010.; Miriri, Duncan. “Kenya demands U.N. removes massive
Somali refugee camp." Reuters. April 11 2015.
3

UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1.
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The difference between asylum and refugee status is based on where the individual in
question is located when they ask for the state's protection: if the individual is already
5

Violations of this law are perhaps to be expected since it lacks a strong
enforcement mechanism but is costly to obey. Respecting the law, or allowing free entry
to all those fleeing for their lives or safety, requires taking on some amount of cost and
risk that should increase in direct proportion to the size of the incoming population.
However, while the violations are common enough, it is unclear what effects these
restrictions on flight from conflict states actually create. By the same token, physical and
geographic barriers to flight from states in civil war can have the same effect; mountains,
deserts, and oceans can all effectively make flight very risky or impossible. Yet again, it
may not be feasible to exit, leaving civilians stranded.
If it is harder to get out of the conflict state, will more civilians simply stay put
and die? Or, will civilians react differently to violence and insecurity if they are trapped?
Since civilians are an important resource for armed actors in civil war, this also opens up
another set of questions: Will armed actors be as likely to use displacement as a way to
consolidate territory? Or, will this change the kind of displacement strategies they use? It
certainly seems strange to expect that if displacement is a strategy or goal during conflict,
that restrictions on flight would not change the dynamics of conflict or the behavior of
belligerents (Steele 2011). Given the growing unwillingness of the international
community to shoulder the burden of refugees since the end of the Cold War, this is an
area well worth exploration:

within the state or at the border of the state where they request protection, they will
request asylum. Individuals who are already located in a state other than their home state
will request to be resettled as refugees in a third country. This definition can become
quite muddled, however, based on host-state legal policies and the granting of prima facie
refugee status to large conflict-induced migration flows. For the purposes of this chapter,
and the chapters that follow, the terms will be generally interchangeable.
6

Increasingly, however, the absence of alternatives is influencing the decision to
remain [internally] displaced. The growing inclination of the international
community is to prevent refugee flows and restrict refugee admissions. Although
the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is enshrined in international
human rights law, large numbers of persons are finding borders closed to them
(Cohen and Deng 1998, 29-30).
It is the effects of these policies, and equivalent barriers to civilian flight from civil
conflict, that I explore in this project. This is a valuable contribution in a number of areas.
Of course, improving on existing models of refugee flight is useful for its own sake, but I
also offer the empirical contribution of a disaggregated pair of measures of the “push"
and “pull" forces that shape civilian behavior in conflict. Using these measures, I aim to
bridge the literatures on migration and civil conflict dynamics through a study on how
restrictions to civilian flight shape the resources and behavior of armed actors. This also
has particular relevance to the sub-literature in civil conflict on violence against civilians,
as using violence against civilians coercively should have very different implications in
settings where they have no means of escape.
There are potential policy implications from this study, as it is largely policy that
shapes the availability and quality of flight from conflict. If it is the case that closing
international borders to refugee inflows from a neighboring state might actually create a
more violent and more destabilizing conflict, this might be a good reason for states to
reconsider their policies. Additionally, while it is normatively and morally unpalatable to
see states close their borders to civilians fleeing conflict, this has its limits in persuading
leaders to change policy. Demonstrating that there is a clear theoretical and empirical
basis for expecting that trapped and endangered civilians cause broader conflict-related
security issues may prove more convincing.

7

Existing Models of Civilian Flight
Most scholarly work on displacement from conflict can be grouped broadly into
three categories: studies predicting refugee and internally displaced person (IDP)
migration patterns (e.g. Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2006, Davenport, Moore
and Poe 2003, Bohra- Mishra and Massey 2011); studies of the impact of refugee
populations on host communities (Black 1994, Choi and Salehyan 2013, Jacobsen 2005,
Lischer 2005, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2007, Salehyan 2008); and studies
on the use of displacement as a strategic tool in conflict (Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Steele
2011, Uzonyi 2014). In this study, I aim to unite models of the factors that drive and
restrict refugee flight with theories of displacement’s effect on conflict dynamics. If
moving civilians is an important tactic for belligerents in civil conflict, then surely,
considering how restrictions on this flight shape conflict should offer valuable insights.
I will first discuss the traditional approach to modeling migration flows in
conflict; I will then explain how purposely disaggregating both the broad factors that
shape migration and the different types of migration that they create allows for a better
understanding of the relationship between civilian migration and civil conflict processes.
Models for Predicting Migration Flows
The existing literature on migration from conflict assumes that individuals have a
choice to either flee or to stay put, and attempts to evaluate how individuals make this
choice in response to the factors that push civilians to leave, and those that pull civilians
away from their homes. In the case of refugees, this will entail factors that “push" or
“pull" civilians outside of their home state; for the internally displaced, this will only
involve movement to a new destination within the home state. Common “push" factors
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include violence against civilians by the state, violence by rebels and/or dissidents, and
violence between rebels and the state (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006,
2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and
Kis-Katos 2009). This may be simply the level of violence, in terms of casualties, or it
might be the geographic scope of the violence (Melander and Oberg 2007). In a number
of studies, “push" factors are the only topic of investigation, particularly if the topic at
hand is the size of migration outflows, rather than their direction (see Moore and
Shellman 2004, Melander and Oberg 2006); this is based on the premise that civilians
who flee their homes first choose whether to flee, and then choose their destination
(Moore and Shellman 2006, 601). This is problematic because if an individual is making
the decision of whether or not to abandon their home and seek refuge elsewhere, the set
of available destinations must figure directly into this decision. If there are no options for
flight that are superior to the current situation, then the individual in question will not
flee. Separating push and pull into different stages of the decision-making process of the
individual civilian implies a very strong and seemingly unjustifiable set of assumptions in
this regard.
This then leads to the factors that “pull" individuals to flee, or in some
conceptions, determine the destination that an individual will choose. “Pull" factors in the
existing literature are usually confined to the same measures that are used to determine
quality of life and security in the home state: the level of democracy in neighboring
states, the wealth and wages in neighboring states, the presence of civil conflict in
neighboring states, and of course the human rights practices of neighboring states (Moore
and Shellman 2006, 2007). Additionally, networks available in potential host states
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through a prior diaspora from the state in question might facilitate easier flight, thus
acting as a “pull" factor (Schmeidl 1997, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Moore and
Shellman 2006, 2007). Of course, the closer a state, the greater the “pull"; the further a
potential host state is, the higher the costs to get there, which decreases the pull of
otherwise attractive destinations (Iqbal 2007). On its face, this is a reasonable approach;
civilians should prefer to go somewhere with superior government practices, security,
and economic opportunity, that is easier to reach. However, there are a couple of serious
problems with this general approach.
First, the stark problem: not all states allow refugee and asylum inflows. If the
goal is to model refugee migration patterns, this is an enormous omission from existing
models. Even outside of the most extreme example of a border closure, there is still a
great deal of room to restrict conflict-induced migrants from entering the state. While it is
easy to argue that the motivated migrant can cross a border illegally, this is not without
its own costs and risks; although asylum seekers should not be punished for illegally
entering the country per the terms of the UN Convention on Refugees, the simple fact is
that many states will throw all illegal migrants into jail, or immediately deport them,
regardless of their reason for seeking entry to the country. State policy towards the
immigration of refugees and asylum-seekers, then, should figure prominently in any
model of these migration flows. Migration to a particular state may actually not be an
available choice; if the state in question is the only neighboring state - or if all
neighboring states restrict refugee entry - then perhaps flight from the conflict state is not
actually within the set of choices available to an individual choosing whether to flee.
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This brings me to the second problem, which is perhaps more subtle but no less
important: how states treat their citizens and how they treat refugees and asylum-seekers
are often quite distinct. While previous studies expect that refugees and asylum-seekers
will go to states that have better civil rights and human rights practices broadly, this
makes the enormous and untenable assumption that refugees and asylum-seekers will
have access to these same rights and protections. This is simply not the case; asylumseekers and refugees do not generally have the same set of rights - or the same level of
protection for their rights - as native citizens. Therefore, to properly measure the “pull" of
outside states requires directly measuring how those states treat refugees and asylumseekers, not just how they treat their own citizens. Considering how states treat refugees
and asylum seekers - specifically, whether or not states grant them entry, and how they
are treated if they are able to enter the state - should allow for a stronger understanding of
not only the strength of the “pull" of outside destinations, but whether there is any pull at
all.
Models of the Ability to Flee
It is therefore possible that restrictions on flight from conflict by neighboring
states will shape the level of “pull" from these potential destinations, and in the extreme,
may rule out external flight entirely. The existing literature does show that it matters
whether people can flee in predicting migration; many models of both internal
displacement and refugee flight consider variables that might hinder or facilitate
individual ability to flee; this typically is measured in terms of economic wealth in IDP
models, or in models of refugee flight, the networks available through previous refugee
outflows (Okatmoto and Wilkes 2008) or the number of contiguous land borders that
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asylum-seekers can cross (Moore and Shellman 2006). Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003)
make the only mention of the possibility of migration policy restrictions impacting flight
patterns; specifically, they argue that autocracies should be more likely to restrict civilian
exit from the state, while democracies should be more likely to restrict entry (33). This
largely grows out of observable patterns during the Cold War; however, it is since the end
of the Cold War that refugee policies have changed appreciably, and over the past
twenty-five years, autocratic states figure just as prominently in the list of refoulement
offenders as democratic states. It is therefore very important to consider and measure the
impact of refugee and asylum policies directly.
Thus, the literature clearly says that barriers to flight matter, and I argue that
major barriers to flight have to this point been neglected. If, then, migration is not equally
available in all circumstances, then some civilians are unable or unwilling to flee. If they
cannot or will not flee from the state but are still exposed to the forces that impel flight,
this should have distinct implications for the nature of the civilian population left behind,
and how this population will shape the continued development of the conflict. Lacking
the means to vent a heavily victimized civilian population, this population will instead
remain within the conflict state, feeding back into the conflict and thereby creating
increasing pressure. This will manifest in destructive and unstable outcomes. For
example, Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) argue that if ethnic groups lack reasonable places
to flee as a refugee (as proxied by the present ethnic kin networks in neighboring states)
then they will instead choose to address their grievances through rebellion. Melander and
Oberg (2006) show that those with the lowest cost to flight will leave early in the
conflict, leaving behind an increasingly uniform population of those unable to flee - and
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perhaps those most vulnerable to the armed actors that have destabilized their state.
While Melander and Oberg (2006) lump IDPs and refugees into the aggregate category of
“forced migrants," disaggregating these types of flows allows for a more nuanced
understanding of how barriers to flight from the conflict state - either on the individual
level or at the country-level - shape conflict-induced migration.
Models for Disaggregating Migration Flows
The previous literature typically models flight exclusively in terms of refugee
flows (Moore and Shellman 2007), lumps IDPs and refugees together into the “forced
migrant" category (Melander and Oberg 2006), or studies micro-level internal
displacement within a single conflict (Adhikari 2012, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009, Steele
2009, 2011). There are specific reasons to study each of these, but I argue that to
understand how the availability of flight from violence shapes the development of the
conflict, refugee and IDP flows must be modeled as separate but substitutable outcomes
impelled by the same set of push factors. This follows Schmeidl's (2000) model, in which
she states “Refugees and IDPs flee from similar root causes rather than responding to
completely different occurrences" (152), and also follows the logic of Moore and
Shellman's (2006) article, which was the first to systematically study refugee flight and
internal displacement as substitutes.
If the ability to flee from the state is shaped by not only violence pushing civilians
out, but also by restrictions on flight by outside states, then some conflicts will have
higher levels of internal displacement simply because the option to become a refugee is
not feasible or not worth the cost of the journey. I will argue in subsequent sections that
IDPs and other victimized but stationary civilians have very different impacts on the
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conflict that created them than refugees, who are technically outside of the conflict once
they leave the state's borders. 5
This will have implications beyond predicting migration flows. Specifically,
given the importance of civilians to civil conflict, if victims of violence and insecurity
cannot leave the state despite high levels of violence to push them out, this population
will become volatile and vulnerable to targeting and manipulation by armed actors. This
will create a fertile base of recruits and supporters, a hostage population to bring in
resources through external humanitarian aid inflows, and will thus ultimately create
longer, bloodier conflicts and greater instability. This is the pressure-cooker conflict
state, subject to a positive-feedback cycle of violence by armed actors and increasing
civilian support for armed actors, which in turn fuels further conflict.
In the next section, I will build on existing individual-level decision models to
flee to build a more nuanced model of the availability of flight and its implications for
civilian behavior in conflict.
Theoretical Foundations: Exit Quality
Individuals in civil conflicts choose whether to flee from violence and insecurity
based on a rational decision calculus; they weigh their available choices and the expected
utility for each choice, then select the option that maximizes their expected payoffs. In
broad terms, the most basic choice available in migration studies is to either stay put or
flee. In this basic choice model, an individual civilian evaluates the risk to his or her life
and security posed by violence; this shapes the utility for staying put. As the level of

5

This is obviously not strictly true, but I will discuss this in greater detail later.
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violence and the threat to the civilian's life increases, the utility for staying put should
decrease proportionately. This shapes one side of the decision calculus, commonly
measured in terms of the “push" factors that drive flight out of civil conflict. Generally,
this means violence. In the broader terminology of the processes that drive and constrain
behavior, this would equate to the willingness to flee; greater violence, and a greater risk
to survival, means an increased willingness to pick up and leave one's home.
The expected utility of flight is shaped by factors specific to the expected benefits
and costs of flight itself. While the existing literature has considered the isolated effects
of push at great length and from varying perspectives, the effect of pull factors has
received comparatively little attention outside of limited dyadic studies of refugee flows
(Moore and Shellman 2007). I propose considering, rather than “pull" factors, the overall
quality of exit options, or exit quality. Exit quality is a function of the expected quality of
life in target destinations, less the costs of the journey to arrive at said destinations. There
are, then, a number of factors that shape exit quality for conflict-induced migrants that
seek asylum or refugee status across international borders: the treatment of refugees and
asylum-seekers in nearby states; the likelihood of gaining entry to nearby states;
geographic obstacles to potential asylum states including distance, oceans, mountains,
and deserts; the threat of violence en route to the destination; and of course the actual
costs of not only leaving behind property, possessions, and livelihood, but also of
financing the journey - a venture that frequently becomes prohibitively expensive due to
a combination of visa-related migration fees by potential host states and payments to
human smugglers in cases where flight is restricted. Thus, while violence drives the
willingness to flee, exit quality determines the opportunity to flee; following the original
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framework of opportunity and willingness articulated by Most and Starr (1989), I argue
that while the willingness to flee may vary enormously in direct relation to the level of
violence, this will only translate into actual refugee outflows if there is sufficient
opportunity to flee, or high enough exit quality.
Specifically, I argue that increased push or willingness to flee through violence
decreases the utility of staying put; thus, while it does not increase the absolute utility for
flight, decreasing the utility of staying put will of course make the other option - to flee relatively more attractive. That is, higher levels of violence against civilians will make
staying a much less palatable option; it does not change the expectation of the conditions
awaiting in the destination, nor does it change how difficult the journey to reach it will
be. Violence against civilians does not improve exit quality. It does, however, make the
flight option - difficult though it may be - relatively more attractive. If the level of
violence is low and generally confined to fighting between armed actors, civilians will be
unlikely to leave behind their homes and possessions to seek an uncertain life as a
refugee in a foreign country; however, once there is widespread violence against
civilians, the uncertain life abroad may be a better option than the certainty of imminent
death at home. Therefore, the willingness to flee should increase along with the levels of
violence and the probability of becoming a casualty.
This is perhaps easy to accept; after all, there is a consensus in the literature that
higher levels of violence, and more widespread violence, will unilaterally increase the
likelihood of flight (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport,
Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009).
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However, I propose that changes in exit quality - or the opportunity to flee - will also
shift the likelihood of flight, even as the level of violence stays constant. Thus, even if the
level of violence stays the same, a sudden decrease in exit quality will make staying put
relatively more attractive, and will therefore diminish flight. If the utility for flight, or exit
quality is high, it will only require low levels of violence to make flight the more
attractive option; however, if exit quality is low, even at high levels of violence, staying
put may remain the best choice. Indeed, on an individual level, given the high costs
sometimes entailed by flight, some individuals will never flee because they simply cannot
afford it; to expect increased violence to suddenly drive these people out would be
unrealistic. In the absence of any opportunity to flee from the conflict state, refugee
outflows will be observationally equivalent between high levels of violence and zero
violence; if people lack the opportunity to get out, then modeling outflows as a function
of willingness alone is highly problematic. Not only will it produce biased predictions of
migration, but also it will not accurately measure the true impact of violence on flight.
In short, the concepts described above can be grouped into the two main determinants of
civilian behavior in conflict, as shown below:
1. pull = opportunity to flee = exit quality
2. push = willingness to flee = violence
These combine to determine whether civilians flee or stay put, and whether the civilians
that stay put are likely to feed into the conflict processes or to continue with their lives
unimpeded.
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A contemporary illustration of this is in the comparison of Yemen and Syria, both of
which are experiencing civil wars with high levels of civilian-targeted violence, but have
starkly different levels of exit quality. A journalist on the ground in Yemen describes the
frequent indiscriminate shellings, which not only cause high levels of civilian casualties,
but also wreak havoc on infrastructure:
...despite the risks, many Yemenis “would rather die in their homes and suffer
with their families on their own land than live an undignified and abused life as a
refugee,'' Potter says...The war has led to a rise in malnutrition. And more than 8
million Yemenis currently lack access to basic health care. If this war had
happened elsewhere, it might have caused a refugee crisis like the one in Syria.
But unlike in Syria, where besieged families can flee to Turkey, Iraq, Jordan or
Lebanon, Yemenis often feel trapped.
To the north are the Rub’ al Khali desert and the closed borders of Saudi Arabia
and Oman. To the south are the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, across which lie
Djibouti and Somaliland (a breakaway region from Somalia). “Neither are very
hospitable to Yemeni refugees'', says Potter. Embassies from neighboring
countries have mostly closed in Sanaa. Yemenis who have left tend to be from
wealthy families, who can afford expensive air travel and endure complicated visa
requirements. 6
In Syria and Yemen, though there are comparable types and levels of violence against
civilians, driving similar willingness to flee, the difference in exit quality - or opportunity
- keeps Yemenis stationary, while Syrians surge outwards in search of refuge.
The use of push and pull factors is well established in the conflict migration
literature. However, it is new to explicitly think about the balance of these two. My
contribution is this: I argue that the precise balance of push and pull, of motivation and
opportunity, of violence and exit quality, will drive distinctly different civilian choices

“The Unthinkable: An ancient city plunges into darkness as a war on civilians rages."
NPR, August 21, 2015
6
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and leave behind a different civilian population. This population, in turn, will shape
different conflict dynamics.
The Interaction of Exit Quality and Internal Violence
I opened this chapter with the inquiry - what happens if states refuse to let in
refugees? Here, I argue that closing borders to refugee inflows - or restricting refugee
inflows broadly - will severely diminish exit quality for civilians in neighboring states. If
all the neighboring borders are closed, and there is effectively no opportunity to flee, then
flight from a conflict state should remain at zero. This does not, however, mean that the
violence that would otherwise impel them to leave will stop. This just means that these
civilians will be effectively trapped inside the conflict state, exposed to violence and
living in the remnants of infrastructure that survive campaigns of violence such as
indiscriminate shelling.
If a population has the opportunity to flee but lacks willingness, then refugee
flows should be at zero. If a population is willing to flee but lacks the opportunity to do
so, again, refugee flows will be at zero. These are extreme examples, but they illustrate
the importance of considering these as separate processes that shape migration. Perhaps
more importantly, in the case of the first situation - opportunity to flee but no willingness
- we should expect the civilian population to remain in their homes and communities,
productive and secure. This might characterize a conflict with very low levels of
violence, which is exclusively between the rebels and the state, in one very small part of
the state, far away from heavily populated areas. The second situation, however, will
have very different implications; where there is high willingness to flee from the conflict
state but little or no opportunity to do so, civilians will be more likely to be internally
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displaced, or to stay in their homes and communities while still exposed to violence and
infrastructure loss; these civilians will be less productive and quite vulnerable, leading
them to seek any available security from armed actors, even if it means joining the armed
actor in question.
To simplify the discussion above, I can break down the essential expectations for
the set of types of civil conflict states based on the combination of exposure to violence
and exit quality. This is by necessity a simplification into binary categories of high and
low violence and exit quality, respectively. In reality either of these should be ranged
along a continuum, with a corresponding set of continuous but constrained values for
each measure. However, for the sake of clarity, I reduce this to the most extreme cases of
willingness to flee and opportunity to do so. The table below shows the expected
outcomes for each combination.
As shown in Table 1, the latent level of exit quality only comes into play when
there is a high enough level of violence to push people to flee. That is, it does not matter
whether there is an opportunity to flee unless the individuals in question are actually
willing to uproot their lives. In the absence of violence - or when violence is only
exchanged between armed actors - there will simply be no push to flee. In that case, an
island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and a landlocked state surrounded by accessible,
high-quality neighbors will be observationally equivalent. Either will be characterized by
the third outcome, stasis, in which civilians should not change their behavior because
there is no motivation to do so. Therefore, refugee outflows should remain at or close to
zero, in the absence of the violence necessary to create genuine refugees.
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Table 1: Types of Civil Conflict States

High Violence
(High Push/Willingness)

High Exit Quality
(High Pull/Opportunity)

Low Exit Quality
(Low Pull/Opportunity)

Exodus

Pressure-Cooker

Low Violence
(Low Push/Willingness)

Stasis

However, as the top row of outcomes shows, the level of exit quality becomes
extremely important once violence escalates to levels that push civilians to flee abroad.
Once willingness reaches high levels, the observed outcome will depend on the latent exit
quality; where flight options are high-quality and easily accessible, I expect to observe
high volumes of refugee outflows resulting in the exodus outcome in Table 1 above. In
this case, as violence increases, the victimized population should vent into neighboring
states, draining this vulnerable group away from the reach and control of armed actors
and limiting their capacity to feed back into the conflict process. Theoretically, the scale
of violence in terms of casualties is itself inherently limited by outflows, which should
respond to this violence, decreasing the potential civilian targets and thereby limiting the
scale of casualties. Yet, again, if exit quality is low, the population will be trapped in an
increasingly violent and destructive environment, lacking any outlet to vent the pressured
civilian population. This leads to the pressure-cooker conflict state; this is the worst-case
scenario for limiting the intensity and destruction of conflict. Returning to the opening
example of the Israeli blockade and bombing of Gaza, Omer’s description of the
devastation on the ground paints a clear picture of a pressure-cooker conflict. It is then
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perhaps unsurprising that the civilians in Gaza would respond by increasing their support
for Hamas, given that this was their only available path towards survival.
To better illustrate the outcomes of the interactions of violence and exit quality, I
trace examples of the three types of civil conflicts: exodus, stasis, and pressure-cooker. I
begin by tracing all four combinations of conditions through the duration of the conflict
in Iraq (2003-present). I then give a brief description of stasis conflicts, and in-depth
descriptions of cases of exodus in Syria and pressure-cooker conflict in the Chechen
conflict.
Iraq: An Illustration of all Combinations of Exit Quality and Violence
The Iraqi conflict provides an excellent illustration of each of these outcomes over
the course of the war. Initially, when the conflict began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq
by the United States, neighboring states made an explicit effort to advertise that they
would not take in refugees. Iran announced that its border would be closed to any civilian
who tried to cross; the border with Kuwait was already walled off, a reminder of Iraq's
own past invasion of Kuwait. However, despite the expectation of a massive refugee
exodus on the part of neighboring states and the humanitarian community, none came.
The violence at this stage of the conflict was specifically targeted at the actual armies and
bypassed the civilians, who simply “hunkered down" in their homes, waiting for the
violence to end. This was a clear example of stasis, in which low exit quality did not
matter because there was no motivation or willingness to flee.
In the second stage of the Iraqi conflict (2004-2005), exit quality changed: when
the massive refugee outflows never appeared, neighboring states relaxed their policies
and the borders reopened. While these neighbors, like most Middle Eastern states, did not
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have explicit policies in place for refugees and asylum-seekers, they did generally allow
other Middle Eastern citizens to stay as “guests" in their countries. Violence did
gradually pick up during this stage as the insurgency against U.S.-led Coalition forces
began, but the bulk of this violence still bypassed uninvolved civilians. Yet again, though
exit quality was now markedly higher, almost no one left because there was no strong
push to make civilians willing to flee. Thus, the second stage remained in stasis, with
minimal outflows of refugees.
In the third stage (2006-2007), however, the level of violence escalated
dramatically. The beginning of the sectarian conflict following the al-Anbar awakening
left civilians extremely vulnerable to not only being caught in the crossfire between the
Iraqi insurgents and Coalition forces, but also to incredibly brutal sectarian violence
between Sunnis and Shias. During this stage, the exodus began from Iraq, sending
massive outflows of civilians seeking refuge into the neighboring states of Syria and
Jordan, with some outflows into Turkey and Iran, and a very limited number to Saudi
Arabia (Fagen 2007, 2009).
These massive outflows drove the onset of the fourth stage (2007-2009): in
reaction to high volumes of Iraqi refugees and a perceived increase in crime and terrorism
rooted in those communities, neighboring states began closing their borders in rapid
succession from 2006 through 2007 (Fagen 2007, 2009, Harper 2008, Hodson 2007). In
addition to these external border closures, governorates within Iraq began to seriously
restrict internal migration in an effort to limit the movement of insurgents and terrorists. 7
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Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC).
“Challenges of forced displacement within Iraq." 29 December 2008; Norwegian
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Further, most roads were largely impassable and unsafe due to the violence of armed
groups and criminal gangs. The humanitarian community was in agreement that there
were no viable internal exits to substitute for external exits. In this stage, the Iraqi conflict
entered the pressure-cooker state.
Violence has since dropped off and then dramatically increased in Iraq; there are
additional instances of entering into lulls of stasis and then again into exodus and
pressure-cooker following the invasion of ISIS.
Stasis: Low Violence Conflicts
There is very little of interest to say about civil conflicts characterized by lowlevel, localized violence in the context of flight. This is simply because if there is nothing
to push civilians to flee from conflict, then the quality of flight options does not come
into play; not only is there a theoretical "push" factor missing from the model, but
without evidence of violence or persecution, these civilians by definition cannot claim
asylum or refugee status abroad.
The odds of identifying a conflict that never flares up sufficiently to impel some
level of flight are vanishingly small; first and foremost, it is unlikely that this level of
violence would qualify as a civil conflict or civil war in most current datasets. Further,
Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). “Iraq: a
Displacement Crisis." 30 March 2007; Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal
Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). “Iraq: Sectarian Violence, Military
Operations Spark New Displacement, as Humanitarian Access Deteriorates. A Profile of
the Internal Displacement Situation." 23 May 2006. Though this may seem like it would
be ineffective, the governorates were responsible for distributing the food rations most
Iraqis relied upon for survival; without proper registration in the governorate, these
rations were not accessible.
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over the lifespan of a civil conflict, there will be moments characterized by a high level
of violence, but these may just be punctuation to long periods in which violence
decreases to the point of almost disappearing, subject only to the occasional flare-ups that
signal that to some degree, the conflict lingers on. Many civil war scholars would also
rightfully argue that the level of violence will vary greatly within a civil conflict state,
leaving some areas free of violence, while others are subject to high levels of violence
and destruction. I will delve into these distinctions in later chapters; in the meantime, it is
worthwhile to think of whether the conflict is generally characterized by low levels of
civilian exposure to violence.
Thus, it is more appropriate to consider periods of time in civil conflicts in which
violence is at low levels, infrastructure damage is minimal, the location of fighting is
confined to small and remote areas, and violence is restricted primarily to fighting
between armed rebels and the state military. In these circumstances, there will be little
civilian involvement, and the impact of the continued conflict will be small enough to
exert little to no "push" on civilians to flee the area.
Again, these types of conflict are of little interest for this study, because they are
by definition observationally equivalent between high and low exit states. The latent
quality of flight options remains latent, and the conflict exerts no push for change in
civilian behavior.
The Syrian Civil War: Exodus
The Syrian conflict is a classic case of exodus; neighboring states largely opened
their borders, the international community provided high levels of aid, and Syrians
pursued all available paths out of the state. As shown in Table 1, this conflict had a
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combination of high exit quality and high violence against civilians, driving massive
civilian flight from the conflict state, or exodus. As one recent news article described:
“‘Everyone I know is leaving,” said Mohammed, 30, who climbed three mountains to
make his way across the Turkish border from the city of Aleppo with his pregnant wife…
‘It is as though all of Syria is emptying.'" 8
Following a brutal government crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 2011, the
opposition solidified into an armed rebellion. The Assad regime responded with a largescale, indiscriminate campaign of violence, most of which has been borne by civilians.
The civilian-directed violence in Syria is on a massive scale and is largely inescapable.
This included the use of chemical weapons against civilians in residential areas. 9 Regime
forces have systematically dropped barrel bombs on civilian-inhabited areas, as one
resident of Palmyra described: “Everybody can see it, but they don't know where it is
going to be dropped [or if] it’s going to hit them, or their neighbors...They simply wait to
see whether they will die.” 10 This tactic alone has drastically increased the willingness of
civilians to flee:
Beyond killing civilians, barrel bombs are playing a big part in forcing Syrians
from their country. In most wars, civilians can find a modicum of safety by
moving away from the front lines. But Mr. Assad's indiscriminate use of barrel
bombs deep in opposition-held territory means that for many there is no safe place
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to hide. That ugly reality has played a major part in persuading four million
people to flee the country. 11
The Syrian refugee crisis has become a focal point in the international
humanitarian community and media; the effects of this scale of refugee outflows have
gone well beyond neighboring states in the Middle East and changed border and
migration policies in the European Union as well. Four million refugees is a definitive
exodus, and shows that clearly exit quality was high enough to permit flight given the
willingness of civilians to flee. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey have together
taken in well over 4 million Syrian refugees.12 Of course, this does not mean that exit is
available equally across the population or over time; some people cannot afford to flee;
some are trapped in sieged cities; some borders have opened and closed periodically over
time. However, the macro-level balance of exit quality and violence has resulted in the
expected outcome of a massive drain of the civilian population out of the conflict state.
The Syrian conflict displays another characteristics of exodus civil conflicts: over
time, exit quality degrades. The massive outflows of Syrian refugees squeezed out the
available aid resources of the international humanitarian community.13 Eventually, if
large numbers of refugees flee, they will eventually wear out the welcome in their host
states and cause a severe dip in the level of exit quality.
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The Second Chechen Conflict: Illustrating the Pressure-Cooker
The Second Chechen Conflict (1999-2009) is a strong example of a pressurecooker conflict state; it was a scorched-earth campaign by the Russian state against a
separatist Islamic rebellion, characterized by not only extremely high levels of civilian
casualties and infrastructure damage, but also by the Russian state's intentional blockade
of most exit corridors for Chechen civilians. Thus, to revisit Table 1, the Chechen
conflict was a combination of low exit quality and high violence against civilians,
creating the outcome of a pressure-cooker conflict. While its immediate effects were
generally confined to the republic of Chechnya and the surrounding area of the North
Caucasus and encompassed only a small portion of the Russian state, the geographic
constraints imposed by the Russian government ensured that within its borders, Chechnya
fit this typology quite well.
The second Chechen conflict is not a perfect example of this type of conflict
because there was one exit path available to civilians, albeit unevenly over time and
across the space of the republic of Chechnya. The ideal case would, of course, have exits
entirely blocked; this is a rare thing to find in the world, with possible exceptions
including the blockade of Gaza in 2014 that opened this chapter. The neighboring
republic of Ingushetia did shelter hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians who fled
the violence and destruction of the conflict, which relieved some of the pressure pushing
these people out (Nichols 2000, 248). However, it remains an excellent illustration of the
types of barriers that incumbents can construct to deter not only flight abroad, but also
flight within the state. Additionally, while the exit was available at times, this had its
limits; not only was it unevenly accessible, but it was also an extremely low-quality exit.
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The fact that anyone chose to take it speaks to the strength of the forces pushing them
out, and the extremely high willingness to flee. Nonetheless, not everyone could flee, and
the low quality of life in Ingushetia for the internally displaced, along with the
devastation wrought in Chechnya itself, made for a fertile base of recruits and supporters
to fuel the conflict.
Background
This conflict followed a long history of displacement and violence with the
Russian state or the USSR, depending on the timing of the incident in question; most
prominently this included Stalin's forced deportation of the entire Chechen population in
1944 to Siberia and Central Asia (Nichols 2000, 243). After Stalin's death and the official
permission to return, most of the survivors did return to Chechnya (243). The tiny
republic again came into conflict with the Russian state following the breakup of the
Soviet Union, in which it declared its independence; this resulted in the first Chechen
war, which lasted from 1994-1996. In this round of conflict, Chechnya defeated Russian
forces, although at great cost in Chechen civilian lives and infrastructure: “The war had
left Chechnya devastated‚ with much housing and nearly all infrastructure destroyed and
much farmland mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245).
A power vacuum emerged in Chechnya following the departure of Russian troops,
and criminality and violence thrived in the ruined economy that the first conflict left
behind (Holland 2004, 335). In this environment, a militant Islamism took root, which
resulted in a renewed conflict with the Russian state in 1999 as a result of Chechen
rebels' invasion of the neighboring republic of Dagestan. This was part of a greater effort
to create an Islamic state in the entirety of the North Caucasus region (US embassy cables
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2010). When a series of terrorist bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow killed over
200 civilians, Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, blamed Chechen terrorists
and launched a scorched earth campaign against Chechnya and all of its inhabitants,
lumping civilians in with rebels (Holland 2004, 335). 14 This was supposed to be a "quick
anti-terrorist operation" but became a war that only saw operations officially cease a
decade later in 2009, and which continues to fuel terrorist and insurgent activity to the
present day.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the first and
second Chechen wars together displaced more than 800,000 people (2013). The second
conflict alone displaced over 300,000 (Gilligan 2010, 2). The bulk of this movement was
to the neighboring republics in the Caucasus, primarily that of Ingushetia. Estimates of
civilian deaths from 1994 on vary widely, but a conservative estimate runs from 65,000
to 75,000 (Gilligan 2010, 3).
Violence and Destruction in Chechnya: the Push to Flee
The violence and infrastructure damage of the second Chechen War are almost
unparalleled in contemporary warfare:
The military engagement that began in 1999 led to five months of indiscriminate
bombing and caused thousands of civilian deaths. By March 2000, Russian troops
had some control over most of Chechnya. Since 2000, violence has continued as
Russian forces attempt to crush the opposing guerrillas, carrying out extra-judicial
and summary executions, forced `disappearances', exploitation of paramilitary
forces, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, rape, attacks and assassinations of
civilians and virtually complete impunity for the perpetrators of such human
rights abuses (Holland 2004, 335).
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All violence by Russian troops in Chechnya was by very definition indiscriminate,
because every Chechen male over the age of ten was officially considered a terrorist, and
by the same token, any person residing in Chechnya after the start of the 1999 invasion
was similarly considered to be a member of the separatist rebels (Nichols 2000, 242).
While Chechen rebels accounted for a much smaller portion of the violence and primarily
targeted ethnic Russians or supporters of the pro-Russian regime, they also contributed to
the dangers for civilians in Chechnya (Holland 2004, 335). Estimates of the total civilian
casualties over the first and second Chechen conflict are, at the conservative end, 65,000
to 75,000 for the period up to 2005 (Gilligan 2010, 3).
While in the first conflict the fighting was confined to specific areas of Chechnya,
making it feasible for civilians outside of these areas to safety stay put, this was not the
case in the Second Chechen War. A displaced Chechen described this: “During the first
war, we lived north of Grozny. At that time it was still possible to stay in Chechnya,
which is no longer the case. We can neither hide nor defend ourselves" (Gilligan 2010,
36). The scope of the fighting and the violence encompassed the entirety of the region,
making it impossible for civilians to find refuge in rural areas and forcing them to seek it
outside of Chechnya, if at all.
As a Chechen civilian who had fled to Ingushetia stated in 2002, “It's become too
dangerous to stay in Chechnya. One day can be quiet, the next day shooting and shelling
break out all around. The Russians are constantly making security sweeps, and taking
men away. We just couldn't bear it anymore." 15
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In addition to the casualties directly caused by indiscriminate bombing and
security sweeps, this campaign decimated what remained of Chechnya's infrastructure
from the first conflict. As Johanna Nichols described:
Even more than the 1994-96 war, the one that began in September 1999 is notable
for its brutality towards civilians and its levels of destruction. The capital city of
Grozny, formerly home to about 400,000 people, suffered unprecedented levels of
destruction in 1994-96 and has been almost entirely reduced to rubble in the
present war; this must be the greatest level of destruction ever visited on any
urban area in any non-nuclear war" (2000, 246).
Nearly every ethnic Chechen who lived in Chechnya before the war has now been
economically ruined. The bombardment of towns, cities, and villages has been
massive and continuous, and the degree of destruction of Grozny‚ probably
unparalleled in non-atomic warfare. The conflict has destroyed urban and rural
infrastructure. Farmland and pasture has been ruined by bombing, mining, and
bombing of oil refineries, waste dumps, and other toxic sources (2000, 250).
Another Chechen IDP gave a similar account of the situation in 2002: “It was just
impossible to stay there. If you have any food, Russian soldiers will steal it. There is no
school, no electricity, no water. Most of all there is no safety‚ Russian soldiers seize our
men in the security sweeps, beat them and rob them. Sometimes they disappear
forever.”16 Attempts to convince Chechen IDPs to return home began as early as 2002 as
part of an attempt to convey that the insurgency was defeated, but these met with fierce
resistance amongst the displaced who understood the reality of the situation on the
ground. Not only was there concern regarding the violence perpetrated by Russian forces,
but also the criminal gangs that had flourished in the anarchic conditions in Chechnya.
Vera Daudova, also a Chechen IDP, explained this in 2004: “I know that the majority of
people do not want to go back to Chechnya. They are afraid to go back because there is
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no security there. At any time, somebody might intrude into their homes. It doesn't matter
who the intruder is. Nobody knows. All these people are in camouflage. People are
disappearing in [Chechnya]." 17
In the end, some might conclude that Putin's scorched earth campaign was brutal
but effective; Russian troops were able to largely subdue the insurgency, recapture the
bulk of the Chechen territory, and eventually to funnel massive funding into Chechnya to
rebuild the cities and villages it had destroyed (though much of this was lost to the
corruption endemic to the pro-Moscow regime, leaving unemployment and poverty at
dangerous levels).18 However, the damage done to Chechnya, both in terms of the
practical loss of infrastructure and economic opportunities, and the emotional damage
wrought by murdering much of the population and displacing and impoverishing the
remainder, has left behind a legacy that continues to fuel insurgent and terrorist activities,
long after operations were officially concluded in the Caucasus. Indeed, the extremist
Islamic insurgency that took root in the devastation of the Chechen wars is still thriving
under the guise of the Caucasus Emirate, and not only has it continued to conduct
operations within Chechnya and across the wider Russian Federation, but it has also
produced a substantial number of the most feared foreign fighters in the Islamic State. 19
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Nearly 2,000 of the Islamic State's foreign fighters originated in the Caucasus, making
Russia the fourth-largest contributor of such forces.20
Clearly, the combination of direct, on-the-ground violence during security
sweeps, randomized shelling of Chechen cities and villages, and the utter destruction left
behind meant that there was an extremely high willingness to flee. There was no real cost
to abandoning a home that had already been razed to the ground and that lacked any
electricity or clean water already, particularly when any means of securing a livelihood
was likely long gone at that point in any case. Russian forces all effectively wiped out
medical care, food, clean water, and shelter. Criminal gangs abducted Chechen civilians
to secure ransoms, while Russian forces abducted males over the age of eleven into
"filtration camps," where they were tortured, executed, or occasionally ransomed back to
their families (Nichols 2000, 246). It is difficult to conceive of how much more could be
done to push civilians out, short of actually using nuclear weapons.
The Pull to Flee from Chechnya
However, the opportunity to flee was severely limited. Flight abroad was almost
entirely inaccessible; Russia began the conflict by blockading Chechnya and Ingushetia's
borders, so while a few thousand were able to make it across the border early in the
conflict, the rest were only able to move within Russia, and then only to Ingushetia
(Nichols 2000, 246). Russia stopped permitting Chechens to apply for international
passports, and Chechens were generally not permitted to move elsewhere within the
Russian Federation; a system of checkpoints, both at the borders of the republic and
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within Chechnya itself, meant that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
Chechen civilians to evade these restrictions:
The border blockade means that buses and cars must pass through a checkpoint
with strict passport control, and in general people can pass these checkpoints only
if they have a residence permit for their intended destination. There are similar
internal checkpoints along highways and major roads in Chechnya (12 of them,
for instance, along the 25-mile stretch of highway from Gudermes to the border
checkpoint at Ingushetia). Each of these too involves possible harassment,
solicitation for bribes, and/or detention (Nichols 2000, 247).
Later in the conflict (primarily from 2003 onwards), the plight of the internally
displaced worsened dramatically and return to Chechnya remained unsafe, so thousands
of Chechens managed to make their way to Europe through Belarus or Ukraine. Though
some Western European states - notably Austria - did grant asylum and assistance to
Chechen refugees, those more proximate to Russia, including Poland, Slovakia, and
Ukraine, routinely refused asylum and deported asylum-seekers back to Russia (Gilligan
2010, 119). Thus, while some Chechens did eventually find their way out of the country,
refuge abroad was largely inaccessible and highly uncertain, even after the worst of the
conflict had passed.
Attempting to flee elsewhere within the Russian Federation was also problematic
beyond official restrictions on leaving Chechnya itself; the racism against Chechens,
which had always been present throughout the state, became pronouncedly worse when
the conflict began.
Although Chechens have long encountered racial discrimination and harassment
in Russia, since the resumption of armed conflict in 1999, racial discrimination
has evolved into a state-sponsored, large-scale coordinated campaign. During
2000, federal and local law enforcement agencies, by their actions, demonstrated
their intention to make living conditions for Chechens in the Russian Federation
outside Chechnya unbearable. This discrimination has taken several forms:
forcible evictions from residences; arbitrary identity checks, forcible entrance into
premises, searches, detention and beatings; fabrication of criminal accusations;
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refusal to grant the status of 'forced migrant'; denial of the right to employment,
health care and education; and refused to grant sojourn or residence registration in
many Russian regions. Government actions betray a strategy to keep Chechens in
Chechnya’ (Holland 2004, 337).
This made exit elsewhere within Russia an extremely low-quality option, and in any case,
a generally unavailable path.
This leaves flight to Ingushetia as the only available option, and indeed, it was
one that many Chechen civilians chose to pursue. However, not everyone could access it.
Generally, while some pull factors are determined by nature, such as terrain, distance,
and a lack of contiguous borders, or by behavior, such as the decision to close borders,
other pull factors are structural. Structural issues, such as poverty, age, and illness, might
make flight impossible on the individual level even if nature and behavior leave paths to
exit otherwise open on the aggregate level. Distance, expenses, dangerous travel, and the
occasional closing of the border checkpoint all curtailed access to Ingushetia, leaving
many civilians with no path from the conflict. The geographic location of civilians,
coupled with the locations of active fighting, determined the availability of flight in some
cases:
Not all who wish to flee are able to do so. The refugee entry point to Ingushetia is
in the western Chechen lowlands, while the cities of Grozny and Gudermes are in
the east, and the highlands that have seen most of the recent fighting are in the
southeast. Travel to Ingushetia is difficult and dangerous for people from these
areas, and the cost of transport by vehicle is prohibitive for many (Nichols 2000,
247).
Indeed, traveling through Chechnya was itself dangerous, and since civilians
could only flee to Ingushetia, traveling through Chechnya was the only way to reach it.
The journey was fraught with peril, so even before considering the expected quality of
life in the target destination, the path to reach it may have made it too dangerous an
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option to be worth pursuing. In order to get out, fleeing civilians risked being shot,
bombed, or having to pay bribes in order to pass through humanitarian corridors set up by
Russian troops (Nichols 2000, 248). Further, the border crossing to Ingushetia would
arbitrarily close, sometimes when violence was particularly high; on one particular
occasion, this left thousands stranded at the border, many of which were wounded and in
severe need of assistance (247). Additionally, Chechen rebels at times prevented civilians
from leaving Chechnya, as this worked against their interests (see Holland 2004 ,335):
"[Chechen forces] laid extensive antipersonnel land mines in apartment buildings and
around the city, obstructing [civilians'] exit from the capital" (Gilligan 2010, 41). At one
point, Russian forces dropped leaflets on Grozny warning civilians to leave, and
promised to stop bombing for five days so that civilians could safely leave; however,
bombing resumed the next day, leaving many civilians stranded (Gilligan 2010, 38).
Once the distance, expense, and risk of the journey and border crossing were
accounted for, that still left much in question at the final destination. The conditions in
Ingushetia were also dire, although they of course could not compare with the devastation
inside of Chechnya. Ingushetia was small, crowded, impoverished, and ill-equipped to
handle the influx of Chechen refugees, which by 2000 already amounted to 250,000
people, against the 300,000 people that comprised its own population (Nichols 2000, 248;
Gilligan 2010, 16). While they were generally spared the violence occurring at home, the
internally displaced in Ingushetia still faced a host of problems:
“The minimum living conditions [for IDPs in Ingushetia and Chechnya] are
nonetheless devastating. IDPs in Ingushetia face increased health risks, including higher
incidences of tuberculosis, measles, infant mortality and HIV. Most of those displaced in
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Ingushetia have little or no access to employment. Over 99 percent of the population of
Chechnya and nearly all of the IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan lived under the poverty
line and have difficulty meeting their basic food needs" (Holland 2004, 341).
In the Chechen case, then, there is an extremely high push, creating an almost
unparalleled willingness to flee amongst civilians, coupled with a very low,
intermittently-available, but nonetheless widely-utilized opportunity to flee. The fact that
anyone, let alone hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians, chose to flee under these
conditions speaks directly to the strength of the forces pushing them out; under less dire
conditions, it is difficult to imagine that so many would choose such a path. Without any
available exit, it is likely that the insurgency would have gained further strength; as it
was, the minimal exit opportunity that remained was still an insufficient substitute for
many who instead were radicalized and joined the insurgents. The long-term economic
consequences of the destruction of Chechnya have also left many young people without
alternatives to joining the continuing insurgency, at it is frequently the only means of
employment available to them.21
Additional Theoretical Concerns
Criminality and Predation
The Chechen example leads to an additional concern regarding the feedback cycle
of violence and poverty that plagues trapped civilians in pressure-cooker conflict states.
In civil conflict, civilians have varying levels of access to economic activity and
production. In some cases, if the war is geographically contained in a small area of the
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state and violence does not spill over beyond that area, most economic activity will
continue unimpeded. However, in other cases where the conflict impacts wider
proportions of the state, the negative externalities of conflict will severely decrease
economic capacity. This is the most common scenario (Murdoch and Sandler 2002,
Murdoch and Sandler 2004). The violence of civil conflict not only drives the loss of
physical capacity through the destruction of both public infrastructure and private
property, but also sends workers and investment capital fleeing for safer climes. Travel
routes for carrying traded goods through and out of the state are also likely to be blocked
or otherwise insecure due to potential or actual violence en route, further crippling the
economy. There is little incentive to invest in education, business growth, or other
foundational necessities for a strong economy when any of these investments is likely to
be lost to violence and other destruction (see Murdoch and Sandler 2004, Kathman 2011,
Costalli and Peschedda 2014). This is true both for the government, which is likely to
divert funds away from building the economy and towards fighting the rebellion, and for
private investors (Kosuke and Weinstein 2000). Civil conflict is so crippling to the
economy that it damages the economies of neighboring states as well (Murdoch and
Sandler 2004). While typically the macroeconomic consequences of civil war are the
most visible and receive most scholarly attention, there is also good reason to give
particular attention to how this impacts civilians directly.
In the presence of widespread violence and the destruction of infrastructure and
property, the means of eking out a livelihood for individual civilians should diminish
substantially. This has obvious consequences related to the general discussion in this
chapter: where it becomes more difficult to survive in one's current location, the utility of
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staying put should decrease and flight should become a relatively more attractive option.
If, however, the exit quality is still too low to make flight feasible, then the civilian in
question remains trapped inside a conflict state without the means to produce sufficiently
for the survival of himself or his family. This will should ultimately drive increased
pressure on civilians, compounding the impact of the pressure-cooker conflict through
higher levels of criminal activity in the state and increasingly violent tactics to extract
resources from the remaining civilians. Criminality and predation are one mechanism
through which the pressure-cooker effect takes place, and in conjunction with the direct
pressure from one-sided violence, this should push more civilians to feed into the conflict
processes and to undermine the conditions that would allow for functioning peace.
It is easy to draw a direct line to the earlier expectation: if civilians cannot
produce enough to survive, and lack the ability to flee, they should be more willing to
cooperate with or fight for any armed group that will provide them with some means of
survival. Indeed, armed groups often hijack the distribution of humanitarian aid inflows
in order to bring civilians under their control.22 The loss of work and productive capacity
can directly drive civilians into cooperation with armed groups in order to secure food
and shelter; even in the absence of high levels of civilian casualties through
indiscriminate violence, a trapped population without access to these basic necessities is
still extremely vulnerable.
However, over and above the direct insecurities created by infrastructure damage
and economic loss, there remains yet another impact of the loss of economic self-
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sufficiency in conflict zones: where legitimate means of production vanish, those who are
trapped within the conflict state are more likely to predate on each other. This is
especially likely in the presence of indiscriminate shelling in urban areas, or scorched
earth tactics in rural areas. With no other way to produce, and with law and order in a
state of flux, trapped civilians are more likely to simply steal whatever they can from
each other. Aid workers may be particularly lucrative targets, but fellow civilians are
more plentiful. Of course, the threat of kidnapping and extortion should push out any
civilians who remain with the means to leave; however, for those individuals who lack
such means, or those areas where refugee flight is inaccessible across the board, the
situation becomes all the more dire.
This was a prominent issue in the conflict in Chechnya, the classic example of a
pressure-cooker conflict state. The Russian government shut down all pathways for flight
out of the region and simultaneously laid waste to its major cities and agricultural areas.
Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya, was "almost entirely reduced to rubble" in "the
greatest level of destruction ever visited on any urban area in any non-nuclear war"
(Nichols 2000, 245). The farmland was "mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245). With
nowhere to go and a complete loss of not only local infrastructure and economy capacity,
but also bureaucratic oversight and security, crime flourished, leaving vulnerable
civilians to be preyed upon by their neighbors.
Chechnya sank into lawlessness and economic chaos; some war veterans became
leaders of paramilitary, radical fundamentalist, or criminal groups and fomented
civil war, assassinating several high government officials. Kidnapping gangs,
secure in implicit impunity for crimes against Chechens and crimes committed in
Chechnya, operated in and near Chechnya, terrorized the local population, and
drove out nearly all international observers and aid agencies (Nichols 2000, 245).
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Nichols (2000) estimates that about a thousand hostages were taken during this period in
the Chechen war. As she explains, although fellow Chechens were not able to pay
particularly large sums in ransoms for their kidnapped relatives, kidnapping remained
lucrative because there was so little overhead due to the lack of legal and security
oversight.
This example shows clearly that the combination of the power vacuum in
contested conflict zones and the loss of economic capacity can create ideal conditions for
criminal gangs to flourish; this is particularly true in cases where there are no viable
substitutes such as flight from the conflict. While the Chechen example is particularly
illustrative in the context of low exit quality, criminal gangs that kidnap and extort
civilians are a common feature of civil wars: Syria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and many
other civil wars share this feature.23 This is all the worse, then, for the civilians that are
trapped in these areas, and it should be little surprise that any armed group or paramilitary
organization that offers some measure of protection from criminals, possible protection
from the violence of the opposing forces, and access to food and shelter, will be met with
open arms. FARC, Colombia's long-enduring insurgent force, is perhaps the most wellknown for using these tactics, but they have also flourished in other areas, including
Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, and Haiti.24 The targeting of civilians by criminal groups
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has also plagued the Syrian civil war, where a black market for kidnapping sprung up in
the midst of the outbreak of violent conflict.25
Of course, when the economic capacity of the conflict area dips, so too does the
amount of resources that armed actors can easily extract from the area. The shrinking
resource base will make the civilians who hold these resources less willing to give any
part of it up, since they will need more of it, if not all of it, to survive - and it may well
still prove insufficient. This can lead these armed groups to use more violent and coercive
tactics in order to continue to fund their enterprise; they thus take up the behavior of
criminal groups, kidnapping and extorting through violence in order to continue
squeezing resources out of impoverished civilians.
Therefore, the conclusion is this: any individual civilian who cannot sufficiently
produce for him or herself should already be more willing to cooperate with armed
groups in civil wars for food and shelter. However, on top of this, other civilians in the
area who face the same challenges - who are attempting to fill the gap left by lost jobs,
businesses, and farms - may turn to criminal activity out of necessity. These new
criminals, then, are kidnapping and extorting their neighbors, who are already in dire
straits themselves. In this insecure environment, this type of criminal activity will provide
an even stronger impetus for civilians to put their trust in armed groups. Not only might
armed groups provide food and shelter, but they can also offer some measure of security,
from not only the violence of war, but also the criminal activity of other civilians. This
will, of course, impact the poorest individuals the most; these are the very people who are
least likely to be able to flee in the first place.
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Uncertainty
Obviously, if civilians in conflict zones are facing a rational decision calculus to
either stay put or to flee, and these civilians have expectations about the quality of life
and likelihood of survival for each of these choices, they will always face some degree of
uncertainty. To an extent, this is true for staying put: will the fighting continue, or will
there be a cease-fire? Will the front lines of violence move closer to or further away from
their homes? Will their village lose power or be bombed or burned to the ground, will
there be a massacre like the ones that have taken place in other villages, or will the worst
of this pass them by? However, the degree of uncertainty for fleeing will almost always
be much greater than for staying in place; this is because not only do potential refugees
face the same uncertainties about the future that plague staying put, but they also face a
significant amount of uncertainty about the realities of the present situation. This is not
just a problem of the unknowable circumstances of the future in a war zone, but is
actually a problem of bad and incomplete information about the current state of affairs on
the ground in potential host countries. The lack of certainty about the reality on the
ground is thus what differentiates fleeing and staying put in this regard, and is therefore
the focus of this section.
Realistically, when civilians make the choice to flee, they are unlikely to have
perfect information about their likelihood of being permitted to enter another state, or the
availability of asylum/refugee status, or even the probability that they will survive the
journey. War zones are notorious for bad information; official channels of
communication are often disrupted, unavailable, or distrusted, leaving word-of-mouth
through networks of friends and family as the main method of communication. Of course,
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this high-stakes game of whisper-down-the-lane is unlikely to communicate such vital
information with a high level of accuracy.
Indeed, there is a small but fairly consistent body of literature addressing how
well refugees understand the conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees in their host
countries before leaving. Most of this literature suggests that they either have very little
understanding of these conditions, or, even knowing that they were in for a long and
difficult journey that might end with indefinite detention or refoulement, felt it was
worthwhile anyway (Crawley 2010, Gilbert and Koser 2006, Spinks 2013, Richardson
2010). This literature argues that it is thus unrealistic to expect changes in policy or
practice towards refugees and asylum seekers to change their decision calculus prior to
fleeing from conflict zones.
However, there are reasons to doubt these findings. Most of this work is based on
surveys of refugees who were already in the destination country; knowing that this group
of people chose to flee despite having bad information does nothing to tell us about the
people who chose to stay. This is a serious selection bias. Further, just because some
individuals felt it was worthwhile to flee even though they expected low-quality
conditions in their host countries does not automatically mean that efforts to deter
asylum-seeker inflows through tougher policies were ineffective. Rather, this just means
that for those people, the situation on the ground in their home state was bad enough that
even a low-quality exit was a better choice than staying put. For others, though, whose
situation was perhaps poor but not quite as desperate, decreasing the quality of the
conditions for asylum-seekers may have prevented them from attempting to flee;
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restricting studies to those have already made the journey removes this equally if not
more informative portion of the population from consideration altogether.
Additionally, this body of work is almost exclusively focused on OECD states
(e.g. Australia and Western Europe). It is perhaps unsurprising that a civilian facing
indiscriminate shelling in Syria might not have a good idea of the asylum policies in
Denmark or New Zealand; these are distant states that the average Syrian would have
little exposure to in the course of their typical daily life. Any other Syrians who had fled
there would have a difficult time communicating the conditions back to those still at
home. However, most refugees simply flee across a contiguous border to a neighboring
country; the Syrian in question would instead be considering the expected conditions in
Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, or the neighboring Gulf States, for example. It is far more
reasonable to expect that the average Syrian facing the violence and destruction of the
conflict would have a somewhat accurate idea of what they would face in these states,
and be able to use that information to make a reasonably informed decision to flee or to
stay.
However, even Syrian civilians fleeing the war know that, for example, Europe
has better protection of refugees than the neighboring Gulf States. A news article from
late 2015 belabors this point:
Why [do] refugees want to go the Europe? The answer is simple: Europe has the
best laws for them. None of the six Gulf Cooperation Council states has signed
the UN convention on refugees, which has governed international law on asylum
since World War Two. The convention defines the status of refugees and the
duties and rights of governments. In practice it means that there are no
standardized procedures to deal with large numbers of people arriving from
abroad seeking help.
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Critics say that many of the Syrians cited as having taken refuge in the Gulf states
are in fact affluent citizens looking to sit out the war in comfort, rather than
fleeing families forced out of their homes.
Receiving refugee status in European states gives migrants the right to stay in the
country indefinitely, guarantees access to social support, accommodation,
schooling for children, language courses, and help with training for the job
market.
Crossing into [Gulf state] countries neighboring Syria, which do not have a
recognized refugee status, may be possible but often means staying in refugee
camps with no jobs, meagre living conditions and no prospects.26
The almost uniform unwillingness of Syrian civilians to attempt flight into the
Gulf States - coupled with the strong border control exercised by Gulf State governments
- results in rather good information about the barriers to flight across these borders, and
the low quality of exit expected in these states.
There are some facets of exit quality that are easier to predict than others;
geographical barriers and climate, for example, are fixed and known quantities.
Mountains, oceans, deserts, and distance are all consistent and should be known to those
considering flight. When it comes to policies, some are better established and thus easier
to predict; if states have gained a reputation for mistreating or refusing entry to asylumseekers, they may be known for this and thus be better understood by civilians
contemplating flight. It is also reasonable to expect that, as in the example of the Syrian
above, potential refugees will have better information about more proximate states, not
only because they will have a better understanding of how these states have treated
fleeing populations historically, but also because it will be much simpler for refugees and
asylum-seekers on the ground to communicate this information back to those still in the
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conflict zone.27 For this same reason, over the course of a conflict, civilians on the ground
should have better information about what they would face if they flee, simply because
the first waves of refugees will have already tested those waters. This will also extend
broadly to cases in which ethnic kin communities are larger in the target destination,
because they will be more likely to convey information about conditions back to those
still within the conflict state.
There is certainly anecdotal evidence to suggest that potential refugees internalize
their expectations about conditions in destination countries, and that at times they will not
attempt to flee in the first place because of these expectations. One civilian in Yemen
facing the violence of Saudi-led airstrikes stated that "fleeing the country is not a viable
option for him because he is a Yemeni national with no other citizenships. 'There is no
other place I can go to even in Yemen itself,' he said.” 28
Assuming that potential refugees do have a concrete expectation about the
conditions they will face, though perhaps the expectation is incorrect, then the following
should hold: In reality, it probably only matters if would-be refugees perceive conditions
to be worse than they actually are and stay put, never verifying the actual conditions if
they should flee. In this case, the model has a problem because people that should flee
will stay, despite the higher level of exit quality. If, on the other hand, refugees perceive
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conditions to be better than they actually are, they will update their information upon
actual exposure to these conditions upon attempted or actual flight from the country; if
they find the border closed, then of course they will observably remain in the country,
and at that level the implications are the same as if they had known the border would be
closed in the first place. Even if these civilians are able to flee abroad but find conditions
to be so low quality that they realize they should have stayed, this need not be a problem
for the model, because in such circumstances typically these refugees will simply return.
Though it is not always a simple and straightforward task, it is by and large much easier
to get back into the conflict state than it is to be admitted to another state as an asylumseeker or refugee.
Indeed, the clearest observable implication of this uncertainty (about both present
and future conditions in destination countries) is in the return of refugees to their home
state while conflict conditions remain constant. While the going assumption is that the
fear of violence, and the possibility of injury or death, will push people out in the same
manner across all conflicts and over time, the return of refugees from safe, if otherwise
intolerable exits, shows that even in the face of danger at home, a lack of viable
alternatives can still make remaining at home - or returning there - preferable. If you have
no means of income, and no food or shelter in your host country, the risk of death by
violence may be preferable to the certainty of starvation abroad. The recent swell in
returnees to Syria (in fall 2015) is a strong example of this. A recent BBC article
described the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan, who were beginning to return to
active conflict zones in droves after the conditions in Jordan became particularly dire:
Increasingly, Syrian refugees in Jordan are in dire financial straits. The UN says
86% now lives below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 Jordan dinars ($96) a

49

month. The government does not allow most to work legally and no longer
provides free medical care. At the beginning of last month, 229,000 living outside
refugee camps had their aid from the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) totally
cut due to a lack of international donations. 29
This article describes the situation of one Syrian refugee in Jordan: "Khaled was well-off
in Syria but now his savings have run out. He shows me a photograph of his large house
in Deraa. His parents are there and have told him the situation is calm now. 'It's been
terrible; shelling and barrel bombs almost every day. People dying. For the last 20 days
there's been talk of a truce‚ I can't deny I'm scared, but you only die when your time is
up. We don't have a life here." 30
A spokesman from the World Food Program in Jordan stated that "the people here
are telling us that they would go back to Syria - back to an active war zone. That must
mean that they have really reached rock bottom to make that choice." 31
Thus, while there is absolutely reason to expect uncertainties, it is still very
reasonable to expect that potential refugees will have some sense of what they should
face in host countries, particularly those that neighbor the conflict state, which are of the
greatest interest for this study. This is where most people flee, and it represents the most
direct and accessible path away from the dangers of civil conflict. The topic of
uncertainty and its variation is vast and ripe for in-depth exploration, but it is secondary
to the main purpose of this project, and because I focus on states that neighbor those in
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active civil wars, the OECD states that claim their asylum seekers are ignorant of policy
are also generally outside of the scope of the relevant exits for this study as well. At most,
these regions (e.g. Western Europe) may represent a viable exit option, but the
distinctions of specific policies within them are both unlikely to be clear to would-be
refugees, and unlikely to specifically shape patterns of out-migration from a conflict zone
in different ways.
The Plan
This chapter has introduced the idea that state practices towards refugees and
asylum-seekers can impact whether civilians choose to flee from violence in civil wars. I
further have argued that how civilians react to violence – specifically, whether they flee
or remain within the conflict state – will shape the ongoing dynamics of the conflict. To
facilitate this understanding, I have introduced the concept of exit quality, for which I will
develop a measure of the expected utility for flight from a civil conflict; high exit quality
conflicts are surrounded by states that treat refugees and asylum-seekers well, while low
exit quality conflicts are typically surrounded by states that close their borders to
refugees, abuse refugees and asylum-seekers, or routinely jail these populations as illegal
immigrants or criminals.
In civil wars surrounded by neighbors that welcome and protect refugees –
conflicts with high exit quality - escalating indiscriminate violence should push civilians
to flee the state. On the other hand, if neighboring states treat refugees poorly – that is, if
exit quality is low – civilians will be less likely to flee. Instead, they will remain trapped
within the conflict state, exposed to increasing violence and danger. This leads to a
pressure-cooker conflict state, in which civilians are unable to escape and thus feed back
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into the conflict. Civilians are at minimum a resource for armed groups, and may actually
chose to join the conflict as combatants for protection or to gain access to the resources
that these groups have – resources which likely become scarce elsewhere due to the
ongoing conflict. I argue that this will lead to more violent conflicts – not only in terms of
violence against civilians, but in terms of casualties from battle – and that these conflicts
will flare and burn out sooner. However, while these conflicts may end sooner, the sheer
destruction will leave behind a legacy of instability and destruction that is likely to
contribute to long-term terrorism, insurgency, and general instability.
To test this requires generating a measure of conflict-level exit quality. To this
point, however, there has been no comprehensive data available on state practices
towards refugees and asylum-seekers. As this is obviously a necessity to measure exit
quality from conflict, in Chapter 2 I introduce a new dataset on state practices towards
refugees, the Refugee Rights dataset, which covers all states in the international system
for each year from 1993-2014. The Refugee Rights dataset includes indicators for
refoulement, government abuse of refugees, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from
abuse by non-state actors, and the legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. This
chapter includes preliminary theoretical expectations on the characteristics of states that
drive better or worse respect for these rights; empirical tests confirm that wealthier states,
and states that face high volumes of refugee inflows, are more likely to abuse the rights
of refugees and asylum-seekers.
Chapter 3 takes the next step towards generating a measure of conflict-level exit
quality. Using the Refugee Rights dataset, data on the respect for human rights of native
citizens, and data on civil conflict intensity, I build measures of the destination quality of
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individual states. Using factor analysis and item response theory, I confirm that there are
two distinct dimensions of destination quality: the treatment of refugees, and general
security. I use item response theory to generate scores for each of these two dimensions. I
then run face validity models of dyadic refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring
states. These models confirm that the interaction of destination quality and violence
against civilians drives refugee flight.
Chapter 4 tests the interacted effect of violence against civilians and exit quality
on civil conflict duration and intensity. To create the measures of exit quality, I aggregate
the individual destination quality scores of states neighboring each civil war. I evaluate
each measure of destination quality – refugee rights and general security – separately.
Lower levels of general security in neighboring states drives longer civil wars if violence
against civilians is high, however, at low levels of violence against civilians, high and
low general security surrounding a conflict has no impact on its duration. However,
general security has no impact on conflict intensity (battle deaths). The findings are
clearly distinct for refugee rights (the second dimension of exit quality). Low levels of
refugee rights in neighboring states drive more intense conflicts if violence against
civilians is high, but refugee rights do not impact intensity if violence against civilians is
low. The results for duration are somewhat mixed; initially, it does seem that low refugee
rights and high violence will drive shorter conflicts. However, robustness tests show that
generally, it actually appears that conflicts with low refugee rights and high violence will
end sooner than those with high refugee rights and high violence. It seems that the
pressure cooker conflict state is ultimately an accurate analogy: trapping civilians in a
violent conflict creates a more violent conflict that ultimately burns out sooner. General
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security, on the other hand, creates a more stable region that can prevent outside
resources from flowing into the conflict and sustaining it.
Finally, I conclude in Chapter 5 by reviewing the findings and suggesting
directions for future work in this area. Ultimately, this project shows that there are
consequences when neighboring states fail to protect refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing
civil wars, and these consequences extend beyond the humanitarian costs. When civilians
are trapped in violent and dangerous civil wars, they can easily be pulled into the conflict
and feed its progression. This effect is distinct from the effect of a generally “good
neighborhood”, in which there is no other civil conflict or repression. Stable neighbors
help to dampen the continuation of conflict, but neighbors that welcome refugees
ultimately vent pressure from violent situations and dim the intensity of violent conflicts.
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Chapter 2: The Refugee Rights Dataset
Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce a new dataset on state treatment of refugees and
asylum seekers. This dataset is meant to measure the pull factors, or the opportunity to
flee, specific to refugees and asylum-seekers. It is comprised of hand-coded annual scores
drawn from the State Department Human Rights Reports, covering the post-Cold War
period, from 1993-2014, for all states in the international system. These data, which
cover practices including government abuse of refugees and the forced return of refugees
and asylum-seekers (or refoulement), are a necessary step towards creating accurate
measures of exit quality. Measures of exit quality that include the treatment of refugees
specifically, and separately from the treatment of native citizens, are vital to test the
theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. I expect that civilians respond differently to
violence based on how they expect to be treated if they flee, but to predict how this will
impact civilian behavior and in turn the progression of civil conflicts, I first need to
measure how refugees expect to be treated. This dataset allows me to measure this
expectation of exit quality, and in turn to test whether civil wars with high levels of
violence against civilians will progress differently based on how neighboring states treat
refugees fleeing the conflict.
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However, the data are also a valuable contribution in their own right. I argue that
greater attention to varying respect for refugees’ rights is necessary for three reasons
beyond generating a measure of exit quality: first, because the rights of refugees may be
in contention with the rights of native citizens; second, because studies predicting the
direction of refugee flows should consider not only the treatment of citizens in host states
but the actual treatment of refugees and asylum seekers; and third, because varying
respect for the rights of refugees may increase or decrease the negative externalities
commonly associated with refugee populations such as conflict over resources, terrorism,
and civil war. In the following sections, I introduce and explore the data, and advance
and test some preliminary theoretical expectations on what drives variation in state
treatment of refugees. This is valuable because it allows for a better understanding of
what makes some states attract refugees, while others repel them. In more specific
terminology, this develops expectations about the correlates – and perhaps the causes – of
the factors that pull refugees, or more succinctly, of exit quality.
Literature Review
The extant literature on government respect for human rights focuses on either
general respect for human rights, or on rights specifically for citizens (e.g. Poe and Tate
1994, Poe et al. 1999, Cingranelli and Richards 2010). There is a particular interest in
rights that are coded into international law, because there is some consensus, or at the
very least a focal point, against which to compare both state practices and law. Most of
the scholarly focus is on physical security rights, as these are the most basic rights upon
which most people can agree (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010).
Specifically, in one of the most prominent measures of physical security rights, these
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rights include freedom from political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killing, and
disappearance (Cingranelli et al. 2014). These rights are also the primary focus of most of
the policy community’s attention to human rights. Other work on the state’s respect for
human rights includes women’s rights, workers’ rights, and civil liberties, all of which
have garnered some attention and all of which have some degree of presence in the
quantitative empirical literature (e.g. Mosley and Uno 2007). 32 However, these are all
built on the understanding of the government’s responsibility to - and reliance upon - its
own citizens. The forces that shape respect for the human rights of citizens may well
differ from the forces that shape respect for the rights of non-citizens. In particular, the
treatment of refugees is of interest, because while they are non-citizens, they also benefit
from rights coded into international law (UN 1951, 1967).
With a couple of notable exceptions, the quantitative political science literature
has done little to measure or directly theorize on the drivers of state practices towards
refugees and asylum seekers (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004).33 The actual treatment of
refugees by governments deserves attention for several reasons.
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The CI-RIGHTS database, for example, has coded measures of all these rights (see
Cingranelli and Filippov 2018).
33

The World Refugee Survey (WRS) has produced annual refugee grades on several
dimensions, though there has been little analysis of these grades. However, there are a
few issues with the WRS coding procedure. First, the limited coverage of states is likely
biased by the fact that these are the states that receive the most refugees: thus, the states
that are best able to deter refugees from entering in the first place may never even make it
into the sample. Second, in some cases it aggregates fundamentally different concepts.
This is a particular concern with regard to the refoulement/physical protection score; this
score aggregates the functionality and “fairness” of the asylum system, incidents of
refoulement, and physical violence against refugees or asylum seekers by the
government. These are concepts that are best examined individually to accurately
determine how willingness and capacity affect each. Third and finally, the U.S.
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The first and most important reason for giving attention to state practices towards
refugees is to measure the exit quality, or pull, of states that neighbor civil conflict. Exit
quality, in conjunction with violence against civilians, will shape the pull, or opportunity
to flee, and the push, or willingness to flee, respectively. Measuring how states treat
refugees should allow for better prediction of both refugee migration patterns from civil
wars and civil conflict development generally. In conflicts with high levels of violence
against civilians, specifically, refugee rights in neighboring states should condition
whether civilians respond by fleeing (if refugees are treated well), or by staying in the
conflict state and feeding back into the conflict processes (if refugees are treated poorly).
Thus, for understanding how civilians impact civil conflict development, measuring exit
quality is absolutely vital.
The second reason for devoting attention to how refugees are treated is for
broader studies on the migration of refugees and asylum-seekers. These studies are
suffering from serious omitted variable bias by excluding how states deal with refugees.
In studying the push-pull forces that impel, deter, or generally direct migration, we
should be considering not only how refugees expect to be treated in a potential host-state,
but also whether that state will let them in the first place (Davenport et al. 2003, Moore
and Shellman 2006, Schmeidl 1997, Steele 2009). After all, just because a potential
destination may “pull” migration with a high standard of living, economic opportunity,
and civil and political rights, does not mean that said state simply permits would-be
asylum seekers to enter. Most refugee movements are between states with low levels of

Committee for Refugee and Immigrants ceased producing the WRS reports and the
associated scores after 2009.
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human rights practices; this is in part because these states tend to cluster together in
space, but it is also because the most desirable target states are often incredibly difficult
to get into.
Of course, we should also consider how asylum seekers expect to be treated in
host states: if they are likely to be put into detention camps upon arrival or suffer abuse at
the hands of the state, they should weigh these risks carefully when choosing a
destination. From the point of view of potential refugees, there is an overarching risk that
even if they are able to enter an asylum state, they will not be able to access the human
rights, civil rights, wealth, and other opportunities and protections that native citizens
enjoy. Generally, if we as scholars only consider how the state treats its citizens when
predicting migration flows, we are seriously neglecting the very real fact that the
migrants in question will not have access to those same rights in many (if not most)
cases. The reality is that refugee policies and rights should shape if, how, and to where
refugees flee. Individuals seeking to flee their countries should have some awareness of
how refugees specifically are treated in other states. Rationally, they should incorporate
their expectations for the treatment of refugees into their decisions of whether and where
to flee. Nonetheless, abuses of refugees do not automatically deter all future refugee
inflows; even poor conditions for refugees may be preferable to horrific conditions at
home.
Third, from a normative standpoint, considering only how states treat their own
citizens may paint an overly rosy portrait of their rights practices. The European Union,
for example, uses harsh and aggressive measures to deter asylum seekers, which clash
with the EU’s generally high standard of respect for human rights (USCRI 2008).
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Additionally, given that respecting the rights of citizens requires resources and refugees
can create a very real drain on state resources, it reasonable to expect that there may be a
trade-off between the amount of support the state can devote to refugees’ rights while still
respecting those of its own citizens.
The fourth and final consideration for direct theorizing and data on state practices
towards refugees is that the treatment of refugee populations may condition the
relationship between refugee inflows and the negative externalities they create. These
include resource shortages, terrorism, and civil conflict onset (Black 1994, Lischer 2005,
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). It is possible
that greater respect for and attention to the rights of refugees might help to prevent their
radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups and militias. However, it is also
possible that restricting refugee access in the first place and keeping the population more
secure by restricting movement may temper the likelihood that refugee flows present a
threat to the state. Either way, given the recent surge of attention to the problems that
refugee populations cause, it is only logical to consider how the state’s treatment of
refugees might shape these outcomes.
Theorizing on State Practices Towards Refugees
The definition of refugees and the rights accorded to them by international law
grew out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and were specifically
codified in the UN 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967
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Protocol. 34 According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as “[a person] who is
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion” (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The Convention also
stipulates that refugees and asylum-seekers should not be punished for illegal entry or
stay (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The most prominent of the rights for refugees in the
Convention, however, is the right to non-refoulement, which asserts that: “no one shall
expel or return any refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she fears
threats to life or freedom” (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The definition of refoulement, then,
is the forced return of refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this
status to a geographic territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom.
Additional rights stipulated for refugees include access to primary education, the right to
work, and access to courts.35
At present, 145 states are participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
Clearly there is a broad consensus that these are the agreed-upon definitions of refugees
and their rights. However, the degree to which states uphold the rights enumerated in
these documents varies greatly. The normative push for respecting these rights is often in
conflict with the difficulties that a large refugee population creates for the government. I
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The 1967 Protocol effectively removed the geographic and temporal restriction from
the 1951 Convention, which limited its coverage to events in Europe occurring before
1951, though states could still restrict their coverage in that manner if they so chose.
35

Exceptions are for individuals who have committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity, or for Palestinians who are protected under the auspices of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA).
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argue that states’ respect for the rights of refugees is a function of both willingness and
capacity (Jacobsen 1996, Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). That is, there are varying
factors that may influence a government’s inclination to take on refugees, and a separate
set of factors that should influence its capacity to do so.
State Inclination to Respect Refugee Rights
The most obvious indicator of a state’s inclination to respect the rights of refugees
is participation in the international treaties that define and enumerate these rights. I
expect participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to have better relationships
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and therefore to be
more likely to cooperate with it in times of crisis (see Jacobsen 1996). However, while
membership will likely have a positive correlation with respect for refugees’ rights, it is
unlikely to be causal; rather, it is more likely that participation in these treaties simply
reflects a greater likelihood to respect these rights in the first place (Keith 1999).
Hypothesis 1: States that are participants in the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol will have higher respect for refugees’ rights.
By the same logic, if respect for the rights of citizens is part of an underlying dimension
of respect for overall human rights, then states that have better respect for their citizens’
basic human rights should be more likely to respect the basic rights of refugees as well.
If, however, respect for human rights is a simple function of citizens’ domestic demand
for their own rights and not in any way concerned with the dignity of the person, then
there should not be a relationship between these two outcomes. Yet, if respect for
physical integrity rights is non just a function of the desire to respect human rights, but is
also the result of a well-controlled state security apparatus (see Englehart 2009), then this
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respect should extend beyond native citizens to asylum-seekers and refugees. It may
therefore be difficult to entirely separate inclination and capacity in the impact of human
rights respect of native citizens on the respect for the rights of refugees.
Hypothesis 2: As the level of government respect for citizens’ human rights increases,
the level of respect for refugees’ rights will also increase.
Regime type may also exert a normative influence on the level of respect for the
rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Democratic states should have inherently greater
respect for the civil rights of their citizens than autocratic states, and should therefore
have greater overall respect for human rights (Gibney 2009). By extension, these states
should show higher levels of respect for the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.
However, it is less clear whether this is actually a reasonable expectation the effect of
regime type on refugee practices, since democracies should carry out the will of their
citizens, and in many cases citizens will resent the burden of a refugee population and the
problems this causes for resource distribution.
Hypothesis 3: The level of democracy will impact respect for refugees’ rights.
A final consideration on state inclination to host refugee populations is the effect
of ethnic kin networks. That is, if the potential host state is home to an ethnic group that
has ties to the refugee population, this should affect the level of protection that the state
affords the refugees in question. However, again, the direction of this effect is murky and
should ultimately be conditional on the state’s relationship with the ethnic group; if there
is no tension between ethnic groups, or the ethnic group is in the majority in the state,
then the presence of an ethnic kin network should have a positive effect on the level of
respect for refugees’ rights. In contrast, if there is a fragile balance between ethnic
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populations that an influx of refugees could upset, or if the ethnic group in question is
problematic for the host state, this should decrease the level of respect for refugees’
rights. The plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq is an excellent example of this dynamic:
though this group has often had a strong case for asylum - including Saddam Hussein’s
genocide in 1988 – Turkey is consistently reluctant to permit more Kurds to enter, due to
its long and troubled relationship with its own Kurdish population.36
Capacity
The state’s capacity – often defined in terms of wealth, military strength or
bureaucratic effectiveness – generally speaks to its overall strength and ability to carry
out the goals that it sets (Braithwaite 2010). The most obvious effect of capacity on rights
is direct: respecting any human rights requires resources, and weak states lack the
capacity to effectively enforce respect for human rights (Englehart 2009). If one can
accept that the respect of physical integrity rights depends on state capacity, it should be a
much smaller logical leap to accept that respecting the rights of refugees will require
resources and manpower. After all, refugees often require the support of the host state to
survive. Therefore, we might expect that higher-capacity states would be more likely to
be able to respect the rights of refugees. However, this is actually a more complex
concept than it may seem at first glance: increased capacity can also increase the ability
of the state to keep refugees out in the first place or actively violate their rights once they
enter the state (see Jacobsen 1996). This may well tie into Braithwaite’s (2010) finding
that state capacity conditions the likelihood that civil war spreads spatially: high-capacity
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To effectively evaluate the relationship between ethnic kin networks and state practices
towards refugees requires dyadic data including the composition of refugee populations,
so I am not able to test it in this chapter.
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states are better equipped to stem and secure the inflow of refugees that Salehyan and
Gleditsch (2006) find spreads conflict.
These high-capacity, resource-abundant states should also be more attractive
targets for would-be refugees, which can decrease state willingness to take on refugees –
at least compared to the number of refugees that wish to go there in the first place. Since
demand for entry is so high, these states have incentive to diminish the ability of asylum
seekers to enter. Thus, these states may have the perverse outcome of both increased
incentive and increased capacity to keep refugees out and restrict the rights of those who
do make it into their borders.37 I therefore expect that states with more resources should
actually be less likely overall to respect refugees’ rights.
However, there is reason to expect that the effect of state capacity is likely
conditional on the regime type. Autocratic states, without the constraints of a liberal
democracy, are most likely to abuse refugee rights if they have the wealth to attract
refugees and the resources to curtail refugee entrance, movement, and other refugee
rights. More democratic states, however, should be more constrained in their reaction to
potential or actual refugee inflows, so the impact of wealth should be smaller or nonexistent at the highest levels of democracy.
Hypothesis 4: The impact of state capacity (resources) is conditional on the level of
democracy. At low levels of democracy, as state capacity (resources) increases, the level
of respect for refugees’ rights will decrease. However, at high levels of democracy, state
capacity (resources) will not impact respect for refugees’ rights.
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These states should also have greater pull for economic migrants, making it more
difficult to distinguish between true refugees and economic migrants seeking a way in the
door.
65

Additional Influences
There are several other factors that should shape state practices towards refugees.
First, the size of the state’s native population should shape the level of respect for
refugees’ rights, simply because states with larger populations will be less affected by
each additional refugee. Therefore, states with larger populations should be better
equipped to handle refugee inflows, so the larger a state’s population the greater its
expected respect for refugees’ rights.
Actual exposure to refugees should also have a very direct effect: simply put,
more refugees should increase the likelihood that states have the opportunity to abuse the
rights of refugees. Many isolated island states have never had asylum requests.38 The size
of the refugee population should also shift the capacity of the state to respect the rights of
existing or would-be refugees. Simply put, a larger refugee population should drain the
resources of the state, decreasing the level of respect that the state shows for refugees.
Hypothesis 5: States that host larger refugee populations should have lower respect for
refugees’ rights.
A neighboring civil war should have a similar effect: the state will be more likely
to face a problematic refugee population, but it will be an even greater concern because
this population may harbor rebels and terrorists, presenting a threat to the state (Choi and
Salehyan 2013). This should lead to decreased respect for the rights of refugees. Carter
and Poast (2015) find that while refugee inflows do not predict the building of permanent
structures at borders, the threat of a neighboring civil war will do so. It is likely that states
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For this very reason, I include robustness checks in the empirical portion that control
for the number of contiguous land borders.
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will simply restrict the ability of refugees to enter the state and to move within the state to
deal with the security problem that refugees present, which may be why Carter and Poast
do not find evidence for the effect of refugee populations on permanent border structures.
After all, it is well established that refugee populations from civil war states bring along a
number of negative externalities in terms of security for their host states (Gleditsch and
Salehyan 2006, Salehyan 2007, 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). However, states should
be particularly motivated to protect their security in whatever manner they can in the face
of potential conflict spillover (see Jacobsen 1996), so I expect neighboring conflict to
drive decreased respect for the rights of refugees.
In the next section, I outline the methodology I use to test these expectations,
including the collection of a new annual state-level dataset on respect for the rights of
refugees.
Research Design
Dependent Variables: State Practices towards Refugees
To measure state practices towards refugees, I undertook a data collection effort
to create annual scores on several dimensions based on a reliably produced source
document. To this end, I used State Department Annual Reports from 1993 through 2014
to construct the Refugee Rights dataset: a twenty-two year dataset of the practices
towards refugees of the full sample of states in the international system. Some had
insufficient information, but this still generated a sample of 175 states. Unfortunately, in
these reports the coverage on issues such as freedom of movement for refugees and
asylum seekers, their right to earn a livelihood, and their access to courts was spotty at
best. However, there is consistent reporting on the legal state of the asylum system,
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incidents of refoulement, government violence towards refugees and asylums seekers,
protection of refugees and asylum seekers from violence by other (non-governmental)
actors, and cooperation with the UNHCR to provide services and protection to refugees.
Considering that these should be the most basic concerns of refugees, this is a reasonable
indication of both the expectations of refugees regarding their welfare, and the general
practices of states towards asylum-seekers and refugees. The reports do not give detailed
enough information to create a fine-grained breakdown of the scores in an internally
consistent manner. Therefore, I instead use a 0 – 1 – 2 scale, in which zero indicates the
lowest level of protection of these rights and two indicates the highest level of
protection.39 40 I code five categories on this scale: (1) legal system for asylum and
protection of refugees; (2) refoulement; (3) governmental violence against
refugees/asylum-seekers; (4) protection from violence by non-governmental actors and
(5) cooperation with the UNHCR.41 Across all the scores, higher values indicate a higher
level of respect for the right in question.
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The distinction between a 1 and a 0 is based on whether the abuse of the right in
question is isolated or widespread/systematic. If there are isolated incidents based on
individual failures – but little reason to expect this is a consistent or systematic problem –
the score is a 1. If the abuse is widespread or there is evidence of an underlying
systematic issue creating the abuse, the score is a 0.
40

The use of this 0-1-2 scale is loosely modeled after the CI-RIGHTS/CIRI physical
integrity rights indicators, which are also built on annual human rights reports.
41

The measure of the legal system is only a measure of the policy, and does not take
actual practice into account. As stated earlier, refoulement is the forced return of
refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this status to a geographic
territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom.
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Table 2: Frequencies of Refugee Rights Scores
Refoulement

Government
Violence

0

616

18.1% 652

Protection
from nonstate violence
19.2% 313
9.2%

1

370

10.9% 147

4.3%

2

2,414

71%

2,601

76.5% 3,027

89%

Total

3,400

100%

3,400

100%

100% 3,400

60

3,400

Cooperation
with UNHCR

Legal System

108

3.2%

994

29.2%

1.8%

238

7%

550

45.4%

3,054

89.8% 1,856

54.6%

100%

100%

3,400

Table 2 shows the frequencies of each of the refugee rights scores. Refoulement
measures whether a state has refused entry to individuals who were seeking asylum or
who would qualify for asylum; has forcibly expelled any individuals already present in
the country who did or could qualify for asylum or refugee status; or has undertaken
general practices that would have this impact (e.g. wholesale closing of borders or
screening practices that keep the individuals from applying successfully for asylum).42
Government violence measures the equivalent of physical integrity rights, but specific to
the refugee and asylum-seeker population. This can also include those who might have
technically qualified for asylum or refugee status, but who were never given the chance
because of flawed refoulement practices. For example, if a state beats back asylumseekers at borders, both preventing entry and physically abusing them, this would be
codeable as government abuse. Arbitrary detainment and long-term detainment against
international refugee law also qualify as government abuse. Extortion and harassment of
refugees and asylum-seekers by state security forces also qualify. Protection from non-
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Determination of whether an individual might qualify for asylum is based on UNHCR
definitions, not on internal national definitions, which often diverged from international
norms.
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state violence measures the exposure of refugees and asylum-seekers to abuse from any
actor other than the host state’s security forces; this includes societal violence by native
citizens, violence by rebel forces within the state, and violence by security forces from
states other than the host state. Cooperation with UNHCR measures the extent to which
the state cooperates with the UNHCR overall; if the states restricts UNHCR access to
refugee and asylum-seeker populations, or otherwise curtails the UNHCR’s ability to
carry out its directives in the state, this qualifies for a lower score on this measure.
Finally, the legal system measures whether the state has implemented a legal system to
process and protect refugees in accordance with the international norms laid out in the
UNHCR 1951 treaty and 1967 protocol.43
Independent Variables
To measure the level of human rights afforded to citizens, I use the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) Physical Integrity Rights score, which ranges from 0-8, where 0
indicates the lowest level of respect and 8 indicates full respect (Cingranelli et al. 2014).44
This score encompasses torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and
disappearance. To measure regime type, I use the Polity IV data, which ranges from -10
(complete autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) (Marshall et al. 2013). 45 To capture overall
state capacity – with a focus on access to material resources – I use the size of the
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For a full description of the coding procedure, please see the Appendix of this chapter.

44

In this chapter, I only use the data covered by the original CIRI data (through 2011); in
subsequent chapters, I add in the data covered in the extended CI-RIGHTS data (in the
models that run through 2014).
45

I recalculated this by adding ten points so that it ranges from 0 to 20 in my data to
avoid any issues working with negative numbers.
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economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) as reported by the World Bank (2012).46 I use
the UCDP-PRIO definitions of civil war, which includes both internal armed conflicts
and internationalized external armed conflicts, to control for the effect of internal conflict
on practices towards refugees (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). I also use this definition
to measure for the binary presence of civil conflict in a bordering state. Following
standard practice in the literature predicting human rights, I control for the total size of
the population using the Gleditsch (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. The binary
indicator of participation in the UN Treaties on the rights of refugees (UN 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol) data comes from the World Refugee Surveys (2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Finally, to control for the size of the refugee population, I use
data from online statistical database of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. 47
Results
The refugee rights scores range from zero to two, so I use an ordered logistic
regression model. The results are in Table 3 and 4; Table 3 uses the basic model for
predicting individual refugee practice scores, while Table 4 adds an interaction term
between regime type and wealth to test the conditional impact of wealth based on regime

46

As this measure is skewed, I use the natural log of GDP. I measure this in the previous
year to avoid problems of reverse causality.
47

Summary statistics for all measures available in Table 2 and in Appendix A in Table
12. The measure of the refugee population is also used in the natural log form, and lagged
one year to avoid reverse causality. It only includes refugees from within 950 km to
conform to practices in the quantitative refugee literature, notably Salehyan and Gleditsch
(2006).
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type.48 I predict each outcome (refoulement, government violence, protection from nongovernmental violence, the legal system towards refugees and asylum-seekers, and
cooperation with UNHCR) separately. 49
Human rights towards citizens are significant in predicting government violence
towards refugees, protection against other violence, and cooperation with UNHCR. It
seems intuitive that it would impact the level of governmental violence towards refugees
because the types of abuses coded in the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights score are the
same as those that would be coded as government violence here; only the population
being abused (or not) changes. This also does suggest that either the normative notion
that respect for human rights of citizens extend to refugees and asylum seekers – or that a
state security apparatus that does not engage in corrupt abuses of citizens will likewise be
restrained in violating the traditional physical integrity rights of refugees and asylum
seekers. The fact that physical integrity rights of citizens also predict the level of
protection from other violence (societal, by rebel forces, or by neighboring state security
forces) lends some support to the argument for the capacity of the security apparatus
driving the impact of the CIRI measure, as this would explain the ability to restrain other
actors from abusing refugees and asylum seekers. However, notably, there is no impact
on refoulement; therefore it seems that while states that respect the human rights of their

48

Table 13 in Appendix A shows the results for the basic ordered logistic model with the
addition of an indicator of the number of UNHCR refugee-specific agreements that the
country has signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and the associated 1967 Protocol). I run
these separately as the signatory indicator is likely to soak up a great deal of variation
because it will vary little over time within individual countries.
49

I also ran a regression predicting refoulement that includes safe country of
origin/transit restrictions as a violation of refoulement; the results are essentially
unchanged.
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citizens are less likely to physically abuse refugees within their borders, this has no
impact on the likelihood that they will close borders to asylum-seekers, return these
populations to countries where they fear for their life and well-being, or otherwise restrict
entry for would-be refugees and asylum-seekers.
The results from the interactive model are shown in Figures 1 through 5. Each
figure plots the out of sample predicted probability of scoring a “2” – the highest score –
on one of the five measures of refugee rights. These probabilities are plotted for high and
low GDP states across all levels of regime type (democracy).50 Figure 1 shows the
probability of a 2 on the refoulement score. Across all levels of democracy, wealthy
states are more likely to refoule; however, the gap between wealthy and poor states
shrinks at the highest levels of democracy, suggesting that regime type can constrain the
refoulement abuses of high capacity states. This is not the case in the protection of
refugee populations from non-governmental violence, shown in Figure 2. In protection,
there is no appreciable difference between high and low capacity states across all levels
of democracy.
Wealthier states are more likely to engage in government abuse refugee and
asylum-seeker populations at any level of democracy, shown in Figure 3.These
differences actually become more pronounced at higher levels of democracy. Since
government abuse includes detention, this might also reflect the propensity of high
capacity, highly democratic states to detain refugees for extended periods of time. This
pattern is also reflected in the prediction of cooperation with UNHCR, shown in Figure 5:
there is no difference between high and low capacity states if they are autocratic, but as

50

High GDP (ln) is set at 14, while low GDP (ln) is set at 6.
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states become more democratic, low capacity states are actually more likely to fully
cooperate with UNHCR. This might be explained in part by the greater need of lowcapacity states for the resources, personnel, and bureaucratic oversight that the UNHCR
provides. Autocratic states may be more willing to forego UNHCR aid in order to retain
complete control over the management of refugee populations within their own borders.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of a fully implemented legal system
for refugees and asylum-seekers in accordance with the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. This is the only plot that exactly matches the expectations from Hypothesis 4;
with the least democratic governments, high capacity states are less likely to implement a
full legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. However, as states become more
democratic, this difference disappears. At least in terms of the legal system for the
protection of refugee populations, regime does constrain high-capacity states from
ignoring the rights of refugees.
Contiguous civil conflict is one of the most robust predictors of abuses of the
rights of refugees and asylum-seekers; it has a significant and negative effect on every
outcome with the exception of the legal system. This speaks very strongly to the negative
reaction of governments to the refugee populations created by neighboring civil wars.
The possible presence of terrorist, rebel groups, and other dangerous populations amongst
the refugees might trigger this reaction. Notably, though unsurprisingly, contiguous civil
conflict also makes it more likely that refugee-type populations will be abused by groups
other than their host state government – while this may well include native citizens, it
likely is also shaped by rebel forces and or the security forces of the neighboring conflict
state.
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Constant cut1
Constant cut2
Observations
Clusters
Wald χ2

Population (ln)

Refugee Populationt-1 (ln)

GDPt-1 (ln)

Contiguous Civil Conflict

Civil War

Regime (Polity)

CIRI Physical Integrity Rights

Legal System (Refugees)

VARIABLES

(2)
Government
Violence

(3)
Protection
from Violence

0.0886
0.112**
0.141**
(0.0548)
(0.0571)
(0.0663)
0.0269
0.0137
-0.0477**
(0.0198)
(0.0245)
(0.0226)
0.270
-0.0259
-0.0348
(0.292)
(0.290)
(0.340)
-0.979***
-0.631***
-0.552**
(0.200)
(0.238)
(0.252)
-0.311***
-0.391***
0.103
(0.0980)
(0.107)
(0.119)
-0.0742***
-0.187***
-0.223***
(0.0273)
(0.0280)
(0.0475)
0.157
0.347**
-0.148
(0.134)
(0.149)
(0.175)
-3.754***
-3.527***
-4.856***
-3.092***
-3.244***
-4.609***
2,905
2,905
2,905
163
163
163
80.20
81.38
55.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

(1)
Refoulement

Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)

0.0857
(0.0571)
0.0697***
(0.0200)
-0.123
(0.290)
0.0555
(0.213)
-0.150
(0.101)
0.0683**
(0.0278)
0.0652
(0.151)
-0.318***
0.465***
2,905
163
28.47

(4)
Legal
System
0.617***
(0.143)
0.187**
(0.0911)
0.0717***
(0.0246)
-0.315
(0.310)
-1.166***
(0.305)
-0.371***
(0.137)
0.0186
(0.0356)
0.174
(0.177)
-4.703***
-3.221***
2,905
163
129.0

(5)
Cooperation
with UNHCR
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(6)
(7)
(8)
Refoulement Government
Protection
Violence
from Violence

(9)
Legal
System

0.0827
0.115**
0.142**
0.0741
(0.0555)
(0.575)
(0.0657)
(0.0565)
Regime (Polity)
-0.0856
0.0556
0.0058
-0.140
(0.0782)
(0.0812)
(0.0961)
(0.0990)
GDPt-1 (ln)
-0.451***
-0.341**
0.167
-0.430***
(0.145)
(0.157)
(0.177)
(0.161)
Regime * GDPt-1 (ln)
0.0102
-0.0038
-0.0048
0.0194**
(0.0072)
(0.0076)
(0.0089)
(0.0089)
Civil War
0.246
-0.0125
-0.0127
-0.180
(0.293)
(0.292)
(0.343)
(0.296)
Contiguous Civil Conflict
-0.964***
-0.638***
-0.555**
0.0805
(0.197)
(0.238)
(0.252)
(0.212)
Refugee Populationt-1 (ln)
-0.0742***
-0.187***
-0.223***
0.0669**
(0.0272)
(0.0280)
(0.0477)
(0.0278)
Population (ln)
0.155
0.347**
-0.153
0.0740
(0.135)
(0.149)
(0.180)
(0.148)
Constant cut1
-5.290***
-2.980**
-4.199***
-3.253**
Constant cut2
-4.625***
-2.697**
-3.952***
2.459
Observations
2,905
2,905
2,905
2,905
Clusters
163
163
163
163
2
Wald χ
78.73
89.73
54.64
36.41
Robust standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

CIRI Physical Integrity Rights

Legal System (Refugees)

VARIABLES

Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)

0.631***
(0.140)
0.188**
(0.0896)
0.243**
(0.110)
-0.225
(0.176)
-0.0147
(0.0092)
-0.258
(0.313)
-1.183***
(0.311)
0.0156
(0.0355)
0.173
(0.172)
-3.074**
-1.591
2,905
163
122.6

(10)
Cooperation
with UNCHR

Figure 1: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Refoulement Score=2

0

Probability of Refoulement = 2
.2
.4
.6
.8

1

Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Polity Score (Regime)
Low GDP

High GDP

Figure 2: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Protection Score = 2
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Figure 3: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Government Abuse Score = 2
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Figure 4: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Legal System Score = 2

0

.2

Probability of Law = 2
.4
.6
.8

1

Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Polity Score (Regime)
Low GDP

78

High GDP

Figure 5: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Cooperation with UNHCR Score
=2

Probability of Cooperation with UNHCR = 2
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1

Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Polity Score (Regime)
Low GDP

High GDP

Larger refuge populations are also frequently significant in predicting practices
towards refugees; this matches my expectations, and conforms to more general patterns
of human rights abuses (see Cingranelli and Richards 2010). With more refugees, there
are more opportunities for abuse; further, with more refugees there is a greater tax on the
state’s resources. The size of the refugee population is a significant and negative
predictor of refoulement, government violence, and protection from violence. However, it
has no impact on cooperation with UNHCR, and has a positive impact on the legal
system. The effect on the legal system does wash out with the inclusion of UNHCR
treaties (see Model 9). This may speak to the fact that with larger refugee populations,
states are more likely to undertake the effort of implementing fully functional legal
systems to handle refugees, rather than dealing with them in an ad-hoc manner.
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The actual (non-refugee) population of the state has very little impact on practices
overall; however, larger states are significantly better in avoiding governmental violence
against refugees and asylum-seekers. This does conform to my initial expectations,
suggesting that larger states are better prepared to handle refugee inflows and less likely
to abuse these groups.51
Discussion
The results from the empirical tests show clearly that different types of rights and
protection for refugees – each representing a different element of the pull factors in
neighboring states - do have distinct drivers. The finding that human rights practices for
citizens do typically translate into better respect for the rights of refugees that are already
within the country suggests some level of support for the notion that normative rights
matter. This suggests that states that respect human rights generally will exert a stronger
pull on potential refugees, not only because of the general lack of repression, but also
because these states are more likely to respect refugee rights.

51

In the set of models in Appendix A (Models 11-15 in Table 13) that include the sum of
UN refugee treaties signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and 1967 Protocol), UN refugee
treaty signing is a significant and positive predictor of everything with the exception of
protection from non-governmental violence. It is not clear that this is necessarily causal,
but more likely is a proxy for a general predisposition to respect the rights of refugees
and asylum-seekers. Including this does wash out some of the significance of other
variables, most notably in the model predicting the legal system (Model 9). The size of
the refugee population and the level of democracy both lose significance, leaving the UN
treaty indicator as the only significant variable in the model. Finally, the implementation
of a legal system for refugees does predict higher levels of cooperation with UNHCR,
though this is only significant at the p < 0.10 level with the inclusion of the actual treaty
signing (separate from implementation).
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However, this is tempered by the finding that wealthier states are more likely to
both practice refoulement and to violate the physical integrity rights of asylum seekers, in
terms of both arbitrary detention and violence by government agents. These effects were
generally not tempered by regime type. This does make sense given the increased
demand for asylum in richer states, and their greater capacity to keep unwanted asylum
seekers out or detained if they enter the country illegally. Even if relatively poor states
would prefer to keep refugees out, a combination of porous borders and limited
manpower and bureaucratic capacity may make it impossible for these states to
effectively restrain refugee inflows. Richer states may also be therefore be better
equipped to refuse help from the UNCHR, making it more likely that they will restrict
UNHCR access to asylum-seeker and refugee populations. Of course, this effect
disappears in autocratic states, suggesting that autocracies may be more willing to forego
UNHCR assistance across the board in order to maintain complete control over refugee
populations within their borders. Thus, while the wealth of high GDP states may exert an
independent pull on refugee inflows, their increased likelihood of refoulement and abuse
may diminish this pull, although in some cases regime type will weaken this impact.
The consistent finding that contiguous civil conflict increase incidents of
refoulement supports the arguments that the security threat presented by these refugees
drives down respect for refugees’ rights in an attempt to protect the state. This might also
provide another reason that state capacity conditions the deleterious impact of refugee
flows from neighboring civil wars; higher capacity states are more likely to restrict these
refugee flows and to systematically detain them within the country. This will once again
translate into a decreased level of pull for refugee inflows; however, this may not be
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enough to outweigh the risks and immediate dangers of remaining within the conflict
state.
Conclusion
With the new dataset on state practices towards refugees, I am able to evaluate the
drivers of refugee rights systematically through regression analysis. This allows for a
better understanding of what types of states are most likely to be good destinations for
refugees, or to exert the strongest pull. Up to this point, this type of modeling has only
been used on respect for the rights of citizens, or at best across the population of the
country as a whole. I find that capacity, regime, norms, and security concerns all have
influences on the level of respect for the rights of refugees. In turn, these factors all
influence the expected quality of life of states that neighbor civil wars, and therefore
shape both the pull from civil wars and consequently the development of these conflicts.
In the next chapters, I will use this dataset to construct a measure of the
destination quality of each state for would-be refugees and asylum seekers. Using
measures of the individual destination quality of states neighboring civil conflicts will
allow me to then generate an aggregate measure of the total exit quality from each
conflict. Using the information on refugee rights in states around civil wars therefore
allows me to test how the combination of exit quality, or pull from surrounding states,
and violence against civilians shapes refugee outflows and civil conflict dynamics. I can
thus determine whether states with high levels of violence against civilians and low exit
quality are indeed longer, bloodier conflicts; that is, I can test whether the pressurecooker conflict theory holds.
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Chapter 3: Fight or Flight? Measuring Exit Quality
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have argued that civil wars can become longer,
bloodier conflicts if civilians attempting to flee violence are unable to leave the conflict
state. This the pressure cooker at work; widespread violence and human desperation
combine to create mounting pressure, which will continually build on itself if civilians
lack reasonably safe places to which they can flee. It is the availability of refuge that
determines whether this dynamic comes into play. When civilians have nowhere to seek
sanctuary, violent civil wars can become more brutal, racking up increasing casualties not
only amongst civilians, but also on the battlefield. Trapped civilians cannot escape the
violence, so they cannot avoid being victims of it; in turn, civilians are more likely to
feed into the conflict by supporting armed actors for protection and resources, or even by
becoming combatants themselves. The availability of refuge is what determines whether
violence against civilians creates a pool of resources to feed conflict, or drains resources
to starve it.
Chapter 2 introduced a new dataset on state practices towards refugees and
evaluated the characteristics that drive states to be better or worse hosts of refugees and
asylum-seekers. The Refugee Rights data are important because they present original
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indicators of the opportunities civilians have to flee civil war. Going forward, the key
question will be whether states’ treatment of refugees actually does shape civilian flight
and broader civil war dynamics as the pressure cooker theory suggests. Toward that end,
this chapter sets out to develop a single measure of exit quality rooted in the new data
described in Chapter 2.
Exit quality should include both the quality of the treatment of refugees and the
level of general physical security in the states that neighbor civil conflicts. In this chapter,
therefore, I use established statistical methods including factor analysis (FA) and item
response theory (IRT) to create a set of unidimensional measures of the latent destination
quality of each individual state-year in the international system covering the years 19932014. Destination quality measures expected quality of life for refugees in a single
potential destination. For example, in the Syrian Civil War, a civilian contemplating
flight might consider the destination quality of Jordan specifically, or might weigh this
against the destination quality of Lebanon or Turkey. Exit quality, then, is simply the
aggregation of destination quality for all states neighboring a civil war state, and
measures how safe a potential asylum-seeker can expect to be overall if they attempt to
flee. In the Syrian case, this would comprise the full set of potential destinations
surrounding the conflict. These concepts are discussed in greater detail in the beginning
of this chapter.
As stated above, a key question is whether exit quality shapes refugee flight as the
pressure cooker theory suggests. Testing this is central to this chapter, and should reflect
on the validity of the constructed measure of exit quality. I therefore use a model of
dyadic refugee flows from civil conflict states to neighboring states to evaluate the face
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validity of the individual measures of destination quality. The next chapter examines how
exit quality influences the dynamics of civil wars, and will use aggregated measures of
overall exit quality to test this. In both this chapter and the next, the importance of human
movements and human suffering are key to whether civil wars become pressure cookers
of elevated violence, deprivation, and suffering.
The Need for Unidimensional Measures
The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state is built on the impact of variations
in exit quality in conflict zones. Specifically, it is built on the interaction of exit quality
and the level of violence directed against civilians. In civil conflicts where there is little
to no violence against civilians, civilians should have limited cause to fear for their
physical security and should thus be relatively less impacted by the conflict in general.
They will be unlikely to attempt to flee, and less likely to impact the conflict if they
cannot flee. However, in civil conflicts where there are high levels of violence against
civilians, specifically one-sided violence that civilians cannot avoid, these civilians will
be pushed to respond. If there are good options for flight – or high-quality destinations
that treat refugees well and are generally considered safe - neighboring the conflict state,
they will be more likely to flee to those neighboring states. However, where the
neighbors surrounding the conflict state are low-quality destinations – or treat refugees
poorly, and are generally considered to be unsafe - civilians are more likely to remain
within the conflict state, and to feed into the conflict itself, driving longer, bloodier civil
wars.
To test the impact of exit quality of the civil conflict requires first generating a
single, unidimensional measure of exit quality for each civil conflict that I can model
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directly. However, to get to the exit quality, I first need to general unidimensional
measures of the latent destination quality of all states that neighbor civil wars. In this
chapter, I use both existing data on general physical security protection within individual
states, and my new dataset of states’ practices towards refugees, to create unidimensional
measures of the latent continuous dimension of destination quality. This follows the
example of Treier and Jackman (2006), who use the various Polity IV indicators to
generate a measure of the latent level of democracy. Specifically, each individual
indicator is considered an observable indicator of the otherwise unobservable level of
democracy; in the same manner, I use the individual indicators from the data introduced
in Chapter 2 on Refugee Rights and the indicators from CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and the
UCDP/PRIO level of civil war to measure the underlying dimension of destination
quality.
To better conceptualize the difference between destination quality and exit
quality, consider the two hypothetical conflict states illustrated in Figure 6. On the left
panel, the landlocked conflict state A is surrounded by neighboring states B-G. On the
right panel, conflict state H has one neighbor (state I), but otherwise is surrounded by
water. Referring back to the left panel, each individual state (state B, state C, state D,
state E, state F, and state G) has its own individual destination quality. For example, state
G may welcome refugees, have generally high levels of human rights practices, and be
free from any of its own internal conflict. State G would then have very high destination
quality. State E, on the other hand, might refoule and arbitrarily detain refugees, abuse its
own citizens, and be fighting off an internal armed conflict. State E would have low
destination quality. Each of the other individual states will have their own distinct
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destination quality based on these considerations. However, to truly consider the full exit
quality of the civil conflict in State A, all of these individual destination qualities must be
aggregated. Yet, if we consider the conflict state H in the right panel, the destination
quality of its only neighbor, state I, would be equivalent to the entire exit quality for state
H, as there is nowhere else to go.
Figure 6: Hypothetical Exit Quality v. Destination Quality Scenarios

Figure 6 shows two hypothetical civil conflict states A and H (in gray). A is a landlocked
country surrounded by six neighboring states B-G, while H is a coastal country with a
single neighbor (I). The exit quality for state A is an aggregation of the destination
qualities of states B-G, while the exit quality for state H is equivalent to the destination
quality of state I.
In order to create an actual measure of destination quality that I can use for
modeling and testing, I need as condensed a measure as possible. While it would be ideal
in some ways to have just one single measure and unilaterally consider that to be the sole
measure of destination quality, this approach has some weaknesses. Most immediately,
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there are simply too many characteristics of potential destination states to meaningfully
and consistently encompass in a single measure. These might include: the treatment of
refugees and asylum-seekers, respect for the physical security rights of native citizens,
respect for civil rights, regime type, involvement in a civil or international war, wealth,
the presence of ethnic kin networks or diaspora communities, and the level of
criminal/gang activity. Measuring all of these is beyond the scope of this project, and
indeed, forcing all of these into a single measure would make the interpretation of that
measure quite difficult. Therefore, for the purposes of testing my theory, I focus on
creating measures of destination quality within each potential asylum state encompassing:
(a) the treatment of refugees/asylum-seekers, and (b) general physical security. Each of
these is useful in its own right, and modeling these separately allows for a more nuanced
understanding of the characteristics of neighboring states that can impact refugee
outflows from civil wars and in turn the development of said wars.
Methodology
To create the destination quality measures, I start with two sets of data. The first
is the data described in Chapter 2 on state practices towards refugees (or, more
succinctly, “Refugee Rights”). As discussed in the previous chapter at greater length,
these measures include refoulement, government violence against refugees, the legal
structure for granting asylum/refugee-status, cooperation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and protection of refugees and asylum-seekers from
violence by non-state actors. All of these are scored as a 0, 1, or 2, depending on the level
of respect for these practices, in which a score of 0 indicates widespread or systematic
abuse and a score of 2 indicates no credible reports of abuse.
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The second group of data that I use to create measures of destination quality uses
broader information on the level of physical security within a potential destination state.
This includes general information on the respect for the physical integrity rights of native
citizens drawn from the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights data up to 2011, and from the
updated CI-RIGHTS dataset from 2012-2014 (Cingranelli et al 2014, Cingranelli and
Filippov 2018). The measures cover extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment,
and disappearance. These are also scored 0-1-2, in which a 2 represents the highest level
of respect, and a 0 represents the lowest level of respect. To these I add a measure for the
presence of a civil conflict within the destination state, sourced from the UCDP-PRIO
conflict dataset. This is also a simple 0-1-2 measure. However, in this case, this is
measuring whether there is no conflict (0), a low-scale conflict (1), or a widespread
conflict (2). I reverse the order of the scores so that higher scores represent a safer
destination, matching the ordering of the CIRI and Refugee Rights scores.
This still leaves me with ten data points for each neighboring state in each
conflict-year, or at best, a set of five data points measuring Refugee Rights and five data
points measuring general physical security. It would be very difficult to properly evaluate
the interactive effect of destination quality and civilian-directed violence with so many
measures of destination quality with which to contend. These are also measures that are
unsurprisingly correlated, which would distort regression models that included all of
them.52 Further, considering each of these in isolation would likely obscure the effect of

52

See Table 15 in Appendix B for the full correlation matrix of these variables.
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overall treatment of refugees and overall physical security within the state, which is after
all the actual interest of the project.
I therefore turn to a set of tools used to reduce a multiple correlated data points
into single dimensions. The main tools used in the social sciences to accomplish this are
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Factor Analysis (FA), and Item Response Theory
(IRT). PCA is used to condense data with the understanding that it is creating a
unidimensional measure out of the data, rather than assuming there is an underlying,
latent dimension that drives the data and backwards engineering a measure of that
underlying dimension from the data, which is the purview of the FA and IRT strategies.
PCA also assumes there is no measurement error in the data, which may be
problematic.53 As my theory is built on an underlying dimension of exit (destination)
quality, I focus on FA and IRT, both of which grew out of Classical Test Theory. 54
Factor Analysis is frequently used to take large sets of survey responses and tease
out underlying dimensions driving patterns of responses. For example, in surveys of
student evaluations of teaching administered at the end of a college course, certain
questions may get at the underlying dimension of how accessible an instructor was, while
other questions might instead speak to the how well the instructor knew the subject. Each
of these are important measures of teaching quality, but the underlying dimensions may
well be distinct, and even run counter to one another in some cases. I use FA to explore

53

See Baglin (2014, 2).

54

I did also estimate PCA scores for robustness checks; they performed generally in the
same manner as the factor analysis and IRT scores. For more information on the PCA
estimation, see Appendix B.
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the distinctions between general physical security and the treatment of refugees/asylumseekers, and to confirm that these two underlying dimensions, while correlated, are
indeed distinct.
Item Response Theory is similar to factor analysis in that it seeks to derive a
measure of an underlying dimension (or multiple underlying dimensions).55 However,
IRT generates not only a measure of the underlying dimension(s), but also a measure of
how effectively each individual test item is at evaluating that underlying trait.56 IRT has
principally been used to evaluate the effectiveness of tests and their individual questions
(Rasch 1980, Cai et al. 2016, 298).57 For example, IRT might be used to evaluate the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to determine how well an individual question could
distinguish between a high-aptitude and low-aptitude test taker; very easy questions that
everyone could get right would not be useful in identifying individual aptitude.58 By the

55

The main difference between the IRT and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) models
are that IRT assumes a non-linear relationship between the underlying trait of interest and
the individual item responses, while CFA assumes the relationship is linear (Reise et al
1993, 557).
56

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) can also measure item difficulty and
discrimination; however, it is a simpler and more direct extension of the IRT models,
particularly within Stata 14, so I favor IRT for these measurements.
57

Obviously, IRT has grown to have much broader applications than this; for example,
Laver et al. (2003) use IRT to estimate political party ideological positions, Bonica
(2013) uses an IRT count model to estimate the ideologies of political candidates and
PACs, and Reed et al. (2008) use it to estimate state preferences based on United Nations
voting patterns. As discussed previously, Treier and Jackman (2006) use IRT to estimate
latent democracy measures.
58

In fact, not only is IRT used to evaluate the SAT, but employees of the Education
Testing Service (ETS), the company that creates and administers the SAT, have
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same logic, very difficult questions that nobody could get right would also be poor tools
for identifying aptitude levels. Aggregating points naively – giving equal weight to each
question, scoring based on the percentage answered correctly, and ignoring how
effectively the test as whole parses out the aptitude of the test-taking population – might
give a very inaccurate score. IRT therefore gives measures not only of the latent trait (e.g.
aptitude) of individual test-takers, but also gives measures of the difficulty of each
individual test item and how well it discriminates between test takers. Difficulty, then,
measures the aptitude level at which a test taker would have a 50/50 shot at getting the
correct answer to a specific question; in classical test theory, this would equate to the
proportion of test-takers who answered the question correctly (Reckase 2009, 26).
Discrimination, on the other hand, measures how well a question distinguishes between
test-takers with a different level of the latent trait. If there is little difference in the
probability of a correct answer between high and low aptitude test takers, than that
question does not discriminate well.
The ordinal IRT model that I use follows the example of Treier and Jackman
(2008), who use ordinal measures of democracy from the Polity IV dataset to create a
measure of the latent level of democracy. In my case, I am using the data points from the
Refugee Rights dataset and the human rights and general security data to measure latent
destination quality. In both cases, it is not possible to directly observe the quantity of
interest (democracy or destination quality), but it is possible to use observable indicators

contributed greatly to IRT’s development and expansion over time (Carlson and von
Davier 2013).
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of that underlying dimension to create Bayesian measures that can be assigned to each
individual country-year of interest.
I extend the strengths of these modeling strategies that have been built primarily
for evaluating surveys and tests – but have found increasingly broader applications within
political science (see e.g. Laver 2003, Treier and Jackman 2008; Reed et al. 2008; Treier
and Hillygus 2009; Bonica 2013) - to evaluate the number of dimensions in my data on
destination quality, which data points are best measuring the underlying dimension(s) of
the data, and in turn to generate a scale of the underlying dimension(s) and to score
individual countries on that scale.
Preliminary Scores of Destination Quality
After running the entirety of the data points through factor analysis, it appears that
there are likely two distinct underlying dimensions driving the data.59 However, there is
one dimension that overwhelms all of the others. Simplified factor loadings are displayed
in Table 5 below; for the full factor loadings, please refer to Table 14 in Appendix B.
The first factor – or underlying dimension – explains most of the variance in the
full dataset, with an eigenvalue of 4.07. The CIRI/CI-RIGHTS data on the physical
integrity rights of native citizens – or, more concisely, repression - and the UCDP/PRIO
measure of civil conflict load very heavily onto this factor. Protection of refugees from
non-state violence also weakly loads onto this dimension, which does make sense
because in states where general physical integrity is not well-protected, this will likely
spillover into the refugee population – particularly where civil conflicts are concerned.

59

As the data are ordinal, I use polychoric factor analysis.
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The second factor explains much less of the variance in the overall data with an
eigenvalue of 1.43, and appears to be measuring refugee rights distinctly, as none of the
CIRI/CI-RIGHTS or civil war measures have loaded onto this factor over 0.3. The law on
refugees and asylum-seekers only weakly loads onto this factor, suggesting that legal
practices are less informative with regards to refugee rights than the other data points.
Refoulement and cooperation with UNHCR load very heavily, followed by government
violence and protection from non-state violence.
Based on these initial findings, it does not seem that there is evidence for
evaluating exit quality as a unidimensional measure; despite the extremely high
eigenvalue on the first factor, it is most appropriate to consider it two-dimensional
because the second eigenvalue is still greater than one and the two factors have distinct
variables loading onto each one. After running the same data through an IRT model, it is
clear than compressing all eleven data points into a single score means that the bulk of
that score is driven by the general physical security data points (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and
UCDP/PRIO), the same scores that loaded so heavily onto the first factor.60
I therefore run a factor analysis model and an IRT model, running each set of data
(general physical integrity and refugee rights) on its own. I emerge with two sets of
destination quality scores: general security and refugee rights. Moving forward, I
evaluate the performance of each of these in turn. As the IRT scores correlate quite
closely with the factor analysis scores, I primarily use the IRT-generated scores of
destination quality.

60

See Appendix B for a full accounting of the results per test item from the IRT analysis.
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Table 5: Factor Loadings for Destination Quality Data
Factor Loadings
Item

Source

Factor 1
(General
Violence)

Law

Refugees

-

0.3808

Refugees

-

0.7773

Cooperation with UNHCR

Refugees

-

0.7353

Government Violence

Refugees

-

0.5041

Protection from non-State Violence

Refugees

0.3363

0.5041

Killing

CIRI

0.8603

-

CIRI

0.8164

-

CIRI

0.7485

-

CIRI

0.6772

-

UCDP/PRIO

0.8315

-

4.0768

1.4277

Refoulement

Disappearance
Torture
Political Prisoners
Civil War
Eigenvalue

Factor 2
(Refugee
Violence)

* N=3,535
** Factors loadings under 0.3 are omitted
The destination quality scores are the estimates of the latent destination quality
traits: refugee rights and general physical security. Summary statistics for the scores are
shown in Table 6. The estimated scores are of theta, the latent trait measure within the
IRT framework. The scale of theta – or the latent traits – ranges from about -2 to .7 (in
the case of refugee rights alone) or to 1.5 (in the case of general physical security alone).
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The lowest scores correspond to the worst practices, while the highest scores correspond
to the best practices.
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Destination Quality Theta Scores (IRT)
Destination Quality
Measures (Theta)

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Refugee Rights

3,851

-0.0018

0.7446

-2.3727

0.6828

General Physical
Security

3,851

5.16e-06

0.8854

-2.2049

1.4679

Figure 7: Scatterplot of Selected IRT Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security
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Selected IRT Examples: Refugee Rights v. General Security
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The scatterplot above shows the country labels for selected country-years’ IRT scores of
refugee rights and general security, respectively. These are snapshots of a single point in
time within the sample for each of the countries displayed; some countries will change
position over time, and many even change quadrants within the timespan covered by the
sample.
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Across the continuums of refugee rights scores and general security scores, there
are states that fall into all combinations of values. Selected countries are labeled in Figure
7, which is divided into four quadrants splitting high/low refugee rights scores, and
high/low general security scores. Uruguay, for example, has very high general security
and very high refugee rights, and would thus be a uniformly high quality destination for
any potential refugees or asylum-seekers in the area. By the same token, Sri Lanka is
very low on both refugee rights and general security, and would thus be a uniformly lowquality destination should a civil war break out in a neighboring state. However there are
plenty of countries that do not fit so neatly into a unidimensional approach; for example,
Nigeria has low general security but reasonably good respect for refugee rights.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates scores well on general security, but has poor
respect for refugee rights. All quadrants are well populated (see Figure 27 in the
Appendix for the full scatterplot). It is therefore quite clear that it is worth considering
these dimensions in isolation, as they are not even visually correlated and do seem to be
measuring distinct characteristics. Further, the data do contain examples of most
combinations of these two characteristics.
For another illustration of the destination quality scores, refer to the maps in
Figures 8 and 9. These figures are the real-world applications of the hypothetical maps in
Figure 6. Figure 8 shows the destination quality - specifically, the Refugee Rights score –
for all the neighboring states within 950 km of landlocked Zambia in 2010. Lower scores
correspond to worse destination quality; clearly, Kenya is the worst destination in terms
of how refugees are treated, while Mozambique and Namibia have the highest possible
score for Refugee Rights. This is analogous to Country A in Figure 6; by the same logic,
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the exit quality for Zambia will be the aggregation of all of these individual destination
quality scores.
Figure 8: Refugee Rights Scores around Zambia (2010)

Uganda
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Kenya
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DRC
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(-.7176511,-.5459036]
[-1.408754,-.7176511]
This map is the real-world equivalent of Country A from Figure 6. It shows the level of
respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of Zambia, a fully landlocked
country in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher levels of respect; Mozambique and
Namibia have the highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at
0.683, while Kenya has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -1.409. The
exit quality for Zambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores; for example, if
I use the mean destination quality of neighbors to measure exit quality, Zambia’s exit
quality in 2010 would be -0.283.
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Figure 9: Refugee Rights Scores around The Gambia (2010)
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This map is the real-world equivalent of Country H from Figure 6. It shows the level of
respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal
country with one country that shares its borders in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher
levels of respect; Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the
highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at 0.683, while
Senegal has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -0.594. The exit
quality for the Gambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores. If considering
only bordering countries, the exit quality of the Gambia would be equal to the destination
of quality of its own direct neighbor, Senegal. In this case, the exit quality would be
-0.594. If considering all neighboring states within 950 km, Zambia’s exit quality in 2010
would be the mean of their individual destination quality scores, equal to 0.381.
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Figure 9 shows all states within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal country with
only one state that shares a contiguous land border (Senegal). This is analogous to
Country H, on the right panel of Figure 6. If the measure of exit quality was restricted to
states that directly border the Gambia, its exit quality would be exactly equal to the
destination quality of its sole neighbor, Senegal. Even though there are numerous states
within 950 km, unlike in the case of Zambia, the Gambia has only one direct land route
for flight: into Senegal. To reach any of these other countries and take advantage of their
higher destination quality, any civilian fleeing the Gambia would have to either go
through Senegal or attempt to flee by boat. Thus, in some sense, we could consider that
the Gambia has fewer paths to flight and fewer substitutable options, while Zambia has a
full eight states sharing a land border. However, if the measure of exit quality does
include all states within 950 km equally, the Gambia’s exit quality would be the
aggregation of all of these states’ destination qualities.
Face Validity Test
The goal of this chapter is to generate measures of destination quality, which I
will then aggregate to measure exit quality for each civil war state in the next chapter.
This will be used for testing whether civil conflict dynamics respond to changes in exit
quality as the pressure cooker theory suggests. However, this response is built on the idea
that exit quality should first and foremost influence civilian flight. The pressure cooker
theory expects that, faced with violence, civilians will flee when exit quality is high but
will stay put when exit quality is low. In this section, I begin by running models of
civilian flight to evaluate the face validity of these exit quality measures. Specifically,
these models test the hypothesis that exit quality is positively related to refugee flows.
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To undertake the most direct test of the measures I have generated thus far, I use
individual state measures of destination quality to run a basic model predicting dyadic
refugee flows from civil conflict states to immediate neighbors. Based on the arguments
from the previous chapters, I would expect that generally, higher levels of destination
quality should drive higher levels of dyadic refugee inflows. Specifically, considering a
dyad of origin state and destination state, better general security and better refugee
treatment in the destination state should both increase refugee inflows. I also expect that
there should be an interactive effect between the level of violence against civilians in the
origin state and destination quality, much the same as I would expect this interactive
effect in predicting how civil wars develop. At low levels of violence against civilians,
high and low quality destinations should see the same volume of refugee inflows, both of
which should be low because there is little reason to flee. However, at high levels of
violence against civilians, high-quality destinations should see greater levels of refugee
inflows than low-quality destinations.
To test the impact of the scores directly – and to connect this with the general
theory of pressure-cooker conflict states – I interact one-sided civilian deaths with each
measure of exit quality. One-sided violence measures violence by armed actors directly
against civilians; that is, it includes violence such as massacres and summary executions,
but does not include violence that is the unintentional byproduct of battles or deaths from
malnutrition or disease resulting from conflict.61 The outcome variable - refugee flows –
is generated using UNHCR data on refugee stock and calculating the difference in the

61

The one-sided violence data are from Eck and Hultman (2007).
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refugee stock from the previous year to the current year. The vast majority of refugee
flows (68%) are at or below zero; as such, I use both an OLS regression model predicting
the natural log of refugee flows to correct for skewness and a logit model predicting the
presence of any positive refugee flows.62 The full sample includes all dyads covering
1993-2014, but I focus on refugee flows from civil war states to neighbors within 950
km.
While I would generally expect higher levels of both refugee rights and general
security to drive higher levels of refugee inflows, the findings from the previous chapter
suggest that this may be somewhat more complicated to model. That is, because
wealthier, higher capacity states – and states that host greater refugee populations – are
more likely to abuse refugee rights, it is reasonable that the states that are receiving
higher levels of refugee inflows respond with refugee abuse, resulting in lower scores.
This would create endogeneity between the outcome variable of refugee flows and the
independent variable of refugee rights. To deal with this problem, after running the
preliminary face validity models, I also run an instrumental variable regression for the
refugee rights model.
In all of these models, in accordance with general standards in the literature, I
control for wealth in both the country of asylum and the country of origin (GDP per
capita from the World Bank Database). I also control for the general level of physical
integrity rights in the origin country (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS), the level of the civil war in the

62

Refugee flows are calculated by subtracting the current year’s population from the
previous year’s population. If the current year’s population is smaller than the previous
year’s, that indicates that refugees have been returning to their home state, resulting in
negative refugee flows. This is why refugee flows can be below zero.
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origin state (UCDP/PRIO), the size of the population in the origin state (World Bank
Database), a binary measure indicating the presence of a contiguous land border, and the
minimum distance between the origin state and the asylum state (Gleditsch and Ward
2001). In each model evaluating the interactive impact of a violence against civilians and
one destination quality IRT score (General Security or Refugee Rights, respectively), I
control for the other IRT score.
The results of the logistic regressions using each of the IRT destination quality
scores are displayed in Table 7. The General Security Score predicts the presence of
positive refugee flows out of civil war states, while there is no clear effect of the Refugee
Rights Score on positive refugee flows. The out of sample predicted probabilities in
Figure 10 confirm that generally, higher levels of general physical security do predict the
presence of positive refugee flows, although the refugee rights score does not.
Figure 10: Out of Sample Predictions of Refugee Flows (ln) - General Security Score
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High destination quality neighbors (in general security) are significantly more likely
have positive refugee inflows from civil conflict states at civilian deaths up to 10,000.
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Predicting Positive Refugee Flows
VARIABLES

(1)
Refugee Rights
Score

(2)
General
Security Score

0.144***
(0.034)
0.053
(0.032)
-1.57e-07
(3.74e-06)
-1.63e-06
(4.96e-06)
-0.161***
(0.018)
-0.0005***
(0.0001)
0.453***
(0.073)
0.203***
(0.022)
-0.184***
(0.024)
-0.173***
(0.021)
0.280***
(0.058)
2.109***
(0.390)

0.133***
(0.035)
0.052
(0.032)
2.30e-07
(4.37e-06)
7.98e-07
(4.76e-06)
-0.161***
(0.018)
-0.0005***
(0.0001)
0.452***
(0.073)
0.203***
(0.022)
-0.184***
(0.024)
-0.173***
(0.021)
0.280***
(0.058)
2.109***
(0.390)

Full Score (IRT)
General Security (IRT)
Refugee Rights (IRT)
Civilian Deaths
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths
Physical Integrity (Origin)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)
Contiguous Border
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)
Population (ln) (Origin)
Level of Civil War (Origin)
Constant
Observations
Chi2

7,718
430.8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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7,718
430.7

Table 8: OLS Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln)
VARIABLES

(3)
Refugee Rights
Score

(4)
General
Security Score

0.126***
(0.0371)
-0.0275
(0.0347)
1.00e-05**
(4.32e-06)
-1.82e-05***
(5.74e-06)
-0.192***
(0.0191)
-0.00103***
(0.000103)
0.888***
(0.0806)
0.185***
(0.0238)
-0.263***
(0.0250)
-0.219***
(0.0217)
0.523***
(0.0646)
5.591***
(0.418)

0.123***
(0.0372)
-0.0333
(0.0346)
1.65e-05***
(5.08e-06)
1.29e-05**
(5.49e-06)
-0.192***
(0.0191)
-0.00103***
(0.000103)
0.887***
(0.0806)
0.186***
(0.0238)
-0.263***
(0.0250)
-0.219***
(0.0217)
0.524***
(0.0646)
5.586***
(0.418)

Full Score (IRT)
General Security (IRT)
Refugee Rights (IRT)
Civilian Deaths
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths
Physical Integrity (Origin)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)
Contiguous Border
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)
Population (ln) (Origin)
Level of Civil War (Origin)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

7,718
0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7,718
0.111

The results from the OLS regression predicting logged positive refugee flows –
shown in Table 8 - are generally consistent with the logistic regression. The one major
difference is that civilian deaths in the origin state are a positive and significant predictor
of refugee flows in the OLS regression, but is not significant in the logistic regression.
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This is likely because it is easier to see an impact on the level of refugee flows than on
the presence, as there is likely not a single threshold at which civilian deaths will impel
outwards migration. In both sets of models, the control variables perform as expected.
Better physical integrity in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater
distance between the origin and asylum state decreases refugee flows. A shared
(contiguous) border increases refugee flows, unsurprisingly. Greater wealth (GDP per
capita) in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater wealth in the asylum
state increases flows. Civil wars with greater levels of battle deaths drive out higher
numbers of refugees. The one odd result in the control variables is that the total (logged)
population of the origin state is a negative and significant predictor of refugee flows in
both sets of models. This might indicate that in larger states, there are more internal
options for flight, making refugee outflows less likely.
The performance of the general security score conforms to the standard
expectations in the refugee literature: states that respect their own citizens’ human rights
do attract higher levels of refugee inflows. However, across both the OLS and logistic
regression models, refugee rights remains stubbornly insignificant in predicting refugee
flows. This is likely due to the endogeneity of the refugee rights score and the measure of
refugee outflows; indeed, after running an exogeneity test, it is clear that these are indeed
endogenous.
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Regression
Specifically, refugee rights and refugee flows are endogenous because not only
should higher refugee rights pull in larger refugee flows, but increased refugee inflows
should also push down the level of respect for refugee rights. In short, there is a
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simultaneity problem. This is not just a theoretical issue, but was actually one of the
findings in the previous chapter testing the key drivers of changes in the treatment of
refugees. Larger refugee populations in the previous year robustly predicted more
refoulement, more government abuse of refugees, and poorer protection from nongovernmental abuse. In a way, this is almost paradoxical; better treatment of refugees
drives more refugee inflows, which in turn causes worse treatment of refugees. Thus,
without correcting for the bias introduced by the simultaneity of these variables, it is
unsurprising that refugee rights does not initially appear to be a significant predictor of
refugee flows.
To deal with this endogeneity, I therefore use an instrumental variable approach
to model this relationship. Using instrumental variable regression allows me to introduce
additional measures that should be correlated with my x variable – in this case, refugee
rights – but not with my y variable – refugee flows, except for the impact that it might
have through refugee rights (see Sovey and Greene 2011). My instrumental variable
regression includes two exogenous instruments: (1) the level of ethnic fractionalization
(from Fearon 2003) and (2) the level of women’s empowerment.63 More ethnically
diverse countries (those that are more fractionalized) should be more willing to respect
the rights of refugees, because the native population is already diverse and is less likely to
feel threatened by new refugee inflows. In particular, ethnically homogenous refugee
inflows are less likely to potentially tip a critical balance of ethnic group power within
the asylum state, which is one reason that these governments might fear and react

107

negatively to new refugee inflows, up to and including restricting entry of potential
asylum-seekers and refugees (see Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). My second exogenous
instrument is the level of women’s empowerment from the Varieties of Democracy
(2017) dataset. This is an index constructed through Bayesian factor analysis weighting
that includes women’s civil liberties, women’s civil society participation, and women’s
political participation (see Sundstrom et al. 2015).64 The reasoning for this instrument is
that a state that is likely to respect the rights of refugees is likely to also respect the rights
of other minority groups and groups that are traditionally disadvantaged. Thus, states that
respect the rights of women are more likely to also respect the rights other disadvantages
and underrepresented groups – including refugees and asylum-seekers. However, there is
no direct reason to expect that women’s empowerment in society should drive refugee
inflows.

64

This measure is based on the following information: (1) freedom of domestic
movement for women; (2) freedom from forced labor for women; (3) property rights for
women; (4) access to justice for women; (5) freedom of discussion for women; (6) civil
society organization women’s participation; (7) female journalists; (8) lower chamber
female legislators; (9) power distributed by gender (see the V-Dem Codebook: Coppedge
et al. 2017:67-69).
108

Table 9: OLS and IV Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) on Refugee Rights
VARIABLES

(5)
OLS
(No Instrument)

Women’s Empowerment

General Security (IRT)
Civilian Deaths
Physical Integrity (Origin)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)
Contiguous Border
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)
Population (ln) (Origin)
Level of Civil War (Origin)
Constant
Observations
F test of Excluded Instruments

(6b)
IV
(Second Stage)

0.375***
(0.0523)
0.136***
(0.0410)

Ethnic Fractionalization

Refugee Rights (IRT)

(6a)
IV
(First Stage)

-0.0355
(0.0346)
0.129***
(0.0371)
1.02e-05**
(4.33e-06)
5.197***
(0.781)
-0.00103***
(0.000103)
0.885***
(0.0806)
0.184***
(0.0238)
-0.263***
(0.0250)
-0.219***
(0.0217)
0.524***
(0.0646)
5.602***
(0.418)

0.275***
(0.0130)
1.48e-06
(1.48e-06)
0.0208***
(0.00649)
0.000176***
(3.50e-05)
0.0511*
(0.0272)
-0.105***
(0.00848)
0.0472***
(0.00875)
-0.105***
(0.00848)
0.0250
(0.0220)
0.833***
(0.159)

7,718
-

7,001
-

5.197***
(0.781)
-1.394***
(0.248)
-3.05e-06
(9.08e-06)
-0.313***
(0.0429)
-0.00201***
(0.000259)
0.475***
(0.172)
0.801***
(0.0987)
-0.567***
(0.0646)
0.801***
(0.0987)
0.365***
(0.135)
-0.476
(1.258)

Sargan-Hansen J Statistic
(χ2 p-value)
Standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7,001
30.62
(0.000)
0.093
(0.760)

Table 9 shows the results of a slightly simplified version of the OLS regression
predicting refugee flows (Model 5) based on refugee rights originally presented in Table
8 (Model 3). For consistency, I omit the interaction term, as the interpretation of
interaction terms in IV regression is difficult and complex. The results are generally
consistent with the model including the interaction; refugee rights are not a significant
predictor of refugee flows, while civilian deaths do increase refugee flows. Model 6a and
Model 6b show the first and second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV
regression, respectively. The second-stage model (Model 6b) is the IV equivalent to the
OLS model (Model 3). The IV regression shows that when instrumented, refugee rights
are a highly significant positive predictor of refugee inflows. This matches my initial
expectation: higher levels of refugee rights should increase refugee flows, after correcting
for endogeneity. For a visual of this relationship, Figure 11 shows the out of sample
predictions of the natural log of refugee flows across the continuum of refugee rights.
The y axis shows the natural log of refugee flows, which has compressed the number of
refugees to correct for the skewed distribution of these flows. The predictions veer below
zero at the lowest levels because the OLS model makes no assumption of an outcome
variable bounded at zero. However, if these negative predicted flows were instead
modeled as the raw number of predicted flows, rather than the natural log, they would
simply be expected to be at zero. It is then only the positive expected flows that are truly
informative (starting at an instrumented refugee rights score of about 0.5), and the
increases here are more dramatic when converted back from the natural log, as the
increases appear exponential rather than linear.
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Figure 11: Out of Sample Predictions for Instrumented Refugee Rights with 95%
Confidence Intervals

0
-5
-10

Refugee Flows (ln)

5

Predicted Refugee Flows by Refugee Rights (IV Regression)

-2

-1.5

-1
-.5
Refugee Rights Score (IRT)

0

.5

As the instrumented measure of refugee rights in a given destination state increases, the
predicted level of dyadic refugee flows from neighboring civil conflict states significantly
increases.
The next step is to evaluate the IV regression model. First and foremost, the
Hausman test rejects the null that the measure of refugee rights is actually endogenous,
supporting the use of the IV regression approach. The first-stage model shows that the
instruments are both highly significant positive predictors of refugee rights. This, in
conjunction with the F statistic of 30.62, which is well over both the traditional cutoff of
10 and the Stock-Yogo 10% maximal value critical value for weak instruments, suggests
that the excluded instruments are indeed significant predictors of refugee rights and can
serve as instruments for this variable (Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock and Yogo 2005).
The Sargan-Hansen test also fails to reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated
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with the error term; in effect, it fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid.
Overall, the IV regression is supported by diagnostic testing, and suggests that after
correcting for endogeneity, higher respect for refugee rights does drive higher refugee
inflows.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I used the data I introduced in Chapter 2 on refugee rights, as well
as data on general physical security, to create scores of destination quality in potential
asylum states neighboring civil wars. Factor analysis and Item Response Theory confirm
two distinct dimensions within the data, from which I derive two scores of exit quality to
use in subsequent modeling: the level of refugee rights and the level of general security.
Before moving to testing whether the pressure cooker theory is correct in terms of
predicting the dynamics of civil war, I first need to show that the element driving the
entire mechanism – civilian response to variation in exit quality – actually operates as I
argued in Chapter 1. In a basic set of face validity tests I predict the likelihood of positive
refugee flows and the volume of refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring states
based on the destination quality scores. The models in this chapter do provide evidence
that civilians behave as though they are both aware of the circumstances they will face if
they flee, and that they make decisions about whether and where to flee based on this
information. This not only provides support for the face validity of the measures, but also
is also evidence that the central mechanism underlying the pressure cooker theory
operates as I have argued.
The next step is to determine whether the civilian behavior shaped by exit quality
does in fact influence the dynamics of civil war. That is, do poor options for flight not
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only suppress refugee outflows, but also in turn drive pressure-cooker-like outcomes
including longer and bloodier civil wars? That is the topic of the next chapter: testing the
pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict.
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Chapter 4: Exit Quality and Civil War Duration and Intensity
Introduction
In this project, I have articulated a theory connecting civil war outcomes to
civilians’ ability to seek refuge in surrounding states. Specifically, in Chapter 1, I argue
that when there are high levels of violence against civilians, the ability to flee to a
neighboring state should shape civil war duration and severity. If there are no safe and
viable destinations nearby, violence against civilians should drive longer and bloodier
civil wars. This is the pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict. This theory suggests that
how states treat would-be refugees and asylum-seekers can directly impact how
neighboring conflicts develop. In the previous chapters, I have built measures of exit
quality; initial testing in the last chapter shows that not only do these measures have face
validity, but also the underlying mechanism of civilian response to exit quality works as
expected. In this chapter, I set out to finally test whether this mechanism actually does
impact civil conflict outcomes. That is, do neighbors that welcome refugees act as a place
to vent the pressures of civil conflict? Further, in the absence of safe, welcoming
neighbors, do the pressures of civil wars compound themselves, leading to longer,
bloodier conflicts, and ultimately to humanitarian and geopolitical disasters?

114

In order to test this theory, Chapter 2 introduced a new annual dataset measuring
how states treat refugees. Chapter 3 condensed this new data, along with existing data on
human rights and security, into two measures of destination quality for each state: general
security and refugee rights. In this chapter, I aggregate the destination quality scores of
the neighbors surrounding civil conflicts into two separate measures of exit quality from
the conflict as a whole. I then use these measures to evaluate how general security and
refugee rights surrounding a war impact civil war duration and severity across varying
levels of violence against civilians. I find support for my overall expectations: at high
levels of exit quality, high levels of violence against civilians drive longer conflicts with
higher battle deaths. However, after running a series of robustness checks, the findings
are somewhat more nuanced: generally, in conjunction with violence against civilians,
lower refugee rights surrounding the conflict create more intense and rapid conflicts,
while lower general security surrounding the conflict state drives longer conflict duration.
This suggests that in part the general security dimension is measuring the impact of
overall regional instability, while refugee rights are measuring the impact of trapping
civilians within the conflict state.
The Theory of the Pressure-Cooker Conflict State
Civil wars, which have increasingly dominated over international wars in
resources, attention, and deaths in the since the end of World War II, are not made
equal.65 Some civil wars flare briefly only to abate just as quickly, while others stretch on
for decades, eventually becoming so deeply ingrained in the local culture that it becomes
65

See Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 563) and Fearon (2003, 276-277).
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difficult to separate the two.66 Some civil wars have few casualties, with insurgents
hiding in difficult-to-reach areas and avoiding much direct confrontation with the state,
while others are far bloodier and see huge losses in battle on both sides.67 Within a single
conflict, battle deaths may skyrocket one year, only to drop down to minimal levels for
many years after. Scholars in political science have undertaken a number of high-quality
studies predicting civil war duration and severity, and have found a number of different
factors driving how conflicts develop.68 In this chapter, I aim to add an additional
explanation for the length and intensity of civil conflicts: the interaction of violence
against civilians and exit quality.
While it is not altogether new to argue that violence against civilians might
impact conflict dynamics (see Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and
Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009), it is new to argue that the opportunities to flee from this
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Examples of short-lived conflicts include the Insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, which
lasted 106 days and the 1998 internationalized internal conflict in Lesotho, which only
met the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset conflict conditions for six days. Longer
conflicts include the Colombian Civil War, which lasted over 50 years, and the civil
conflict in the Philippines, which has lasted over 45 years.
67

One example of low-intensity conflict is the Insurgency in Ogaden (in Ethiopia), which
has lasted since 1994, but has never risen above 42 battle deaths per year according to the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The Syrian Civil War was very high intensity, with
estimated annual battle deaths of 38,480 (2012), 68,503 (2013), and 54,547 (2014). For
an example of a conflict that has varying intensity over time, the Sri Lankan Civil War
flared from 17 battle deaths in 2002 up to an estimated 10,165 battle deaths in 2009.
68

These include geographic characteristics such as the conflict’s distance from the capital
(Buhaug et al. 2009) or rough terrain in the form of mountains and forested areas (Collier
and Hoeffler 2004), the relative strength of rebel groups (Cunningham et al. 2009), thirdparty interventions (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Cunningham 2010), control of
valuable natural resources (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004), and state capacity (De Rouen and
Sobek 2004), among others.
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violence will condition its impact. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, most studies that
investigate the violence against civilians as a cause of conflict outcomes - rather than as a
byproduct of conflict outcomes (e.g. Valentino et al. 2004) - are focused specifically on
counterinsurgency efforts and the distinction between indiscriminate and selective
violence (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009). The findings are
inconsistent; some find evidence that indiscriminate violence backfires, while others find
evidence that it weakens the opponent. What is missing from these studies is that
sometimes, civilians can leave, and at other times, civilians simply have nowhere viable
to go. This should shape how they respond to violence, and should in turn drive how
violence against civilians shapes civil war dynamics.
I argue that how civilians respond to violence will shape the length and intensity
of civil wars. In the presence of neighboring states that not only are generally secure for
the native population, but also respect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers that are
coded into international law, civilians should be more likely to respond to one-sided
violence by fleeing. That is, with high exit quality, increasing levels of one-sided
violence should not impact civil conflicts, or may even decrease the length and severity
of conflicts because the flight of civilians is a drain on the resources within the state.
However, if there are no viable neighbors to which to flee, either because there are no
nearby states or because those neighbors are generally not secure or abuse refugees,
increasing levels of violence against civilians should drive longer conflicts with more
battle-deaths. This is because civilians trapped in a conflict become, at minimum, cannon
fodder, and can easily be coopted into the conflict as they become a fungible resource
that can tapped by armed combatants. Feeding the pool of resources for combatants
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should extend the life of the conflict, and should also increase the number of bodies these
groups can put into battle, and thus lose in battle.
I therefore expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian fatalities
to drive civil war duration:
Hypothesis 1: At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in
civil war duration between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of
violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will last longer.
By the same logic, I expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian
fatalities to drive civil war severity, or the number of battle deaths:
Hypothesis 2: At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in
civil war severity between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of
violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will have higher levels of battle
deaths.
I evaluate two distinct dimensions of exit quality, driven by a combination of
theory and empirical outcomes from the previous chapter. The two measures are general
security and refugee rights, both of which should impact conflict duration and severity.
General security measures the overall safety of neighboring states, focusing on the
respect for human rights of native citizens and the presence of civil conflict within those
states. Refugee rights measures how safe refugees can expect to be if they attempt to flee
to a neighboring state; will the government refuse entry, throw refugees in jail, or cut the
refugee population off from access to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)? Although I would expect each of these two measures of exit quality

118

to have the same impact on conflict duration and severity, these are distinct dimensions
and it is possible that they will perform differently.
Measurement
To test the impact of exit quality on civil conflict duration and severity requires
two distinct models. The first set of models predicts civil conflict duration using a Cox
Proportional Hazards model.69 70 The second set of models predicts the natural log of
annual battle deaths, as measured in the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Allansson
et al. 2017) using OLS regression.71 In both sets of models, the main independent
variables are the measures of exit quality and violence against civilians.
There are two measures of exit quality used in turn: general security and refugee
rights. As discussed above, the general security score is built using an Item Response
Theory (IRT) estimation of the underlying level of general security based on the four
indicators of physical integrity rights in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS datasets (torture,
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance), in combination with the
UCDP/PRIO measure of the level of civil conflict (Cingranelli et al. 2014; Cingranelli
and Fillipov 2018). This creates a general security IRT score for each country/year in the

69

I use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model because it requires no assumption about the
shape of the baseline hazard for civil conflicts, which allows for a focus on testing the
causal impact of the theoretical variables without forcing a possibly inaccurate baseline
hazard parameter into the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-48).
70

Conflict duration data is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 17.2 (2017). I use the date at which the conflict reaches the minimum of 25 battle
deaths as the beginning of the conflict. The data are structured to allow for multiple
failures for conflicts that end and later reemerge.
71

This follows the standard of using OLS regression in the civil conflict severity
literature (Lacina 2006; Heger and Salehyan 2007, Lujala 2009).
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data, which should measure how safe the country is generally, but specifically for native
citizens. This can also be considered “baseline safety” – if native citizens and residents
are not safe from abuse by the government or violence from civil war, then there is no
reason that refugees should be exempted from these dangers. The refugee rights score is
also built using an IRT estimation of the underlying level of respect for the rights of
refugees, based on the five variables from the new dataset: refoulement, government
abuse, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from non-state violence, and legal rights of
refugees. This produces a score indicating how well refugees are treated in each
country/year.
This leaves two country-year level measures: refugee rights and general security.
However, to actually use these measures to predict civil conflict outcomes requires
aggregating them on the civil war/year level. Therefore, for each measure of exit quality
(general security and refugee rights), I take the mean of the respective IRT score for all
neighboring states within 950 km of the civil war state’s borders.72 I also lag these
measures one year; this is in part because of the endogeneity discussed in the previous
chapter. Specifically, if a civil conflict has high levels of violence that push civilians to
flee into neighboring states, those neighbors might respond by abusing the new influx of
refugees. This might make it appear that refugee rights were lower than they actually
were at the time that civilians responded to the violence. Using the measures of exit
quality one year prior helps to correct for this. However, there are also theoretical reasons
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I use the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) minimum distance data. I also aggregate this using
the maximum score, rather than the mean score; for discussion of these outcomes, see the
Appendix.
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to use the lagged measure. For civilians in a civil war to incorporate information about
how neighboring states treat refugees into their decision on whether or not to flee, new
information has to filter back from the neighboring states into the conflict zones. It is
reasonable to expect that it will take time for new information on abuses of refugees to
reliably make its way. Brand new information might be met with skepticism; only with
some time and consistent reporting should this information truly shape decision-making.
To properly evaluate the two measures of exit quality requires interacting these
variables with the level of violence against civilians. To measure this violence, I use the
UCDP/GED One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007, Allansson et al. 2017).
This data only considers violence that was specifically targeted against civilians and in
which civilians were clearly not combatants; it does not include secondary civilian
casualties from battle or from war-related starvation, disease, or other maladies.73 I
aggregate the One-Sided Violence Data to annual basis for each country using the best
estimate of total fatalities. I then interact this term with refugee rights and general
security, respectively. The models are broadly as follows, in which X represents a vector
of k control variables, α represents the constant, and ε represents the error term:

1. Civil Conflict Duration = β1(General Security(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) +
β3(General Security(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε

73

The One-sided violence data do not distinguish between indiscriminate and selective
violence, and are thus not directly comparable to studies on counterinsurgency built on
this distinction. However, the purpose of this study to is to evaluate the impact of
aggregate international violence against civilians on the overall duration and severity of
conflict, and for these purposes, the data are a good fit.
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2. Civil Conflict Duration = β1 (Refugee Rights(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3
(Refugee Rights(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε
3. Battle Deaths = α + β1 (General Security(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3 (General
Security(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε
4. Battle Deaths = α + β1 (Refugee Rights(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3(Refugee
Rights(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε

I include a fairly standard set of control variables in each model. Most
importantly, I control for the omitted exit quality score. That is, in the models interacting
general security and civilian deaths, I control for the level of refugee rights. By extension,
in the models interacting refugee rights and civilian deaths, I control for general security.
This allows me to hold the excluded dimension of exit quality constant, and better
evaluate the impact of the dimension of exit quality under scrutiny. I also include
measures of biased intervention by external actors, regime type, the natural log of the
total population, the natural log of GDP per capita, and the nature of the conflict –
specifically, whether the conflict is fought over control of territory or control of the
government. 74 75
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Regan (2002) and Cunningham (2010) show the impact of external interventions on
civil war duration.
75

Intervention data and the reason for the conflict (territory v. government) are drawn
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (2017). Regime type is from the Polity IV
Dataset (2017). The total population and GDP per capita are from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators Databank.
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Table 10: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration
VARIABLES
General Securityt-1 (Mean)
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean)
Civilian Deaths
General Securityt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths

(1)
General
Security

(2)
Refugee
Rights

0.0104
(0.192)
0.195
(0.159)
4.57e-05
(2.85e-05)
0.000406
(0.000379)

0.0751
(0.204)
0.190
(0.162)
-3.41e-05
(6.81e-05)

Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
Battle Deaths (ln)

-0.206***
(0.0676)
-0.120**
(0.0533)
-0.0152
(0.0742)
0.000186
(0.0129)
0.306**
(0.147)
-0.0101
(0.305)
0.101
(0.348)
0.161
(1.252)
104
152
693
72.09
-524.58

Total Population (ln)
GDP per capita (ln)
Regime
Conflict over Territory
Intervention (Government)
Intervention (Rebels)
Intervention (Both)
Civil Wars
Civil War Failures
Observations
Wald χ2(12, 12)
Log pseudo likelihood

Coefficients are reported
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.58e-05
(9.89e-05)
-0.205***
(0.0646)
-0.126**
(0.0537)
-0.00841
(0.0720)
-0.00211
(0.0129)
0.318**
(0.147)
-0.0108
(0.306)
0.0858
(0.342)
-0.0204
(1.142)
104
152
693
37.89
-526.87

Figure 12: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score
(t-1) and High Civilian Deaths
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At high levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding
general security last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding general
security.
Figure 13: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score
(t-1) and Low Civilian Deaths
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At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding
general security last the same amount of time as conflicts with high surrounding
general security.
124

Figure 14: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score
(t-1) and High Civilian Deaths
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At high levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding
refugee rights last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding refugee
rights.
Figure 15: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score
(t-1) and Low Civilian Deaths
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At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding
refugee rights last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding refugee
rights, though the difference is slightly smaller than at high levels of civilian deaths.
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Results
The results for the Cox proportional hazards models predicting conflict duration
are shown in Table 10.76 Model 1 evaluates the impact of general security interacted with
civilian deaths, while Model 2 focuses on refugee rights interacted with civilian deaths.
While it is perhaps interesting that in Model 1, neither general security nor civilian deaths
are significant alone, this is an interactive model with two continuous variables and as
such, properly evaluating this requires plotting predicted outcomes across the two
variables. For models that predict how long a given process will endure until failure –
which in this case corresponds to how long a civil war will endure until it ends – the
appropriate way to visualize impact is to plot survival curves. Survival curves represent
the probability that a process will survive across increasing time since the process began.
To evaluate my models, the survival curves predict the probability that a civil war will
continue as the time that has elapsed the beginning of the civil war increases up to 25
years.77
Figure 12 shows the predicted survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels
of violence against civilians. It is clear that conflicts with low exit scores in general
security last significantly longer than those with high exit scores in general security if
there are high levels of violence against civilians. However, if there are low levels of

76

All of the Cox Proportional Hazards models use the Efron method for handling tied
events, as this is more accurate than the Breslow method (see Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 55).
77

While the maximum length of a conflict within the sample is 65 years, 88% of conflicts
in the sample are less than 25 years long, so this is a reasonable cutoff for the out-ofsample predictions of survival.
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violence against civilians, as shown in Figure 13, civil conflicts with high and low levels
of general security in surrounding states are indistinguishable. This supports the
hypothesis that exit quality should only matter in the presence of high violence against
civilians, and that lower exit quality should drive longer civil wars.
The next model to evaluate, Model 2, interacts refugee rights and civilian deaths.
Again, the results in the table are not impressive, but are also not terribly relevant for an
interactive model with two continuous variables. The plots for Model 2 are displayed in
Figures 14 and 15. Figure 14 shows the survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels
of civilian deaths; it is clear in these projections that conflicts surrounded by neighboring
states that treat refugees poorly should have conflicts that last significantly longer than
civil wars surrounded by states that welcome refugees. In Figure 15, the gap between
high and low exit quality states has narrowed slightly, but it is still clear that, in the case
of refugee rights - low exit quality states should have longer conflicts than high exit
quality states. The gap in expected duration is still smaller with lower levels of civilian
violence, suggesting support for my initial hypothesis, though the support is not as strong
as it was in the model using general security.
The models predicting civil war severity, measured as the natural log of annual
battle deaths, are shown in Table 11. The out of sample predictions for Model 3, which
predicts battle deaths based on the interaction of general security and violence against
civilians, are in Figure 16. Here, it is clear that there is no significant difference in
severity between conflicts with high and low levels of general exit security across levels
of violence against civilians. This suggests that, at least in terms of general security, exit
quality may not influence civil conflict severity.
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Table 11: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths
VARIABLES
General Securityt-1 (Mean)
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean)
Civilian Deaths

(3)
General
Security

(4)
Refugee
Rights

-0.169
(0.140)
-0.124
(0.103)
1.07e-05***
(3.30e-06)

-0.185
(0.139)
-0.0573
(0.104)
7.08e-05***
(2.51e-05)
-9.93e-05***
(3.68e-05)

Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
General Securityt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
Total Population (ln)
GDP per capita (ln)
Conflict over Territory
Intervention (Government)
Intervention (Rebels)
Intervention (Both)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

1.66e-05
(1.90e-05)
-0.0551
(0.0352)
0.206***
(0.0450)
-0.754***
(0.119)
0.853***
(0.195)
0.626
(0.512)
0.780
(0.636)
4.859***
(0.652)

728
0.179
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.0540
(0.0351)
0.215***
(0.0449)
-0.733***
(0.118)
0.850***
(0.193)
0.386
(0.509)
0.901
(0.617)
4.754***
(0.650)
728
0.190

Figure 16: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security (t-1)
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Across all levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of
surrounding general security have no significant difference in annual battle deaths
from conflicts with high levels of surrounding general security.
Figure 17: Predicted Battle Deaths Based on Refugee Rights (t-1)
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At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding
refugee rights have no significant difference in annual battle deaths from conflicts
with high surrounding refugee rights. However, as one-sided civilian deaths increase,
conflicts with low refugee rights have higher levels of annual battle deaths.
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However, the results of Model 4, shown in Figure 17, tell a different story. In this
plot of out sample predictions, based on the interaction of refugee rights and violence
against civilians, up to 2,200 civilian deaths high and low exit quality conflicts are
indistinguishable. At 2,400 civilian deaths and above, civil conflicts with low quality
refugee rights in surrounding states do have higher predicted levels of battle deaths, and
the gap between the 95% confidence intervals on the predictions of battle deaths
increases as civilian deaths increase. This does lend support for the hypothesis, at least in
terms of refugee rights.
Discussion
The results of the models predicting civil war outcomes show evidence in support
of the theory of the pressure cooker conflict state; however, it does appear that of the two
dimensions of exit quality, general security performs better in the models predicting civil
war duration, and refugee rights performs better in the models predicting civil war length.
Additional results based on varying specifications of the aggregations of exit quality are
discussed in the Appendix; these results generally follow this pattern. Specifically, across
all specifications - based on using either the maximum or the mean IRT score of each
dimension, and measuring this score either in the current year or lagged (in the year prior)
- the general security measure’s performance consistently predicts conflict duration in
accordance with the expectations of my theory. However, only one of the four
specifications of general security is significant in predicting battle deaths. The reverse is
true when considering the refugee rights score: almost all of the specifications support the
expectations of the theory when predicting battle deaths, but only one of four predicts
refugee rights in accordance with the hypotheses. The most interesting part of this is that
130

in the three specifications of refugee rights that do not predict conflict duration in
accordance with the hypotheses, the result is robustly th oe opposite of what I originally
anticipated: at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians, conflicts surrounded by
poor refugee rights end sooner than those in neighborhoods with strong respect for
refugee rights. Appendix C is devoted to exploring this in depth.
The fact that the general security dimension and the refugee rights dimension
perform differently in predicting civil war outcomes lends further support to the approach
of considering these as two distinct dimensions. It is also worth considering why these
dimensions would perform differently. General security represents the baseline safety of
states neighboring a civil conflict. Holding refugee rights constant, lower general security
increases conflict duration if there are high levels of violence against civilians, but does
not impact conflict duration at low levels of civilian-directed violence. This is shown in
Figure 12, which plots the predicted duration of civil conflicts under conditions of high
violence against civilians. When general security is low, the conflicts are predicted to last
much longer than when general security is high. Figure 13 displays the expected duration
of civil conflicts under conditions of low violence against civilians. In this case, the
predicted duration is indistinguishable between conflicts with high and low surrounding
general security. However, variations in general security have no impact on conflict
intensity, as shown in Figure 16. One possibility is that general security is acting as a
proxy for state capacity and stability. If neighboring states are repressing their own
citizens and are fighting their own internal conflicts, it is likely that there is conflict
spillover regionally, driving longer periods of instability throughout the region. Strong
and stable neighboring states are better positioned to prevent conflict spill-over into their
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own borders, and are also less likely to feed into conflict processes. In particular, stronger
and more secure neighbors should be less likely to allow refugee camps to become rear
bases for rebels (e.g. Salehyan 2007), and should also be less likely to allow rebels to
operate within their borders generally. This should also halt the black market flow of
goods, money, and manpower into the conflict state. In this manner, more secure
neighbors can prevent the displacement resulting from civil conflicts from creating
processes that feed back into, and thereby lengthen the conflict.78
Conversely, holding general security constant, civil wars surrounded by states
with low refugee rights have higher battle deaths in the presence of high levels of
violence against civilians, but battle deaths are not impacted by violence against civilians
if there are neighbors that respect the rights of refugees. However, refugee rights do not
appear to have the anticipated impact on conflict duration. Indeed, as discussed in the
Appendix, most specifications of refugee rights perform counter to my initial
expectations: generally, low refugee rights in combination with high violence against
civilians actually drives shorter, but more intense conflicts. One possible explanation for
refugee rights impacting severity is simply that more trapped civilians will translate to
more people becoming combatants – willingly or not – and thereby drive up casualty
counts. This might either be simply because there are more people at risk of dying in
battle, but it could also be that, if human lives are abundant and other resources are
scarce, human lives become cheap and are thus expended more freely by the leaders of
armed groups. However, it also stands to reason that low refugee rights traps resources
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This would match the description of the spatial spread of conflict driven by refugee
flows in Salehyan (2006).
132

and civilians within the conflict state, and in combination with the pressure exerted by
one-sided violence, drives the conflict to flare early and to also burn out sooner. Thus, the
pressure cooker conflict should have much higher rates of battle deaths over time, but
will also cease quickly. On the other hand, if there are high levels of violence and
surrounding states allow asylum-seekers and refugees entry, they allow this pressure to
vent, so it does not build up in the same way; this leaves lower rates of battle deaths
annually, but also allows conflicts to stretch on much longer before they in eventually
either come to a head or wind down into a de facto peace.
Future Work
These models have, necessarily, been built on a number of simplifying
assumptions, creating a macro-level, highly aggregated evaluation of the hypotheses.
This is valuable as it gives a clear first cut test of how the treatment of refugees can
interact with violence against civilians to impact conflict dynamics. However, there are
certainly some assumptions that could be relaxed in future work to create more nuanced
investigations. I discuss some of the most immediate options below; this is not a
comprehensive list.
The first area that could benefit from relaxed assumptions is geography. Civil
conflicts – at least insofar as active fighting and violence against civilians are concerned are usually contained to specific geographic areas of the state. The most obvious update
to this model would be to include only geographically relevant neighboring states based
on the actual location of the conflict. Particularly in large states where the conflict is only
active in a very small area, it is quite possible that some neighboring states are too far
away to be relevant, and should thus not be included in a measure of exit quality.
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This leads to another potential confounding factor: some states will have more
viable internal displacement options than others. If a civil conflict is fought in only one
very localized area of the state and there safe areas to which to flee inside of the state
itself, this may negate the need for high-quality exit options outside of the state.
One additional element that could benefit the model is the consideration of
disaggregation of which actors are actually targeting civilians. In conjunction with the
identification of territorial control (between rebels and the state), this may generate more
nuanced expectations regarding conflict dynamics and outcomes. Since rebels are
typically the weaker side, they are more likely to benefit from the resources that the
trapped population provides; however, for this to happen, they have to actually have
access to the trapped population. If the civilian population is trapped in securely
government-held territory, and the government is markedly stronger than the rebels, this
might not make for longer conflicts. However, if the civilian population is exposed to
high levels of violence and trapped in a rebel-held area, that should extend the length of
civil conflicts.
Conclusion
In some civil conflicts, civilians can easily flee from violence into neighboring
states, where they find safety and shelter. In other conflicts, neighboring countries close
borders to asylum-seekers and refugee flows, treat asylum-seekers as criminals and throw
them into jail, or physically abuse refugees. The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict
state argues the following: if there is little to no violence against civilians, it should not
matter how neighboring states treat refugees. However, as violence against civilians
escalates, how neighboring states treat refugees becomes increasingly important. The
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measure of how safe neighboring countries are for would-be refugees is the exit quality of
a conflict. In conflicts with high exit quality, violence against civilians will drive them to
flee. In conflicts with low exit quality, there are not viable options for flight, so violence
against civilians will instead trap these civilians in a pressure-cooker: they cannot leave,
so instead they feed into the conflict itself. This should drive more intense and longer
conflicts. This is the pressure-cooker theory posited at the start of this project.
This chapter evaluates two dimensions of exit quality: general security and
refugee rights. Empirical tests find that both can drive longer conflicts in combination
with high levels of violence against civilians. However, general security is the more
robust predictor of conflict duration, and the only measure that consistently performs as
initially expected. Though refugee rights does weakly support the initial expectations for
duration, changing the specification of the measure almost uniformly results in
expectations of shorter and more intense conflicts when low refugee rights are combined
with high levels of one-sided violence against civilians. This may suggest that general
security impacts conflict contagion and instability in the region, while refugee rights
directly shape the pressure cooker conflict state, creating more intense and rapid conflicts
where exit quality is poor and combatants directly target civilians with violence.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This dissertation opened on the story of the 2014 shelling and blockade of Gaza,
and the utter destruction that civilians trapped in Gaza faced. In the summer of 2014,
under the constant bombardment of Israeli bombs and lacking any means of escape,
civilians identified Hamas as their only path forward. In 2018, the story in Gaza looks
much the same. The blockade of Gaza, put in place a decade ago after Hamas took
control, is still in place. In recent weeks, Hamas has pushed tens of thousands of
Palestinian civilians in Gaza to gather at the border and engage in violence directed at
Israeli soldiers:
...it was billed as an independent Palestinian protest campaign. But actually
Hamas, which controls Gaza, was a driving force. It called from mosque
loudspeakers, encouraging people to gather at the border. And according to the
Israeli army, there were more than 30,000 Palestinians at six different spots along
the border. Israel responded to Palestinians throwing rocks, firebombs, burning
tires. Israel fired tear gas and live fire. It was the most violence in Gaza since the
Gaza war in 2014... People in Gaza tend to call it an open-air prison. Hamas took
control of Gaza by force a decade ago. And since then, Israel and Egypt have
imposed a blockade on Gaza. That prevents most people from being able to leave.
It restricts what goods can enter Gaza. All of this is to try to pressure Hamas.79
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Estrin, Daniel. “16 Palestinians Killed, Hundreds More Wounded In Voilence Near
Gaza Border. 30 March 2018. Transcript from All Things Considered, NPR. Retrieved
from: https://www.npr.org/2018/03/30/598386478/14-palestinians-killed-hundreds-morewounded-in-violence-near-gaza-border
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However, it seems that the pressure intended for Hamas has generally landed on the
shoulders of the civilians trapped within the blockade. Rather than weakening Hamas,
this pressure has left the terrorist organization as the only path for survival and resistance
for the trapped civilian population. Returning to the terminology of this project, this has
created a pressure-cooker conflict; the pressure on the civilians has no way to vent
because of the blockade, and thus actually pushes more fuel into the conflict. It is then
perhaps unsurprising that, not only has Gaza not recovered from the conflict in 2014, but
Hamas will continue to leverage its one internal resource to sustain the fight: the trapped
civilians.
This project argues that governments’ choices to respect, or to violate,
international human rights law on refugees has real and immediate impacts on the
development of civil conflicts. The United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees
(1951) and its 1967 Protocol encode the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, and the
responsibilities of states to protect these rights. Specifically, this includes protection from
expulsion or the forcible return to the country from which they have fled, protection from
penalties for entering the country illegally seeking asylum, and access to representatives
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. These documents were written
as extensions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which articulated the most
basic rights of life, freedom from torture, and arbitrary arrest or detention, all of which
apply equally to those seeking asylum and refugee status abroad. Treatment of refugees
varies widely across time and space; some states welcome refugees openly and protect
these populations, while others gun them down as they attempt to cross the border and
jail any that do succeed in entering the state. As with most international human rights
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laws, there is functionally no direct punishment for governments that abuse the rights of
refugees and asylum-seekers. However, that does not mean these actions are without
consequences.
I argue that one important consequence of abusing the rights of refugees is in the
development of civil conflicts. Civil wars are one of the primary causes of refugee flight.
Generally, this is a reaction to the violence of the conflict; civilians realize that their lives
and well-being are threatened, and thus make the decision to seek safety across
international borders. However, if neighboring states regularly abuse refugees or simply
refuse to permit refugees to enter, civilians should be less likely to respond to violence by
fleeing. Put more succinctly, civilians will not flee to safety if there is no safety to be
found.
Civilians are a vital resource in civil wars. They can be used to extract fungible
resources such as food, supplies, funds, and manpower; they can be coopted for
intelligence; they can be recruited as armed combatants; they can be used to bring in
outside resources from the international humanitarian community; they can be used as
human shields. If civilians flee, the pool of resources available to armed actors shrinks. If
civilians are exposed to violence from the conflict – but they cannot flee – they are far
more likely to be forced to interact with armed actors, and to thus feed back into the
conflict processes in some way. This is what I call a pressure-cooker conflict state.
I therefore introduce the concept of exit quality, the measure of the expected
quality of life as a refugee or asylum-seeker. If the states surrounding a civil conflict are
welcoming to refugees and provide high levels of protection, exit quality will be high; if,
however, neighboring states refuse entry to refugees, abuse refugees, and detain them for
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years on end as criminals, exit quality will be low. In conflicts with low levels of violence
against civilians, exit quality will not matter because there will be no cause, or
willingness, to flee. Without a push to leave, the quality of opportunities for flight is
irrelevant. However, in civil conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians,
distinct patterns will emerge: if violence is high and exit quality is high, civilians will
flee. If violence is high and exit quality is low, civilians will stay put and become part of
the conflict dynamics. This will drive more resources into the conflict, resulting in more
intense civil wars. While I initially also expected this to drive longer civil wars, the
impacts on conflict duration are somewhat mixed.
I introduce an original dataset on Refugee Rights, which I combine with existing
human rights and conflict data to create two separate annual measures of neighboring exit
quality in civil wars: general security and refugee rights. General security measures the
overall level of human rights for native citizens and levels of internal conflict in
surrounding states. Refugee rights specifically measures how neighboring states treat
refugees. Empirical tests show that at high levels of violence against civilians, conflicts
with low general security in neighboring states last significantly longer than conflicts
with high general security. At low levels of violence against civilians, general security
levels have no impact on conflict length. General security has no impact on the intensity
of civil conflicts in terms of battle deaths.
Refugee rights, on the other hand, have a significant impact on conflict intensity;
at high levels of violence against civilians, civil wars surrounded by low refugee rights
have higher battle deaths than those in high refugee rights neighborhoods. The results on
duration are especially interesting; while one specification does show weak support for
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longer conflicts in states with high violence against civilians and low refugee rights, most
alternative specifications tell a distinctly different story. Conflicts with high violence
against civilians and low neighborhood refugee rights actually tend to end sooner than
those with high violence and high neighboring refugee rights. This actually lends greater
credence to the pressure-cooker conflict state terminology: trapping civilians and related
resources within a dangerous and violent conflict pushes the conflict to become more
intense, but also pushes it to burn out sooner. It is also possible that while pressurecooker civil wars end sooner, they will leave behind a legacy of violence, destruction,
and victimization that drives long-term terrorism and low-level insurgencies, particularly
considering the Chechen case study in the Chapter 1, as well as the case of Gaza that
appeared in both Chapter 1 and the start of this chapter.
This dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it introduces an
original dataset on Refugee Rights, covering the bulk of the post-Cold War period (19932014) for all states in the international system on an annual basis. I have also conducted
preliminary tests of the main causes of variation in refugee rights, which show that
overall, greater inflows of refugees and higher levels of wealth tend to drive worse
treatment of refugees. Second, I have shown that how states treat refugees is distinct from
how states treat their own citizens, and that using measures of governmental respect of
native citizens to proxy governmental respect of refugees and asylum-seekers is patently
incorrect. Third, the dissertation introduces the theoretical notion of exit quality, which
should allow for better theorizing of any civil conflict processes related to civilians (or
indeed any models of civilian migration), because the availability of exit should vary
greatly and should condition civilians’ behaviors. Finally, this project has shown that
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abuses of refugee rights – even holding general security and respect for human rights
constant – will shape conflict dynamics. Overall, it appears that abusing refugees and
asylum-seekers will keep more people trapped inside of violent conflicts, creating a
vicious cycle in which conflict intensity escalates further. However, these more intense
conflicts do also tend to end sooner. General security in neighboring states, on the other
hand, does help to contain civil conflicts and to prevent outside resources from sustaining
the fighting.
Future Research
This dissertation has focused entirely on the macro-level of conflict, and this has
been a very deliberate decision. To effectively evaluate the broad impact of states’
refugee policies on conflict requires measuring the policies at the level at which they
occur: this is national and in the available reporting, it is annual. Finding effects even at
the highest levels of aggregation should speak to the strength of these effects. However,
civil wars benefit from study and measurement at lower levels of aggregation. The study
of the impact of exit quality should be no exception. Disaggregating in terms of
geography, time, and actors could offer substantially more nuanced and specific tests of
the interaction of exit quality and violence.
Civil conflicts generally do not occur over the entire geographic space of the
conflict state. Active fighting is usually restricted to smaller areas; indeed, some of the
most nuanced notions of geography in civil conflict break down the area into zones of
control. As originally described by Kalyvas (2006), these range from those areas held
securely by the state, to areas that are in contention and have active fighting, to areas that
are held securely by rebels. If there is one-sided violence against civilians, it may be
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confined only to areas of active conflict; if there are areas that are secure and free of
active violence, it is possible that civilians will be able to move internally within the state
instead of fleeing the state altogether. Indeed, internal displacement is far more common
than seeking refugee status abroad (Norwegian Refugee Council 2017). While the
internally displaced are outside of the scope of this project, which seeks to determine the
impact of respect for – or abuse of – the rights of refugees, broadening the scope of exit
quality to include viable internal displacement options would allow for a more refined
understanding of the relationship between violence, displacement, and the role of
civilians in armed internal conflicts.
Another geographic area for disaggregation is in the measurement of exit quality
specific to outside states. Here, I have used the aggregation of all neighboring states, but
if the model is measuring violence that occurs in only one small area of the state, it would
make the most sense to focus on the exit quality of neighboring states that are proximate
to that area. Particularly in large states, a neighboring state that borders a completely
different area of the country may not actually be a relevant exit option.
Zones of control matter not only for geographic disaggregation, but also for a
more micro-level investigation of the actors in civil conflicts. In this study I have focused
on the overall threat to the lives of civilians, making no distinction between violence
committed by rebels and violence committed by agents of the state. While this
simplification was necessary at this stage, there is a rich area of study open to the impact
of exit quality, conditional on which actor is actually using one-sided violence against
civilians. This would be particularly fruitful in combination with examining which actor
has control of the territory in which civilians are threatened; if the rebels are using
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violence against civilians in government-held territory, that may have very different
implications than rebels using this tactic in their own-territory, or in contested areas.
Building on the disaggregation of geography and actors would also allow for
exploration into the impact of changes in exit quality on whether armed actors choose to
use violence against civilians in the first place. This may be the most exciting extension
of this project: to determine if changing exit quality changes the strategic behavior of
armed groups. Can closing borders around a conflict push soldiers to stop committing
abuses against civilians? Or, will it encourage further abuses? Finding answers to these
questions would have enormous implications for both the scholarly community and the
policy community.
At a time when internal conflict has increasing negative externalities, a more
finite understanding of these types of conflict dynamics is vital. As this project has
demonstrated, abuses of civilian populations have consequences that extend far beyond
national borders. Even the most seemingly helpless civilians attempting to survive the
violence of civil wars impact how conflicts develop, and how neighboring states and the
international community choose to treat these civilians has serious geopolitical impacts.
How states treat refugees and asylum-seekers may actually be one unanticipated way of
shaping violent civil conflicts, and at the very least, neighboring states should consider
this when deciding how to react when a wave of civilians fleeing conflict arrives at their
doorstep.
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Appendix A: Refugee Rights Coding Procedure and Summary Statistics
Coding Procedure from State Department Annual Report
Legal System for Asylum & Protection of Refugees
This variable is coded on policy ONLY, not practice.
0: There is no legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees.
1: There is some legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees, but it does not
conform to the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations
1967 Protocol. Safe country of origin/transit regulations will also downgrade a score of 2
to a 1.
2: There is a legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees that conforms to the
United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations 1967 Protocol.
Refoulement
0: There is widespread/systematic refoulement, including closing borders to asylum
seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a zero score if there is a description of “no
governmental protection from refoulement” in the year.
1: There are isolated incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum seekers.
Alternatively, the state will receive a one if there is a description of “some protection
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from refoulement” by the government in the year, but no indication of
systematic/widespread refoulement.
2: There are no reported incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum
seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a score of two if there is a description of the
government providing protection from refoulement, but no indication of any refoulement
incidents.

Government Abuse of Refugees/Asylum Seekers
0: The government engages in widespread/systematic violence against refugees/asylum
seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Widespread forced detention also
qualifies for a score of zero.
1: The government engages in isolated incidents of violence against refugees/asylum
seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Isolated incidents of forced
detention also qualify for a score of one.
2: There are no reports of the government engaging in any type of violence, harassment,
or forced detention of refugees/asylum seekers.
Protection from Abuse by non-Governmental Actors
0: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to widespread/systematic violence by nongovernmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors
from other states that make incursions into the country’s borders to abuse refugees.
1: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to isolated incidents of violence by nongovernmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors
from other states that make incursions into the country’s borders to abuse refugees.
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2: Refugees and/or asylum seekers are not subject to any incidents of violence by nongovernmental actors.
Cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
0: The government does not cooperate with the UNHCR in most areas, and the UNHCR
is generally restricted in carrying out its operations within the state.
1: There is some major restriction on the UNHCR’s ability to operate within the country,
but it still is able to conduct some operations.
2: The report states that there is full or general cooperation with the UNHCR and makes
no further note of any major restrictions by the government or its agents on UNHCR
operations within the country.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for 1993-2011
VARIABLES

Observations Mean Std. Deviation

Min

Max

Refoulement

3,227

1.53

0.78

0

2

Refoulement (Safe Transit)

3,227

1.44

0.84

0

2

Government Violence

3,227

1.58

0.79

0

2

Protection from Violence

3,227

1.81

0.58

0

2

Legal System - Asylum

3,227

1.25

0.88

0

2

Cooperation with UNHCR

3,227

1.87

0.42

0

2

Physical Integrity Rights (CIRI)

3,063

4.79

2.26

0

8

Regime (Polity)

3,067

13.17

6.60

0

20

Civil War

3,252

0.16

0.37

0

1

Contiguous Civil Conflict (100 km)

3,252

0.51

0.50

0

1

GDP t-1 (ln)

3,244

10.58

2.00

5.41

16.39

Refugee Populationt-1 (ln)

3,244

6.05

4.43

0

15.24

Population (ln)

3,252

9.02

1.65

5.34

14.10

Total Borders (COW)

3,252

5.92

3.47

0

22

Land Borders (COW)

3,252

3.56

2.52

0

14

Sea Borders (COW)

3,252

2.36

2.51

0

11

UNHCR 1951

3,252

0.74

0.44

0

1

UNHCR 1967

3,252

0.75

0.43

0

1

UNHCR Refugee Treaties

3,252

1.49

0.86

0

2
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(11)
(12)
(13)
Refoulement Government
Protection
Violence
from Violence

(14)
Legal
System

0.0767
0.104*
0.135**
0.0852
(0.0560)
(0.0574)
(0.0659)
(0.0610)
Regime (Polity)
0.00981
0.00168
-0.0500**
0.00945
(0.0174)
(0.0218)
(0.0231)
(0.0212)
Civil War
0.232
-0.0677
-0.0547
-0.281
(0.285)
(0.284)
(0.350)
(0.296)
Contiguous Civil Conflict
-0.984***
-0.619***
-0.537**
0.110
(0.200)
(0.239)
(0.250)
(0.200)
GDPt-1 (ln)
-0.283***
-0.364***
0.114
-0.0758
(0.101)
(0.103)
(0.121)
(0.0961)
Refugee Populationt-1 (ln)
-0.0832***
-0.191***
-0.223***
0.0412
(0.0264)
(0.0278)
(0.0458)
(0.0264)
Population (ln)
0.154
0.345**
-0.144
0.0808
(0.136)
(0.142)
(0.175)
(0.140)
UN Refugee Treaties
0.378***
0.271**
0.126
1.328***
(0.114)
(0.136)
(0.196)
(0.148)
Constant cut1
-3.263
-3.065
-4.548
1.533
Constant cut2
-2.586
-2.779
-4.300
2.544
Observations
2,905
2,905
2,905
2,905
Clusters
163
163
163
163
2
Wald χ
80.68
90.86
60.98
119.6
Robust standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

CIRI Physical Integrity Rights

Legal System (Refugees)

VARIABLES

Table 13: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)
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0.277*
(0.155)
0.170*
(0.0902)
0.0626***
(0.0212)
-0.343
(0.315)
-1.126***
(0.313)
-0.344**
(0.140)
0.0146
(0.0328)
0.133
(0.170)
0.526***
(0.164)
-4.693
-3.190
2,905
163
135.7

(15)
Cooperation
with UNCHR

Appendix B: Methodology for Creating Destination Quality Measures
Chapter 2 introduced original data on state practices towards refugees, or more
concisely, refugee rights. This included five measures, coded on a 0-1-2 scale: (1)
Refoulement, (2) Government Violence against Refugees/Asylum-Seekers, (3)
Cooperation with UNHCR, (4) Law on Refugees, and (5) Protection from Other
Violence. However, to test the theory that the destination quality of neighboring states –
aggregated to proxy the exit quality from a civil war state – has an interactive effect on
the length and severity of the civil war, I need distinct unidimensional measures.
The first step is to proxy the destination quality of each state/year in the dataset
that could potentially neighbor a civil war. To adequately capture destination quality,
however, requires considering both how the refugee/asylum-seeker population is treated
and the overall state of human rights protection within the country. To this end, I consider
not only refugee rights, but also general human rights as measured in the CIRI physical
integrity rights scores, including (1) Torture, (2) Political Imprisonment, (3) Extrajudicial
Killing, and (4) Disappearance. I also include the UCDP/PRIO measure of civil conflict
within the country to proxy broader threats to well-being from general violence.
I use three methods for reducing multiple outcome variables to unidimensional
measures: Principal Component Analysis (PCA, Factor Analysis (FA), and Item
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Response Theory (IRT). Two of these methods (PCA and FA) also allow for an
exploratory test of the number of underlying dimensions within the data. IRT generates
measures that show how well each variable discriminates between high and low
destination quality states. I produce several scores that can be, in turn, tested within the
models in the next chapter, in which I predict civil war duration and intensity.
Principal Component Analysis
The first tool that I use to evaluate the dimensionality of the data is PCA. PCA is
a primarily non-theoretical tool meant for condense collinear data into a reduced set of
variables. This is distinct from Exploratory Factor Analysis because of the lack of
theoretical reasoning. As Baglin (2014,2) describes:
Factor analysis is concerned with identifying the underlying factor structure that
explains the relationships between the observed variables. On the other hand,
PCA is used to reduce a large number of interrelated variables into a smaller set
of "components" with minimal loss of information. For example, a researcher
with multicollinearity issues in a multiple regression model might use PCA to
cluster highly related variables into a single predictor to avoid biased parameter
estimates. PCA does not attempt to explain the underlying population factor
structure of the data and makes the often, unrealistic, assumption that each
variable is measured without error. EFA, on the other hand, is based on the
common or shared variance between variables, which is partitioned from the leftover variance unique to each variable and any error introduced by measurement.
Hence, EFA is more theoretically aligned to the goals of exploring the
dimensionality of a scale proposing to measure a latent variable.
Since PCA is a non-theoretical strategy to condense variables into one component, it is a
reasonable starting strategy to determine whether it makes sense extract a single
unidimensional measure of destination quality. Initial PCA analysis suggests that while
there is one overwhelming component within the data, there are still two additional
components (the last of which is borderline at best per traditional Kaiser rules, with an
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eigenvalue of 1.14). This suggests that two dimensions are present in the data. A scree
plot of the eigenvalues is shown in Figure 18.
Factor Analysis
The next step is conducting exploratory factor analysis for three reasons: (1) to
confirm two dimensions, as shown in the PCA results; (2) to determine whether the
refugee rights scores are picking up on something different from the CIRI/civil war data –
which also justifies my initial argument for considering these separately – and (3) to test
whether using a unidimensional model could still make sense.
Figure 18: Scree Plot from PCA Results
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The scree plot from PCA shows two component dimensions that are well above the
minimum eigenvalue of one, and a third dimension that is borderline.
In the Factor Analysis models, I use a polychoric correlation matrix rather than a
Pearson correlation matrix. This is appropriate because my data are all ordinal: “Pearson
correlations assume data have been measured on, at least, an equal interval scale and a
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linear relationship exists between the variables. These assumptions are typically violated
in the case of variables measured using ordinal rating scales” (Baglin 2014, 2). Using the
Pearson correlation matrix with ordinal data in Exploratory Factor Analysis causes
spurious multidimensionality, biased factor loadings, and underestimated relationships
between ordinal variables, which is why it is generally recommended to use the
polychoric correlation matrix in EFA with ordinal data (Baglin 2014; Timmerman and
Lorenzo-Seva 2011; Olsson 1979; Bernstein and Teng 1989; Garrido et al. 2013;
Holgado–Tello et al. 2008).
Once the factor analysis is run, it is preferable to rotate the factor loadings in
order to better interpret them, and therefore to better interpret which variables are most
associated with each factor (or dimension). Either orthogonal or oblique rotation can be
used; orthogonal rotation constrains factors to be uncorrelated, facilitating the simplest
interpretation, whereas oblique rotation allows correlation, thus allowing for a more
realistic representation of the loadings. In practice, I ran both and the predicted scores are
correlated at .97 for both the first and second factors, so it doesn’t seem to matter which
method I use in this model. I therefore elect to use orthogonal rotations; the full set of the
loadings from the orthogonal and normalized rotation is shown in Table 14.
There is one factor that does seem to overwhelm the others (eigenvalue of 4.08),
though there is a second that could be worth inclusion, as it does have an eigenvalue over
1 (1.43). The remaining factors were well below 1. The first factor explains 72.6% of the
variance in the data; the second factor explains 25.4% of the variation in the data;
together they explain 98.1% of the variation.
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Based on the exploratory factor analysis, it does appear that there are two distinct
dimensions underlying the abuse of refugees’ rights and generalized violence within the
country. The first factor accounts for a much larger share of the variance, but there are
clear patterns of each of the sets of data loading onto separate factors. It is also worth
noting – here and moving forward – that the greater variation in the CIRI data (due to
more comprehensive and consistent reporting in the source material) is likely
overwhelming the refugee rights data.
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Table 14: Orthogonal Rotated Factor Loadings
Factor Loadings
Item

Source

Factor 1
(General
Violence)

Law

Refugees

0.0691

0.3808

Refugees

0.0600

0.7773

Cooperation with UNHCR

Refugees

0.2120

0.7353

Government Violence

Refugees

0.1626

0.5041

Protection from non-State Violence

Refugees

0.3363

0.5041

Killing

CIRI

0.8603

0.1239

CIRI

0.8164

0.1989

CIRI

0.7485

0.1429

CIRI

0.6772

0.2747

UCDP/PRIO

0.8315

0.1553

4.0768

1.4277

Refoulement

Disappearance
Torture
Political Prisoners
Civil War
Eigenvalue

Factor 2
(Refugee
Violence)

* N=3,535
Item Response Theory
As discussed in the chapter, IRT is similar to factor analysis but it useful because
it also allows for estimation of parameters evaluating the performance of the individual
items used to estimate the underlying dimensions. This gives information on how well the
variables distinguish between states at varying levels of refugee rights and general
security. Stata 14 does not allow for multidimensional IRT estimation, so based on the
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clear indication of two distinct dimensions at work from the factor analysis results, I run
two separate unidimensional models. The first model, general security, includes the
CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and UCDP/PRIO indicators that loaded onto the first factor. The
second model, refugee rights, includes all of the new data on the treatment of refugees, all
of which loaded onto the second factor.
All of the output from the two-parameter graded response IRT models, including
the difficulty and discrimination parameters, is shown in Tables 15 and 16. The difficulty
parameters show the theta score at which a state would have a 50% probability of scoring
at or above the level listed. For example, in Table 15, a state with a refugee rights theta
score of -1.0968 would have a 50% chance of receiving a score of 1 or higher for the
Refoulement score, while a state with a refugee rights theta score of -0.6762 would have
a 50% chance of receiving a Refoulement score of 2. The visual representations of the
difficulty scores for each parameter are shown in Figures 20 and 21, which show the Item
Characteristic Curves (ICC). The difficulty scores are the marked theta values on the xaxis, which have a corresponding probability of 0.5. The discrimination parameter for
each item is the second parameter displayed in the output in Tables 16 and 17. The
discrimination shows how effectively the item differentiates between comparable levels
of theta; in the ICC graphs in Figures 25 and 26, the discrimination is shown as the slope
on each curve. Law has a discrimination score of 0.5284, and so has a relatively flat slope
in Figure 25. At close levels of theta, the probability of reaching a given score will be
very similar, so it does not discriminate well. Refoulement, however, has a discrimination
score of 2.5409, and therefore has a very steep slope in Figure 25. Even at close levels of
theta, there are distinctly different probabilities of getting a given score.
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The item information functions (IIF) shown in Figures 21 and 22 show how much
information each item provides to estimate theta, or the latent trait – in Figure 21 this
shows how much information each constituent item gives to estimate the refugee rights
score, while in Figure 22 shows how much information each item gives to estimate the
general security score. The unimodal IIFs for the refugee rights score are likely a
reflection of how compressed the difficulty scores are for each item; the bimodal IIFs for
the general security score are a reflection of the wider spread on the difficulty scores to
reach a 1 and a 2 for each item. Refoulement by far offers the most information for
estimating refugee rights, followed by Cooperation with UNHCR, and then by
Government Abuse. Protection from Abuse offers a lower amount of information, and
Law offers almost no information. It is also worth noting the levels of theta at which
information is highest – Refoulement and Government Abuse peak at higher levels of
theta than Cooperation with UNHCR and Protection from Abuse; however, all of the
constituent items have information peaking well below theta scores of zero. On the other
hand, the general security items offer higher levels of information, and do so at levels
ranging from negative to positive values of theta. This suggests that the items making up
the general security scores generally offer better information on and distinctions between
states at different levels of the IRT general security score; this is consistent with my
previous expectations, given the much greater variation in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS scores,
driven by the better and more comprehensive reporting on repression of native
populations in the source materials.
The summed IIFs create the Test Information Function (TIF). Each TIF is plotted
in Figures 23 and 24. As shown in Figure 23, the refugee rights data provide the most
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information for states located at theta of about -1. Moving to theta scores above or below
-1, the standard error increases, and the amount of information about the underlying
dimension of refugee rights decreases. In Figure 24, the TIF shows that there is a similar
maximum information peak at -1 for the general security score; however, the overall level
of information provided across levels of theta is much higher than in the refugee rights
TIF plot.
Finally, it is possible to evaluate how the theta scores derived for each dimension
would perform if the items were instead measured in a simple additive index. The Test
Characteristic Curves in Figures 19 and 20 how varying levels of theta would match to
additive index scores. Based on the collapsing intervals on the y-axis at higher levels of
the index score (and higher levels of theta), it is clear that particularly for the refugee
rights scores, there would not be a true linear relationship between the underlying
dimension of refugee rights and the score an additive index would generate. The one-unit
interval changes at the highest (and also at the lowest) levels would be far less
meaningful than the one-unit interval changes in the mid-levels of the index score. While
this is not as strong a problem for the general security score, it is still a clear pattern,
suggesting that using IRT estimation of the underlying dimensions was a better option for
accurate measurement than adding the constituent scores into an index.
As a final method of comparing the IRT-generated theta scores of the underlying
dimensions of refugee rights and general security, refer to the scatterplot of the two
values in Figure 27. All parts of the plot are populated, suggesting that not only are these
distinct, but it should be feasible to find most of the theoretically possible combinations
of the two scores actually populated in the data. The straight vertical and horizontal lines
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in the plot approaching the maximum values of each score are reflective of the collapsing
and clustering of the scores at the highest levels, where they cannot score higher than the
maximum value and thus end up appearing roughly the same. Selected country/year
values from the full scatterplot are shown in Figure 7 within Chapter 3.
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UCDP/
PRIO

CIRI

CIRI

CIRI

CIRI

Civil War

Political
Prisoners

Torture

Disappearance

Killing

0.089

0.198

0.049

0.099

0.050

0.057

Refugees

Refugees

0.101

Government
Abuse
Protection
from Abuse

0.240

Cooperation
with UNHCR

0.192

1.000

Law

Refugees

Refoulement

Refugee Law

Refugees

Refugees

VARIABLES

SOURCE

0.096

0.183

0.126

0.103

0.111

0.222

0.389

0.384

1.000

Refoule

Table 15: Correlation Matrix of All Variables

0.105

0.218

0.083

0.198

0.134

0.125

0.221

1.000

Coop.
UNHCR

0.142

0.153

0.152

0.157

0.151

0.375

1.000

Govt
Abuse

0.188

0.133

0.187

0.188

0.242

1.000

Protect
Abuse

0.483

0.450

0.542

0.531

1.000

Kill

0.548

0.434

0.356

1.000

Disappear

0.290

0.453

1.000

Torture

0.376

1.000

Political
Prisoner

1.000

Civil
War

Table 16: IRT Graded Response Model - Refugee Rights
Law
Discrimination
Difficulty

Coefficient

Std. Error p < |z|

95% Confidence Intervals

0.5284

0.0472

0.000

0.4360

0.6208

0.1585
0.0672

0.000
0.000

-2.0804
-0.3674

-0.4590
-0.1041

2.5409

0.2254

0.000

2.0990

2.9827

-1.0968
-0.6762

0.0426
0.0308

0.000
0.000

-1.1802
-0.7366

-1.0134
-0.6158

2.0086

0.1337

0.000

1.7465

2.2706

-2.4919
-1.6886

0.0993
0.0610

0.000
0.000

-2.6865
-1.8082

-2.2973
-1.5690

1.6857

0.1164

0.000

1.4575

1.9138

-1.2294
-1.0205

0.0549
0.0472

0.000
0.000

-1.3369
-1.1130

-1.1219
-0.9281

1.2437

0.0961

0.000

1.0554

1.4321

-2.2207
-2.0577

0.1245
0.1143

0.000
0.000

-2.4648
-2.2818

-1.9767
-1.8335

(>=1) -1.7697
(=2) -0.2357
Refoulement
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Cooperation with
UNCHR
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Government Abuse
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Protection from
Violence
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Observations: 3,834
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Table 17: IRT Graded Response Model - General Security
Extrajudicial
Killing
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Disappearance
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Torture
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Political
Imprisonment
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)
Civil War
Discrimination
Difficulty
(>=1)
(=2)

Coefficient

Std. Error p < |z|

95% Confidence Intervals

3.0365

0.1339

0.000

2.7740

3.2987

-1.0013
0.0937

0.0307
0.0237

0.000
0.000

-1.0615
0.0473

-0.9441
0.1402

3.0577

0.1491

0.000

2.7656

3.3499

-1.5520
-0.8429

0.0419
0.0279

0.000
0.000

-1.6342
-0.8975

-1.4698
-0.7882

2.3977

0.1009

0.000

2.1999

2.5955

-0.1514
1.3493

0.0254
0.0396

0.000
0.000

-0.2012
1.2717

-0.1016
1.4268

1.7822

0.0699

0.000

1.6463

1.9202

-0.8731
0.1022

0.0549
0.0286

0.000
0.000

-0.9436
0.0463

-0.8025
0.1582

3.1175

0.1772

0.000

2.7701

3.4649

-2.0053
-1.1686

0.0560
0.0327

0.000
0.000

-2.1150
-1.2326

-1.8955
-1.1045

Observations: 3,851
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Figure 19: Test Characteristic Curve for Refugee Rights
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Figure 20: Test Characteristic Curve for General Security
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Figure 21: Item Information Function for Refugee Rights
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Figure 22: Item Information Functions for General Security
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Figure 23: Test Information Function for Refugee Rights
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Figure 24: Test Information Function for General Security
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Figure 25: Item Characteristic Curves for Refugee Rights
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Figure 26: Item Characteristic Curves for General Security
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Figure 27: Scatterplot of IRT Theta Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security
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Appendix C: Additional Models of Civil Conflict Duration and Intensity
The results from the various specifications of each dimension of exit quality are
summarized below. There were four variations of each dimension (refugee rights and
general security), based on the combination of taking either the maximum score of all
neighbors within 950 km of a civil conflict state, or the mean of all these scores, and
measuring this either in the current year t or the previous year t-1. Each cell indicates
whether the results support the hypotheses.
Table 18: Summary of Whether Results Support Initial Hypotheses

Refugee Rights

General Security

Duration

Battle Deaths

Duration

Battle Deaths

Mean(t)

No

Yes

Yes

No

Mean(t-1)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Maximum(t)

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Maximum(t-1)

No

No

Yes

No
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There is a fairly clear pattern that across various specifications, refugee rights best
predicts conflict intensity (in annual battle deaths), while general security best predicts
the duration of the conflict. What is perhaps more puzzling is that, while general security
ceases to have any significant effect predicting battle deaths in specifications other than
at the maximum of all neighboring states at year t-1, in the three specifications where
refugee rights predicting duration does not perform as the theory would anticipate,
refugee rights actually has the opposite effect: conflicts with higher levels of surrounding
refugee rights last longer.
Figures 28-33 rerun the models from the chapter predicting conflict duration and
intensity using the current year (t) mean, rather than the lagged (t-1) mean. As in the
original model, high civilian deaths are set at 2,000, and low civilian deaths are set at 10.
Figure 28 shows the predicted the natural log of annual battle deaths across increasing
levels of one-sided civilian deaths for high surrounding refugee rights and low
surrounding refugee rights (high exit and low exit, respectively). In this model, it is
actually much clearer that within “pressure cooker” states – those without viable exit
options and with a great deal of pressure exerted by violence against civilians – conflicts
become more intense as the pressure increases. Figure 29 again shows that general
security in surrounding states has no discernable impact on the intensity of conflicts,
regardless of the level of violence against civilians.
Figures 30 and 31 show the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels
of surrounding general security, at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians
(Figure 30) and at low levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 31).
Consistent with the models from the chapter using the lagged mean of general security
168

scores, at high levels of one-sided violence, low exit quality conflicts tend to last longer,
while high and low exit quality conflicts are indistinguishable in duration where onesided violence is low.
What is more interesting is the output in Figures 32 and 33. These figures show
the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels of refugee rights, within the
context of either high levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 32) or low
levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 33). In Figure 32, the results have
actually flipped dramatically from the original hypothesis and the results presented in the
chapter for the lagged mean of refugee rights. Here, at high levels of violence against
civilians, low exit quality in refugee rights drives much shorter conflicts. Turning to
Figure 33, the results are once again flipped; at low levels of violence against civilians,
low exit quality conflicts again last longer.
The results from Figures 32 and 33 are actually consistent with the results from
using the maximum score for refugee rights, either in the current year t or the previous
year t-1. So, in three out of four specifications, it appears that trapping civilians in
dangerously violent conditions drives conflicts that are both shorter and more intense. At
first glance – as is clear from Table 18 – this is inconsistent with my initial hypotheses
predicting longer and more violent conflicts. Instead, these are shorter and more violent
conflicts.
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Figure 28: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t)
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At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, conflicts with high and low refugee rights have
the same predicted annual battle deaths; as civilian deaths increase, low refugee rights
conflicts are increasingly more intense.
Figure 29: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security Mean Score (t)
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There is no significant difference in predicted annual battle deaths between high and low
general security conflicts across all levels of one-sided civilian deaths.
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Figure 30: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t)
and High Civilian Deaths
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Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last significantly longer than
conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided
civilian violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).
Figure 31: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t)
and Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths
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Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last the same amount of time as
conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided
violence (shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).
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Figure 32: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and
High Civilian Deaths
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Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states end significantly sooner than
conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided civilian
violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).
Figure 33: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and
Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths
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Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states last significantly longer than
conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided violence
(shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).
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However, this is the theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. A pressure
cooker works by trapping heat and steam within a closed vessel in order to raise the
temperature higher and heat the contents quicker. If civil conflict states without viable
exit options trap civilians – and thus resources – within the state, increasing pressure on
these civilians should drive more resources into the conflict quicker, creating conflicts
that flare more intensely and then also end quicker. While this was not the original
expectation of the theory, this outcome actually may make more sense; if all of the
resources are driven into the conflict earlier, it should also burn out sooner. Thus, the
naming of this theory as the “theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state” was perhaps
more apt than even I anticipated at the outset.
What is of equal importance is that, again, refugee rights and general security
perform differently. Indeed, in this example they actually are cross-cutting; holding
refugee rights constant, poorer general security in combination with high levels of
civilian violence drives longer conflicts, which makes sense as this allows for continued
resource flows into the conflict because of regional instability. On the other hand, holding
general security constant, poorer refugee rights in combination with high levels of
civilian violence drives shorter conflicts of higher intensity, because civilians – as
resources for combatants – are trapped inside the conflict. This drives conflicts that flare
and come to a head rapidly, but also burn out sooner.
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Table 19: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration
with Exit Quality Measures at Mean Score (t)
VARIABLES
General Security (Mean)
Refugee Respect (Mean)
Civilian Deaths
General Security (Mean) * Civilian Deaths

(1)
General
Security

(2)
Refugee
Rights

0.0437
(0.184)
0.156
(0.169)
9.40e-05
(6.18e-05)
0.000230
(0.000185)

0.0955
(0.185)
0.241
(0.176)
-0.0002**
(8.62e-05)

Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
Battle Deaths (ln)

-0.272***
(0.0707)
-0.0369
(0.0683)
-0.0950
(0.0887)
-0.0166
(0.0145)
0.379**
(0.187)
0.261
(0.349)
0.281
(0.441)
0.238
(1.074)
108
161
729
68.83
-603.09

Total Population (ln)
GDP per capita (ln)
Regime
Conflict over Territory
Intervention (Government)
Intervention (Rebels)
Intervention (Both)
Civil Wars
Civil War Failures
Observations
Wald χ2(12, 12)
Log pseudo likelihood

Coefficients are reported
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.0006**
(0.00028)
-0.278***
(0.0703)
-0.0462
(0.0672)
-0.0877
(0.0871)
-0.0210
(0.0147)
0.382**
(0.184)
0.245
(0.354)
0.240
(0.429)
0.217
(1.042)
108
161
729
73.46
-602.27

Table 20: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths with Exit Quality
Measures at Mean Score (t)
VARIABLES
General Security (Mean)
Refugee Respect (Mean)
Civilian Deaths

(3)
General
Security

(4)
Refugee
Rights

-0.139
(0.136)
-0.213**
(0.100)
-9.70e-06
(2.15e-05)

-0.142
(0.135)
-0.168*
(0.100)
-5.19e-05**
(2.07e-05)
-0.000213***
(7.58e-05)

Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
General Security (Mean) * Civilian Deaths
Total Population (ln)
GDP per capita (ln)
Conflict over Territory
Intervention (Government)
Intervention (Rebels)
Intervention (Both)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-3.32e-05
(5.15e-05)
-0.0578*
(0.0339)
0.203***
(0.0431)
-0.741***
(0.115)
0.874***
(0.187)
0.662
(0.492)
0.684
(0.607)
4.886***
(0.631)

765
0.175
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.0557*
(0.0338)
0.203***
(0.0431)
-0.747***
(0.114)
0.868***
(0.187)
0.771
(0.487)
0.614
(0.617)
4.858***
(0.628)
765
0.179
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